THAILAND: WILL THE SOUTH AFFECT THAKSIN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007952 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BLCTV, S/CT, INR E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: WILL THE SOUTH AFFECT THAKSIN'S REELECTION? REF: A. INR OPINION ANALYSIS 11/04/04 ¶B. INR OPINION ANALYSIS 11/16/04 ¶C. BANGKOK 7677 ¶D. BANGKOK 7171 Classified By: AMBASSADOR DARRYL N. JOHNSON. REASON 1.4(D) ¶1. (C) Summary/Comment: As Thailand moves towards general elections in February 2005, Post believes, along with many local political observers, that barring a dramatic attack outside the southernmost Muslim provinces, the current level of violence in the south -- and the Royal Thai Government's (RTG) handling of it -- will not affect Prime Minister Thaksin's likely reelection. First, most Thais remain either indifferent to the south or even supportive of the government's hard-line position, so Thaksin's posture will not lose him votes nationwide. Thaksin can use the success and popularity of his economic policies plus nationalistic feelings in order to rally his non-South base for victory. Second, Thaksin won handily last time without much support in the Muslim southern provinces, and failure to make hoped-for inroads into the Democrat Party (DP) electoral southern stronghold this time will not significantly harm his overall reelection chances. Post will report separately on speeches made by the King and Queen on the southern situation in recent days and their increasingly high-profile role in publicly calling for peace and unity. End Summary/Comment THE SOUTH WON'T HURT THAKSIN IN THE ELECTION ¶2. (C) To date the South does not appear to be a central issue that will significantly lessen Thaksin's electoral prospects or threaten his grip on power, despite the fact that political observers and the media generally agree that southern violence is the most high profile domestic issue. Despite daily criticism directed at Thaksin and his southern policies by some of the major Bangkok media outlets, the impression of many observers is that the majority of Thai voters will still support Thaksin when it comes time to vote in the February 2005 national elections. ¶3. (C) Academic Amat Sombun, who lives in the southern province of Pattani, told the Embassy that he believes that the current violence has not greatly affected Thaksin's overall support in Thailand, and would likely have little impact on the prospects of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party even in the south. Amat noted that in the southernmost Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, 5 incumbent MPs (all Muslim members of the "Vadha" -- which means "unity" in Arabic -- faction) will run again under the banner of TRT. He feels that TRT has a good chance of at least maintaining those seats. ¶4. (C) Thirapat Serirangsan, the Dean of the Political Science school at Sukhothai University, agreed with this analysis. He told the Embassy that while the situation in the south will prevent TRT gains at the expense of the DP in the Muslim majority provinces, TRT will win comfortably on a nationwide basis. ¶5. (C) Among the large number of Thai voters in the north and northeast regions, the problems of the south remain distant, both literally and figuratively. Much closer to home for northeastern voters are Thaksin's many populist economic measures targeted towards rural voters, such as debt restructuring for farmers, which remain extremely popular. And for many other Thais increasing prosperity, reflected by Thailand's quickly growing economy (6.8 percent in 2003 and an estimated rate of 5.5 - 6 percent this year),is the most important factor in the election. POLITICS REMAIN LOCAL ¶6. (C) Science Minister Korn Dabbaransi told Poloff on November 10 that outside of the three affected southern provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani, most Thais in the other 73 provinces were "indifferent" about the situation in that region. Korn opined that for most Thai voters, the issues of jobs, medical care and housing would supersede the very real security concerns of their counterparts in the southern provinces. ¶7. (C) Even among prominent Muslim-Thai politicians there is an understanding that events in the south are unlikely to stop Thaksin from being reelected in an overwhelming fashion. Muslim Senator Den Tomina, an opposition politician whose late father is regarded as a martyr and icon of the Pattani independence movement -- and who himself has been accused of being sympathetic to today's militant Muslim separatists -- told Poloffs that Thaksin had told him confidently and personally that the southern situation "will not impact voters in other regions." Den said he agreed with Thaksin's analysis. Den noted that for the majority of voters across Thailand, especially those in northern rural areas, Thaksin's "populist" economic policies were much more important than his southern strategy. MANY THAIS SUPPORT A TOUGH APPROACH TOWARDS THE SOUTH ¶8. (C) Thais in Bangkok often express indifference to, or even