C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 004297

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR POLITICAL COUNSELOR JEFF DELAURENTIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SUBJECT LINE CHANGED)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014
TAGS: PTER PHUM PGOV PINR PINS SNAR ASEC CO ELN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH MOD AND PEACE
COMMISSIONER

REF: BOGOTA 04278

Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) On April 27, Ambassador spoke to Minister of Defense
Uribe and Peace Commissioner Restrepo about that day's
presidential declaration on the peace process (reftel).


2. (C) Minister Uribe said that the declaration had been
composed the day before and had been reviewed before issuance
by himself, Minister of Interior and Justice Pretelt,
Restrepo, and the military High Command. Although the
President wrote most of the declaration himself, the message
was a product of many hands. Ambassador told Restrepo that
the Embassy strongly supported the declaration.


3. (C) Regarding the opening line on paramilitary threats
against the President, Minister Uribe said they had good
information that drug trafficker/paramilitary "Don Berna" and
others were trying to organize an attempt on the President's
life. Paramilitary attacks on the President are a new
phenomenon and run counter to their rhetoric of "patriotism."



4. (C) Regarding the line that "those who wished to avoid
extradition must demonstrate to the international community
good faith and a purpose of amending their ways," Minister
Uribe said it was not meant to open the door to evasion of
extradition. Rather, the declaration was clear that
extradition was not on the negotiating table and equally
clear that it was the "international community" who must be
convinced in any case where extradition was not granted.
Extradition would remain an open possibility in all cases
and, at least for the time being, the subject was closed.


5. (C) Minster Uribe commented that the declaration should
serve to separate any paramilitaries interested in a genuine
peace process from those, increasingly dominant, who are
merely narco-terrorists trying to masquerade as political
actors to get in on the benefits. He shared the view that
Carlos Castano was dead and that the paramilitary movement
was falling increasingly into purely narco-terrorist hands.


6. (C) Restrepo said that the declaration was not an
ultimatum, in spite of the language saying "(if the
paramilitaries) do not comply, the government will continue
fighting them until they are done with." Restrepo said it
was a "clarification," which would help him at the
negotiating table, remove any doubts that his tough line was
not also that of the President, and present the
paramilitaries with a clear choice. He stressed the criteria
of a real cease-fire, concentration of forces, and movement
toward demobilization were key to progress.


7. (C) The declaration coincided, by chance, with a rally in
Cali in favor of a "humanitarian exchange" of prisoners of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) for kidnap
victims. The evening news in Colombia focused on the
declaration's statement that the FARC would not be permitted
to impose a humanitarian exchange by threat that would weaken
the Government's policy of democratic security. A parade of
family members of kidnap victims criticized the declaration.

WOOD