COLOMBIA'S "HOMETOWN SOLDIERS" PROGRAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 009200 SIPDIS NOFORN GENEVA FOR JEFF DELAURENTIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014 TAGS: EAID MOPS PINR SNAR CO SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S "HOMETOWN SOLDIERS" PROGRAM Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Milton K. Drucker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The GOC's "Hometown Soldiers" Program has become a hallmark of President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy. The program is designed to supplement regular military units with platoons of local soldiers that perform basic security functions. A valuable outcome of the program has been greater cooperation from local residents and their more active engagement in the GOC's informants network. Hometown soldiers currently number over 21,000, and the GOC has plans to expand the program further. NGO criticisms of the program have not struck a chord with the public at large. End Summary. -------------- How The Hometown Soldier Program Works -------------- ¶2. (C) The Colombian Military's (COLMIL) "Hometown Soldiers" Program ("Soldados Campesinos") allows youth to fulfill their obligatory conscription service in their own home towns or regions. According to Government sources, hometown soldiers receive ten to twelve weeks of training. Because hometown soldiers receive only minimal instruction in offensive operations, their training lasts about two weeks less than that of regular soldiers. They are uniformed members of the military who wear military rank, are subject to the military code of justice, and earn the same salary as regular (nonprofessional) soldiers. ¶3. (C) Hometown soldiers live in rudimentary facilities or field tents donated or built by the towns in which they work. They provide protection to local government officials -- many of whom used to govern from distant, safer urban centers -- in addition to labor for various government initiated civic projects. ¶4. (C) Local commanders are responsible for recruiting and training hometown soldiers. They conduct background checks on all recruits, including hometown and regular soldiers, to screen out individuals with criminal records and potential terrorist infiltrators. At the end of their service, many hometown soldiers reenlist in the professional soldier program under four to six year contracts. Professional soldiers earn 350,000 Colombian pesos a month (about 140 USD),while hometown soldiers earn a monthly salary of only 50,000 pesos (about 20 USD). -------------- GOC Touts Program's Successes -------------- ¶5. (C) GOC officials tout the Hometown Soldiers Program as an irrefutable success. The soldiers' familiarity with the hinterland has proven to be an effective tool in finding and neutralizing members of illegal armed groups. ¶6. (C) Totaling over 21,000 in 500 municipalities, hometown soldiers guard critical infrastructure and participate in civil affairs projects. Hometown soldiers have become instrumental in executing the military's "clear and hold" strategy, serving as local stay-behind forces in conflictive areas. There are, for example, over 2,000 hometown soldiers in Cudinamarca Department who are helping secure the region in the aftermath of the COLMIL's Plan Patriota Phase IIA, which uprooted a previously strong FARC presence. In addition, hometown soldiers' confidence with local residents has increased citizen participation in the Government's informants network. -------------- - Skepticism of Civilian Involvement in Conflict -------------- - ¶7. (C) On August 31, Emboffs met with Ana Maria Diaz and Andrea Milena Bolanos of the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ),a prominent, left-leaning human rights NGO. Diaz and Bolanos criticized the Hometown Soldiers Program for allegedly increasing civilians' vulnerability to the internal armed conflict. They claimed, for example, that guerrillas retaliate against the friends and families of hometown soldiers, leading to an increase in forced displacements. They also argued that because hometown soldiers receive little or no instruction regarding anti-personnel mines, intelligence operations, and anti-kidnapping efforts, they do not have the expertise to carry out operations they are regularly asked to perform. Diaz and Bolanos had clearly done only limited research on the program's effects, however. They based their arguments on examples they had not personally researched, and in the majority of cases could not verify that the soldiers in question were hometown soldiers. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) To date there have been no credible human rights violations ascribed to hometown soldiers, and only a few hometown soldiers have been killed or wounded. Despite the fears of both NGOs and the GOC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have not launched a major offensive against hometown soldiers. So far, NGO complaints about the program, based more on conjecture than evidence, have had little resonance with the public at large. DRUCKER