approval of tough government tactics in the south. While some are sensitive to a backlash effect from blundering by Thai authorities (such as at Kru Se Mosque and Tak Bai), many Thais actually want the government to take a harder line towards "troublemakers" in the south who have assassinated state authorities and innocent Buddhist victims. We don't have an empirical measure on how widespread these feelings really are, but anecdotal evidence suggests that many Thais are supportive of a tough policy; on the street, Bangkok Thais have been heard using derogatory terms when speaking about "ungrateful" southern Muslims; taxi drivers talk about the need for a "tough leader to take care of these problems in South;" even an MFA official, who spoke in confidence, said "the feeling even here among many of my colleagues is that if the southerners don't want to be Thais, well...screw them." ¶9. (U) Recent polling data by INR (reftels A, B) seems to support this anecdotal evidence. Sample surveys taken before the October 25 incident at Tak Bai show that the majority of urban Thais approve of the way the government is handling the situation in the south, and the way the government approaches terrorism. This data tracks with surveys conducted after the Krue Se mosque incident in late April of this year by Rajabhat Suan Dusit University where most respondents said they supported a strong policy towards the South. ¶10. (C) Prominent Muslim-Thai observers have noticed similar trends. Dr. Charan Malulim, a prominent Muslim academic and member of the official investigation commission into the October 25 Tak Bai incident, told the Embassy that he is frightened by strong negative sentiment and growing anger among Buddhist Thais towards southern Muslims. He believes that the effect of the attacks by southern militants on symbols of Thai authority has been to bring out strong nationalistic feelings among the Buddhist majority. He suggested that the tabloid media is encouraging this sentiment. ¶11. (C) While we have no hard evidence that the Prime Minister is cynically manipulating reaction to the southern situation this way, Thaksin can use this apparent growing resentment among some Thai Buddhists, which increases with each attack against symbols of Thai authority or Buddhist civilians, to play on strong Thai nationalist sentiment and rally voters around him and TRT because they look like attacks on "Thailand." This may be why he refuses to officially "apologize" for Tak Bai and the unnecessary deaths that took place when detainees were transported from there on October 25. Of concern, however, is that this refusal to apologize -- which undermines his credibility with Muslims -- plays into the hands of the ill-defined group of Muslim militant "separatists" who are bent on increasing general support among the populations of the Muslim majority provinces of the south. COMMENT: DESPITE THE SOUTH...LOOKS LIKE FOUR MORE YEARS ¶12. (C) Comment: Thaksin has faced serious criticism internationally and domestically over his handling of the violence in southern Thailand. This criticism, along with the growing public concern -- mainly that it will spread North -- about the problem, makes the south one important domestic issue with the potential to erode his general popularity. That said, it doesn't appear that the crisis has undermined Thaksin's administration sufficiently to threaten his broader dominance of Thai politics. As noted above, the general voting public, beyond the Bangkok chattering classes and media, continues to support Thaksin and his southern policy. That support, coupled with the apparent desire by many Thais for Thaksin to take a security-weighted line in the south, means that Thaksin can probably continue the government's ineffective (and, in the longer term, possibly counter-productive) policies vis-a-vis the south without serious national political consequences. ¶13. (C) The wild card factor would be a dramatic attack on a major metropolitan or tourist area before the election. In such a situation, voters could turn on Thaksin, blaming him for failing to "protect us." However, given the public's mood and Thaksin's ability to play on nationalist sentiment, the public might just as likely rally around the prime minister, and support even stronger and one-sided government countermeasures following such an attack. ¶14. (C) Few would deny that political problems stemming from the deteriorating situation in the deep South have embarrassed Thaksin's administration at a certain level: policy approaches appear ineffective and insincere; the Bangkok press and opposition Democrats highlight his failures to curb violence; and there is growing negative international attention to the situation in the South, highlighted by recoil from the handling of the events of April 28 and October 25. For most Thais, however, these factors will not be as important as popular economic programs and nationalist sentiment when it comes time to vote in the national elections. The deep South's travails will not likely derail Thaksin's reelection. End Comment JOHNSON