STRONG PERFORMANCE IN THE COLOMBIAN BANKING SECTOR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BOGOTA 009243 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EFIN ELAB PGOV CO SUBJECT: STRONG PERFORMANCE IN THE COLOMBIAN BANKING SECTOR ¶1. (U) SUMMARY. The Colombian banking sector appears to have finally recovered after struggling through a crisis from 1999 through 2003. Banks recorded record profits in the first semester of 2004 and the GOC continues to take steps to further strengthen the sector, such as fulfilling IMF commitments to privatize state-owned banks and strengthening regulations to meet international standards (septel). The sector seems to be evolving into a multi-banking system and competition between national private banks (with over 50% of the market) and foreign banks (with 20% of the market) is intensifying. However, only 35% of Colombians participate in the banking sector, the rate of non-performing loans is high, and the industry is heavily reliant on volatile securities. End Summary. THE SECTOR EVOLVES ¶2. (U) Some Colombian economists note that the Colombian banking sector has moved from specialization to integration of banking activities since the 1990,s banking crisis (septel),which has helped Colombia strengthen its banking sector against future crisis. The Vice President of the Association of Colombian Banks, ASOBANCARIA, recently described the Colombian system as a multibanking system (a system in which banks have the capacity to participate in a variety of banking activities, thus diversifying against risk); however, in a separate meeting the senior economist of ASOBANCARIA, Caroline Baron, said the Colombian banking system is not technically a multibanking system because individual banks cannot fully perform a variety of services. One of Colombia's central bankers who criticized the Colombian banking system for being a patchwork of distinct financial entities in 2000 and blamed much of the crisis on this patchwork of services now says it is a multibanking system de facto and that, except for insurance and long-term investment operations, the Colombian Banking system can perform any kind of financial service. In his view, this movement toward multibanking has helped stabilize the Colombian banking sector. While there seems to be some disagreement about whether the Colombian banking sector has already become a multibanking system, all experts agreed that the steps to diversify banking activities has strengthened the industry post crisis. ¶3. (U) The banking sector, as a whole, has shown record profits for the first quarter of this year, and profitability more than doubled (102 percent) in 2003. Recent reports show that banks (excluding those specializing in mortgages) earned 629 billion pesos (USD 241 million) between January and July ¶2004. Banks specializing in mortgages increase profits, as well. Mortgage banks earned 217 billion pesos (USD 83 million) between January and July 2004. In addition to increased profits, management and transparency are improving; 39.7 percent of banks (up from 17.6 percent in 2001) achieved high management rankings when measured against Superbancaria's risk ratings (evaluating capital, assets, management, profit and liquidity). Financial institution portfolios grew 7.4 percent in 2003, with the largest growth in mortgage loans (28.1 percent). February 2004 saw a non-performing loan to gross loan ratio of 9.4 percent. This is down from 11.2 percent a year earlier, but the numbers are still a concern to many bankers. STRUCTURE OF THE COMMERCIAL BANKING SECTOR ¶4. (U) Banks in Colombia, as described in the Organic Statute of the Financial System, are financial institutions, which receive deposits from the public through checking accounts, as well as time deposits, with the purpose of lending such deposits to the public. Bankers in Colombia further classify commercial banks as mortgage, foreign-owned, and national. Banks are the largest financial entities in Colombia, holding 84 percent of the value of total assets of credit establishments. ¶5. (U) From 1997 to 2000, 42 financial institutions merged in Colombia due to internal financial difficulties. Weak mortgage and commercial banks merged, with the resulting banks called commercial banks but continuing to operate as mortgage banks. Mortgage defaults contributed significantly to Colombia's financial crisis of the 90,s because they were not well diversified; accordingly, the GOC passed a law in 2001 designating all mortgage banks as commercial banks, allowing them to diversify their portfolios as an important hedge against risk. Regulators said that these previously named mortgage banks have recovered; however, the mortgage banking business, itself, has not recovered. PRIVATE SECTOR COLOMBIAN BANKS ¶6. (U) Privately owned Colombian banks did not face the dire straits that mortgage banks faced during the late nineties, thus this industry continues to see strong profits this year. Prior to the banking crisis, privately owned domestic banks held 20 percent of the system's financial assets. In 2003, privately owned domestic banks held over 60 percent of the total assets in the system. While state-owned banks and mortgage institutions assets declined in the second half of the 1990s, the assets of private sector institutions actually increased. The strong performance of these banks and the IMF's push to privatize the financial sector have been a contributing factors in the GOC's decision to sell off the remaining state banks. Privately-Owned Colombian Banks (Millions of Dollars) 2001 2002 2003 Total Assets 43,360 47,981 54,016 Gross Loans 27,215 29,160 32,011 Total Deposits 31,628 34,470 38,127 Total Equity 4,737 5,113 5,973 Net Income 332 688 1,170 ROAA 0.8% 1.5% 2.3% ROAE 7.3% 14.0% 21.1% NIM 5.1% 5.1% 5.5% Cost/Income 78.3% 69.5% 63.5% Cost/Assets 7.5% 7.2% 7.0% Equity/Assets 10.9% 10.7% 11.1% Gross Loans/ Assets 62.8% 60.8% 59.3% Investments/ Assets 23.9% 27.1% 28.0% NPL/ Gross Loans 11.1% 10.4% 7.8% LLR/NPL 65.2% 71.7% 84.5% SOURCE: Superbancaria STATE-OWNED