Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BAGHDAD697
2004-08-27 16:34:00
SECRET
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
LOCAL OFFICIALS SHARE VIEWS ON AL-SADR'S FUTURE
how-toO 271634Z AUG 04 FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1030 INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE MNF-I C2X BAGHDAD IZ USMISSION USUN NEW YORK USMISSION USNATO
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000697
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2024
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PINS IZ
SUBJECT: LOCAL OFFICIALS SHARE VIEWS ON AL-SADR'S FUTURE
CLASSIFIED BY DRC MATTHEW GOSHKO FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000697
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2024
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PINS IZ
SUBJECT: LOCAL OFFICIALS SHARE VIEWS ON AL-SADR'S FUTURE
CLASSIFIED BY DRC MATTHEW GOSHKO FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Najaf's Governor, the Provincial Council
Chair and the Governor's aide all believe Grand Ayatollah
al-SISTANI's intervention in the Najaf crisis has left al-
Sadr significantly weakened politically. They further feel
that the agreement al-Sadr signed has strengthened the
Iraqi Government's ability to move against al-Sadr if the
Mahdi Militia takes up arms once again. Council Chair
Shayk Fayed Kazem al-Shamri also shared an interesting
analysis of the political make up of the Jaysh al-Mahdi
movement and the role that certain Iranian interests may
play in supporting it. END SUMMARY.
--------------
AL-SADR AND THE JAM'S POLITICAL FUTURE
--------------
2. (S) Provincial Council Chair Shayk Fa'ad said the recent
developments would finish al-Sadr politically and most
likely lead to a further splintering of the Jaysh al-Mahdi
movement. According to Fa'ad, the Jaysh Al-Mahdi is split
into three camps: moderates, led by clerics such as Ali
Sismesom, extremists, led by the likes of Qais al-Khza'ali,
and a third group led by ex-Mukhabarat officers from the
former regime. While moderates within the movement would
probably try and join the Dawa party (NOTE: Fa'ad is a Dawa
member. END NOTE),Dawa is unlikely to accept them because
the group as a whole is tainted by the extremists and ex-
regime members. Fa'ad also noted that it traditionally
takes years of affiliation, often as much as ten, before an
individual will be accepted into Dawa's full membership,
let alone leadership. The reasons for this are historical
and ideological. Dawa withheld full admission for long
periods of time as a defense against infiltration from
Saddam's security and intelligence services. These long
waiting periods have led to an organization that is
politically homogenous. The Dawa leadership is unlikely to
accept vocal and active new members whose ideas may differ
from those of the established leadership. Fa'ad speculated
that some elements of the Jaysh al-Mahdi might be absorbed
into the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI).
3. (S) While it is not uncommon for a Najafi Dawa party
member to label all things evil as being somehow influenced
by SCIRI, Fa'ad actually elaborated on his reasoning.
Fa'ad explained that when SCIRI first rose to prominence
after liberation, there was a schism in the party, and
within its Badr Corps, over how closely the party should
remain aligned to Iran. Prominent clerics like Mohammed
Bakir al-Hakim sought to maintain a healthy distance from
Iran. Other members, including Badr Corps commanders such
as Mahdi Muhandis, wanted to have closer ties with Iran.
Fa'ad alleged that individuals like Muhandis had made early
overtures to the Jaysh al-Mahdi movement and may now look
to absorb these erstwhile allies, and by extension the
resources of their Iranian backers, into SCIRI.
--------------
MONOLITHIC IRANIAN AGENDA A MYTH?
--------------
4. (S) The Jasyh al-Mahdi, Fa'ad said, receive Iranian
support. But, he stressed, there are actually three groups
in Iran that act with different agendas. These groups are
the Revolutionary Guards, the Iranian Intelligence Service,
and President Khatami's administration. These three
groups, Fa'ad said, are all afraid of each other and are
constantly jockeying for advantage. This maneuvering
includes backing different players in Iraq, with the Jaysh
al-Mahdi receiving support from the Revolutionary Guards.
--------------
WHO FORCED SISTANI'S HAND?
