THAILAND: WILL THE SOUTH AFFECT THAKSIN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007952

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BLCTV, S/CT, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: WILL THE SOUTH AFFECT THAKSIN'S
REELECTION?

REF: A. INR OPINION ANALYSIS 11/04/04

B. INR OPINION ANALYSIS 11/16/04

C. BANGKOK 7677

D. BANGKOK 7171

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DARRYL N. JOHNSON. REASON 1.4(D)


1. (C) Summary/Comment: As Thailand moves towards general
elections in February 2005, Post believes, along with many
local political observers, that barring a dramatic attack
outside the southernmost Muslim provinces, the current level
of violence in the south -- and the Royal Thai Government's
(RTG) handling of it -- will not affect Prime Minister
Thaksin's likely reelection. First, most Thais remain either
indifferent to the south or even supportive of the
government's hard-line position, so Thaksin's posture will
not lose him votes nationwide. Thaksin can use the success
and popularity of his economic policies plus nationalistic
feelings in order to rally his non-South base for victory.
Second, Thaksin won handily last time without much support in
the Muslim southern provinces, and failure to make hoped-for
inroads into the Democrat Party (DP) electoral southern
stronghold this time will not significantly harm his overall
reelection chances. Post will report separately on speeches
made by the King and Queen on the southern situation in
recent days and their increasingly high-profile role in
publicly calling for peace and unity. End Summary/Comment

THE SOUTH WON'T HURT THAKSIN IN THE ELECTION


2. (C) To date the South does not appear to be a central
issue that will significantly lessen Thaksin's electoral
prospects or threaten his grip on power, despite the fact
that political observers and the media generally agree that
southern violence is the most high profile domestic issue.
Despite daily criticism directed at Thaksin and his southern
policies by some of the major Bangkok media outlets, the
impression of many observers is that the majority of Thai
voters will still support Thaksin when it comes time to vote
in the February 2005 national elections.


3. (C) Academic Amat Sombun, who lives in the southern
province of Pattani, told the Embassy that he believes that
the current violence has not greatly affected Thaksin's
overall support in Thailand, and would likely have little
impact on the prospects of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT)
party even in the south. Amat noted that in the southernmost
Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, 5
incumbent MPs (all Muslim members of the "Vadha" -- which
means "unity" in Arabic -- faction) will run again under the
banner of TRT. He feels that TRT has a good chance of at
least maintaining those seats.


4. (C) Thirapat Serirangsan, the Dean of the Political
Science school at Sukhothai University, agreed with this
analysis. He told the Embassy that while the situation in
the south will prevent TRT gains at the expense of the DP in
the Muslim majority provinces, TRT will win comfortably on a
nationwide basis.


5. (C) Among the large number of Thai voters in the north
and northeast regions, the problems of the south remain
distant, both literally and figuratively. Much closer to
home for northeastern voters are Thaksin's many populist
economic measures targeted towards rural voters, such as debt
restructuring for farmers, which remain extremely popular.
And for many other Thais increasing prosperity, reflected by
Thailand's quickly growing economy (6.8 percent in 2003 and
an estimated rate of 5.5 - 6 percent this year),is the most
important factor in the election.

POLITICS REMAIN LOCAL


6. (C) Science Minister Korn Dabbaransi told Poloff on
November 10 that outside of the three affected southern
provinces of Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani, most Thais in the
other 73 provinces were "indifferent" about the situation in
that region. Korn opined that for most Thai voters, the
issues of jobs, medical care and housing would supersede the
very real security concerns of their counterparts in the
southern provinces.


7. (C) Even among prominent Muslim-Thai politicians there
is an understanding that events in the south are unlikely to
stop Thaksin from being reelected in an overwhelming fashion.
Muslim Senator Den Tomina, an opposition politician whose
late father is regarded as a martyr and icon of the Pattani
independence movement -- and who himself has been accused of
being sympathetic to today's militant Muslim separatists --
told Poloffs that Thaksin had told him confidently and
personally that the southern situation "will not impact
voters in other regions." Den said he agreed with Thaksin's
analysis. Den noted that for the majority of voters across
Thailand, especially those in northern rural areas, Thaksin's
"populist" economic policies were much more important than
his southern strategy.

