COLOMBIA'S "HOMETOWN SOLDIERS" PROGRAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 009200

SIPDIS

NOFORN

GENEVA FOR JEFF DELAURENTIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014
TAGS: EAID MOPS PINR SNAR CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA'S "HOMETOWN SOLDIERS" PROGRAM

Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Milton K. Drucker for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The GOC's "Hometown Soldiers" Program has become a
hallmark of President Uribe's Democratic Security Policy.
The program is designed to supplement regular military units
with platoons of local soldiers that perform basic security
functions. A valuable outcome of the program has been
greater cooperation from local residents and their more
active engagement in the GOC's informants network. Hometown
soldiers currently number over 21,000, and the GOC has plans
to expand the program further. NGO criticisms of the program
have not struck a chord with the public at large. End
Summary.

--------------
How The Hometown Soldier Program Works
--------------


2. (C) The Colombian Military's (COLMIL) "Hometown Soldiers"
Program ("Soldados Campesinos") allows youth to fulfill their
obligatory conscription service in their own home towns or
regions. According to Government sources, hometown soldiers
receive ten to twelve weeks of training. Because hometown
soldiers receive only minimal instruction in offensive
operations, their training lasts about two weeks less than
that of regular soldiers. They are uniformed members of the
military who wear military rank, are subject to the military
code of justice, and earn the same salary as regular
(nonprofessional) soldiers.


3. (C) Hometown soldiers live in rudimentary facilities or
field tents donated or built by the towns in which they work.
They provide protection to local government officials --
many of whom used to govern from distant, safer urban centers
-- in addition to labor for various government initiated
civic projects.


4. (C) Local commanders are responsible for recruiting and
training hometown soldiers. They conduct background checks
on all recruits, including hometown and regular soldiers, to
screen out individuals with criminal records and potential
terrorist infiltrators. At the end of their service, many
hometown soldiers reenlist in the professional soldier
program under four to six year contracts. Professional
soldiers earn 350,000 Colombian pesos a month (about 140
USD),while hometown soldiers earn a monthly salary of only
50,000 pesos (about 20 USD).

--------------
GOC Touts Program's Successes
--------------


5. (C) GOC officials tout the Hometown Soldiers Program as an
irrefutable success. The soldiers' familiarity with the
hinterland has proven to be an effective tool in finding and
neutralizing members of illegal armed groups.


6. (C) Totaling over 21,000 in 500 municipalities, hometown
soldiers guard critical infrastructure and participate in
civil affairs projects. Hometown soldiers have become
instrumental in executing the military's "clear and hold"
strategy, serving as local stay-behind forces in conflictive
areas. There are, for example, over 2,000 hometown soldiers
in Cudinamarca Department who are helping secure the region
in the aftermath of the COLMIL's Plan Patriota Phase IIA,
which uprooted a previously strong FARC presence. In
addition, hometown soldiers' confidence with local residents
has increased citizen participation in the Government's
informants network.

-------------- -
Skepticism of Civilian Involvement in Conflict
-------------- -


7. (C) On August 31, Emboffs met with Ana Maria Diaz and
Andrea Milena Bolanos of the Colombian Commission of Jurists
(CCJ),a prominent, left-leaning human rights NGO. Diaz and
Bolanos criticized the Hometown Soldiers Program for
allegedly increasing civilians' vulnerability to the internal
armed conflict. They claimed, for example, that guerrillas
retaliate against the friends and families of hometown
soldiers, leading to an increase in forced displacements.
They also argued that because hometown soldiers receive
little or no instruction regarding anti-personnel mines,
intelligence operations, and anti-kidnapping efforts, they do
not have the expertise to carry out operations they are
regularly asked to perform. Diaz and Bolanos had clearly
done only limited research on the program's effects, however.
They based their arguments on examples they had not
personally researched, and in the majority of cases could not
verify that the soldiers in question were hometown soldiers.
--------------
Comment
--------------


8. (C) To date there have been no credible human rights
violations ascribed to hometown soldiers, and only a few
hometown soldiers have been killed or wounded. Despite the
fears of both NGOs and the GOC, the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) have not launched a major offensive
against hometown soldiers. So far, NGO complaints about the
program, based more on conjecture than evidence, have had
little resonance with the public at large.
DRUCKER