--------------
5. (S) Fa'ad seemed as surprised as everyone that SISTANI
had made the sudden, unannounced return to Najaf. Fa'ad
agrees with the conventional wisdom that SISTANI is by
nature a politically timid man who will not take action
unless forced to do so. He noted that none of the
proposals outlined by SISTANI in Basra on August 26 and
agreed to by al-Sadr was new, having been spelled out by
various players over the last several months. Fa'ad told
us he had personally visited four times with SISTANI's son,
beginning on April 7, to request that SISTANI announce
these proposals with an aim towards disbanding and
disarming the al-Mahdi Militia. Fa'ad was very curious to
know what, or specifically who, had prompted SISTANI to
move so suddenly.
--------------
TALAL BILAL:
--------------
6. (S) Talal Bilal, the Governor's aide and close friend,
shared Fa'ad's assessment that al-Sadr is finished
politically. Talal, who was present at the discussion
site, said that al-Sadr arrived at the meeting, held in a
house owned by a Hawza member, accompanied by a single aide
who served as bodyguard and driver. When asked if al-Sadr
would take up arms again, Talal pointed to a copy of the
signed agreement between al-Sadr and SISTANI. Talal said
that if al-Sadr does violate the agreement, he would be
pitting himself against the entire Shia world, which, Talal
intimated, would react strongly to the transgression.
Governor Zurufi shares Talal's assessment that al-Sadr is
finished politically. The Governor also agrees that if al-
Sadr violates the points of the proposal that the
government will be on much firmer ground to move against
him.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
7. (S) All three men agree that al-Sadr is finished
politically. They also believe his ability to cause
trouble with his militia has been severely undercut.
Embassy, however, advises caution in accepting their second
premise. Al-Sadr does not enjoy being without influence.
His political marginalization may actually increase the
chance he will once again stir up trouble with his militia.
Embassy notes that al-Sadr has escaped with his skin twice.
Much will hinge on whether Prime Minister Allawi carries
out his intent to have the legal action against al-Sadr
continue. Furthermore, Embassy does not see evidence that
the al-Mahdi Militia will be easily or completely disarmed.
Reports as of August 27, including visual confirmation by
predator drone, reveal that the al-Mahdi Militia are
sneaking weapons from the shrine area. Finally, it can not
be said conclusively that those fighters who make up the
majority of the Jasyh al-Mahdi's base, mostly unemployed
and uneducated young men, will feel constrained by
SISTANI's opinion.
8. (S) That said, al-Sadr is now deprived of his primary
trump card--the holy mosques with their religious
significance and "citadel" character that made it difficult
to use coalition forces to expel the al-Mahdi militia. He
has suffered grievous losses among some of his better
fighting units and was clearly maneuvered into a difficult
position by the impromptu alliance of secular Shi'a PM
Allawi and religious Shi'a leader SISTANI. If the
agreement holds this will have significance throughout
Shi'a Iraq and beyond. END COMMENT.
NNNN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/27/2024
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS PINS IZ
SUBJECT: LOCAL OFFICIALS SHARE VIEWS ON AL-SADR'S FUTURE
CLASSIFIED BY DRC MATTHEW GOSHKO FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)
1. (S) SUMMARY: Najaf's Governor, the Provincial Council
Chair and the Governor's aide all believe Grand Ayatollah
al-SISTANI's intervention in the Najaf crisis has left al-
Sadr significantly weakened politically. They further feel
that the agreement al-Sadr signed has strengthened the
Iraqi Government's ability to move against al-Sadr if the
Mahdi Militia takes up arms once again. Council Chair
Shayk Fayed Kazem al-Shamri also shared an interesting
analysis of the political make up of the Jaysh al-Mahdi
movement and the role that certain Iranian interests may
play in supporting it. END SUMMARY.