MANY THAIS SUPPORT A TOUGH APPROACH TOWARDS THE SOUTH


8. (C) Thais in Bangkok often express indifference to, or
even approval of tough government tactics in the south.
While some are sensitive to a backlash effect from blundering
by Thai authorities (such as at Kru Se Mosque and Tak Bai),
many Thais actually want the government to take a harder line
towards "troublemakers" in the south who have assassinated
state authorities and innocent Buddhist victims. We don't
have an empirical measure on how widespread these feelings
really are, but anecdotal evidence suggests that many Thais
are supportive of a tough policy; on the street, Bangkok
Thais have been heard using derogatory terms when speaking
about "ungrateful" southern Muslims; taxi drivers talk about
the need for a "tough leader to take care of these problems
in South;" even an MFA official, who spoke in confidence,
said "the feeling even here among many of my colleagues is
that if the southerners don't want to be Thais, well...screw
them."


9. (U) Recent polling data by INR (reftels A, B) seems to
support this anecdotal evidence. Sample surveys taken before
the October 25 incident at Tak Bai show that the majority of
urban Thais approve of the way the government is handling the
situation in the south, and the way the government approaches
terrorism. This data tracks with surveys conducted after the
Krue Se mosque incident in late April of this year by
Rajabhat Suan Dusit University where most respondents said
they supported a strong policy towards the South.


10. (C) Prominent Muslim-Thai observers have noticed similar
trends. Dr. Charan Malulim, a prominent Muslim academic and
member of the official investigation commission into the
October 25 Tak Bai incident, told the Embassy that he is
frightened by strong negative sentiment and growing anger
among Buddhist Thais towards southern Muslims. He believes
that the effect of the attacks by southern militants on
symbols of Thai authority has been to bring out strong
nationalistic feelings among the Buddhist majority. He
suggested that the tabloid media is encouraging this
sentiment.


11. (C) While we have no hard evidence that the Prime
Minister is cynically manipulating reaction to the southern
situation this way, Thaksin can use this apparent growing
resentment among some Thai Buddhists, which increases with
each attack against symbols of Thai authority or Buddhist
civilians, to play on strong Thai nationalist sentiment and
rally voters around him and TRT because they look like
attacks on "Thailand." This may be why he refuses to
officially "apologize" for Tak Bai and the unnecessary deaths
that took place when detainees were transported from there on
October 25. Of concern, however, is that this refusal to
apologize -- which undermines his credibility with Muslims --
plays into the hands of the ill-defined group of Muslim
militant "separatists" who are bent on increasing general
support among the populations of the Muslim majority
provinces of the south.

COMMENT: DESPITE THE SOUTH...LOOKS LIKE FOUR MORE YEARS


12. (C) Comment: Thaksin has faced serious criticism
internationally and domestically over his handling of the
violence in southern Thailand. This criticism, along with
the growing public concern -- mainly that it will spread
North -- about the problem, makes the south one important
domestic issue with the potential to erode his general
popularity. That said, it doesn't appear that the crisis has
undermined Thaksin's administration sufficiently to threaten
his broader dominance of Thai politics. As noted above, the
general voting public, beyond the Bangkok chattering classes
and media, continues to support Thaksin and his southern
policy. That support, coupled with the apparent desire by
many Thais for Thaksin to take a security-weighted line in
the south, means that Thaksin can probably continue the
government's ineffective (and, in the longer term, possibly
counter-productive) policies vis-a-vis the south without
serious national political consequences.


13. (C) The wild card factor would be a dramatic attack on
a major metropolitan or tourist area before the election. In
such a situation, voters could turn on Thaksin, blaming him
for failing to "protect us." However, given the public's
mood and Thaksin's ability to play on nationalist sentiment,
the public might just as likely rally around the prime
minister, and support even stronger and one-sided government
countermeasures following such an attack.

14. (C) Few would deny that political problems stemming
from the deteriorating situation in the deep South have
embarrassed Thaksin's administration at a certain level:
policy approaches appear ineffective and insincere; the
Bangkok press and opposition Democrats highlight his failures
to curb violence; and there is growing negative international
attention to the situation in the South, highlighted by
recoil from the handling of the events of April 28 and
October 25. For most Thais, however, these factors will not
be as important as popular economic programs and nationalist
sentiment when it comes time to vote in the national
elections. The deep South's travails will not likely derail
Thaksin's reelection. End Comment
JOHNSON