BANKS ¶7. (U) Colombia's process of nationalization and privatization began after a banking crisis in 1982. The GOC began nationalizing many failing banks after the 1982 banking crisis; however, the GOC then began to privatize these same banks in the early nineties. This process was interrupted by the financial crisis of the late 90,s and now another wave of privatization is under way. The GOC has announced it will sell or dismantle all state-owned banks except the traditional Banco Agrario. The push for privatization comes from Asobancaria and private investors who see privatization as a way to foster a more competitive environment. ¶8. (U) In a potential setback for the government's privatization plan, the GOC failed to sell Bancafe, the nation's 3rd largest bank, in an auction in February 2004 that generated no bidders. While the failed auction could indicate limited international confidence in Colombian banks, some sector experts suggest that the GOC set too high of a price for the healthy but undercapitalized Bancafe. An official at Asobancaria speculated that Bancafe did not sell because of perceived associations with a dependence on the agricultural sector and the fact that buyers did not want to be associated with a bank that had recently received a large government bailout. Interestingly enough, just after the failed sale, the GOC announced in February 2004 that the 4 largest state-owned banks (Bancafe, Banestado, Banco Agrario, and Granahorrar) earned USD 117 million in 2003 after posting millions of dollars of losses in 2002. Carolina Baron noted that profits were realized industry-wide due to the increase in low interest checking and savings accounts. Checking accounts are &cheap8 ways to obtain funds, so banks have been able to increase deposits while keeping costs low. Public Banks (Millions of Dollars) 2001 2002 2003 Total Assets 13,158 14,556 15,584 Gross Loans 5,906 6,571 6,561 Total Deposits 8,545 9,247 9,697 Total Equity 945 1,106 1,249 Net Income 124 188 305 ROAA 0.9% 1.4% 2.0% ROAE 14.0% 18.3% 25.9% NIM 1.0% 1.6% 2.0% Cost/Income 86.1% 86.8% 72.8% Cost/Assets 7.3% 6.6% 6.4% Equity/Assets 7.2% 7.6% 8.0% Gross Loans/ Assets 44.9% 45.1% 42.1% Investments/ Assets 30.1% 35.7% 42.1% NPL/ Gross Loans 15.7% 12.9% 11.1% LLR/NPL 81.5% 84.6% 88.5% SOURCE: Superbancaria FOREIGN BANKS ¶9. (U) Foreign banks in Colombia hold a smaller share of the market than domestic private banks, and their performance has not been as impressive. Foreign banks in Colombia operate under the same regulations as private domestic banks and state owned banks. These banks are not subject to foreign regulation, and must simply comply with internal, Colombian regulations. However, foreign banks complain that they have experienced higher costs than smaller, domestic banks because, unlike smaller banks, they are obligated to comply with Colombian legislation that other banks simply disregard (such as a tax on certain deposited funds). Foreign owned banks faired well during the banking crisis, but currently the low volume of their business is increasing their unit costs due to the small scale. These banks report the weakest efficiency ratios due to the contraction in their business volumes following the crisis; however, in 2003 they were the most effective in reducing their operational expenses when compared to other types of banks. The ratio of non-performing assets to total assets is 58.3 percent below the ratio for the entire sector. Foreign Banks (Millions of Dollars) 2001 2002 2003 Total Assets 15,451 14,210 15,370 Gross Loans 8,325 8,250 8,876 Total Deposits 9,328 8,938 9,741 Total Equity 1,569 1,417 1,659 Net Income 3 -83 128 ROAA 0.0% -0.6% 0.9% ROAE 0.2% -5.5% 8.3% NIM 2.9% 3.2% 3.7% Cost/Income 93.8% 99.8% 83.2% Cost/Assets 7.8% 7.6% 7.0% Equity/Assets 10.3% 10.0% 10.8% Gross Loans/ Assets 53.9% 58.1% 57.7% Investments/ Assets 29.9% 26.1% 29.2% NPL/ Gross Loans 4.0% 3.4% 2.5% LLR/NPL 152.5% 196.6% 213.7% SOURCE: Superbancaria NEXT STEPS ¶10. (SBU) The Colombian banking sector has seen rising profits recently, but continued improvement is necessary. In a speech at a major banking conference, the Dean of the Department of Economics at The University of the Andes, Juan Carlos Echeverry, mentioned that only 35 percent of Colombians utilize the banking sector (compared to 87 percent in the US). In the beginning of the banking crisis in 1998, there was a steep drop in the numbers of savings and checking accounts. These numbers began to recover in 1999 with savings accounts now having surpassed pre-crisis levels (currently 22.9 million); however, checking accounts are still lower than pre-crisis levels (from 2.1 million in 1998 to 1.9 million in 2003). Echeverry cited two reasons for the limited rate of service penetration. First, many see the poor (59 percent of the population is beneath the poverty level) as a credit risk. Also, Colombia,s internal conflict has made it dangerous and costly for banks to open branches in rural areas. Echeverry pushed for government and industry to work together to offer better opportunities for citizens to access the nation's banking system and noted that protected interest-bearing deposits and access to credit/capital are key benefits that should be extended widely to all Colombians. ¶11. (U) Fitch Ratings and bank regulators expressed concern over the banking sector's reliance on volatile securities related revenue. Fitch also highlighted banks, need to focus on efficiency. As the next steps of regulatory reform, GOC insiders are pushing for legislation that will reduce mandatory investments, eliminate distortionary taxes, improve creditors' rights, and increase legal stability. ¶12. (U) COMMENT. Regulators said they are pleased with the current outlook for the banking sector. Non-performing loans are down (even though many have noted that they are still higher than they would like),capital levels look good, and there are no liquidity concerns. The only concern they mentioned was that banks, portfolios are highly invested in government debt. DRUCKER