--------------
AL-SADR AND THE JAM'S POLITICAL FUTURE
--------------
2. (S) Provincial Council Chair Shayk Fa'ad said the recent
developments would finish al-Sadr politically and most
likely lead to a further splintering of the Jaysh al-Mahdi
movement. According to Fa'ad, the Jaysh Al-Mahdi is split
into three camps: moderates, led by clerics such as Ali
Sismesom, extremists, led by the likes of Qais al-Khza'ali,
and a third group led by ex-Mukhabarat officers from the
former regime. While moderates within the movement would
probably try and join the Dawa party (NOTE: Fa'ad is a Dawa
member. END NOTE),Dawa is unlikely to accept them because
the group as a whole is tainted by the extremists and ex-
regime members. Fa'ad also noted that it traditionally
takes years of affiliation, often as much as ten, before an
individual will be accepted into Dawa's full membership,
let alone leadership. The reasons for this are historical
and ideological. Dawa withheld full admission for long
periods of time as a defense against infiltration from
Saddam's security and intelligence services. These long
waiting periods have led to an organization that is
politically homogenous. The Dawa leadership is unlikely to
accept vocal and active new members whose ideas may differ
from those of the established leadership. Fa'ad speculated
that some elements of the Jaysh al-Mahdi might be absorbed
into the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI).
3. (S) While it is not uncommon for a Najafi Dawa party
member to label all things evil as being somehow influenced
by SCIRI, Fa'ad actually elaborated on his reasoning.
Fa'ad explained that when SCIRI first rose to prominence
after liberation, there was a schism in the party, and
within its Badr Corps, over how closely the party should
remain aligned to Iran. Prominent clerics like Mohammed
Bakir al-Hakim sought to maintain a healthy distance from
Iran. Other members, including Badr Corps commanders such
as Mahdi Muhandis, wanted to have closer ties with Iran.
Fa'ad alleged that individuals like Muhandis had made early
overtures to the Jaysh al-Mahdi movement and may now look
to absorb these erstwhile allies, and by extension the
resources of their Iranian backers, into SCIRI.
--------------
MONOLITHIC IRANIAN AGENDA A MYTH?
--------------
4. (S) The Jasyh al-Mahdi, Fa'ad said, receive Iranian
support. But, he stressed, there are actually three groups
in Iran that act with different agendas. These groups are
the Revolutionary Guards, the Iranian Intelligence Service,
and President Khatami's administration. These three
groups, Fa'ad said, are all afraid of each other and are
constantly jockeying for advantage. This maneuvering
includes backing different players in Iraq, with the Jaysh
al-Mahdi receiving support from the Revolutionary Guards.
--------------
WHO FORCED SISTANI'S HAND?
--------------
5. (S) Fa'ad seemed as surprised as everyone that SISTANI
had made the sudden, unannounced return to Najaf. Fa'ad
agrees with the conventional wisdom that SISTANI is by
nature a politically timid man who will not take action
unless forced to do so. He noted that none of the
proposals outlined by SISTANI in Basra on August 26 and
agreed to by al-Sadr was new, having been spelled out by
various players over the last several months. Fa'ad told
us he had personally visited four times with SISTANI's son,
beginning on April 7, to request that SISTANI announce
these proposals with an aim towards disbanding and
disarming the al-Mahdi Militia. Fa'ad was very curious to
know what, or specifically who, had prompted SISTANI to
move so suddenly.
--------------
TALAL BILAL:
--------------
6. (S) Talal Bilal, the Governor's aide and close friend,
shared Fa'ad's assessment that al-Sadr is finished
politically. Talal, who was present at the discussion
site, said that al-Sadr arrived at the meeting, held in a
house owned by a Hawza member, accompanied by a single aide
who served as bodyguard and driver. When asked if al-Sadr
would take up arms again, Talal pointed to a copy of the
signed agreement between al-Sadr and SISTANI. Talal said
that if al-Sadr does violate the agreement, he would be
pitting himself against the entire Shia world, which, Talal
intimated, would react strongly to the transgression.
Governor Zurufi shares Talal's assessment that al-Sadr is
finished politically. The Governor also agrees that if al-
Sadr violates the points of the proposal that the
government will be on much firmer ground to move against
him.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
7. (S) All three men agree that al-Sadr is finished
politically. They also believe his ability to cause
trouble with his militia has been severely undercut.
Embassy, however, advises caution in accepting their second
premise. Al-Sadr does not enjoy being without influence.
His political marginalization may actually increase the
chance he will once again stir up trouble with his militia.
Embassy notes that al-Sadr has escaped with his skin twice.
Much will hinge on whether Prime Minister Allawi carries
out his intent to have the legal action against al-Sadr
continue. Furthermore, Embassy does not see evidence that
the al-Mahdi Militia will be easily or completely disarmed.
Reports as of August 27, including visual confirmation by
predator drone, reveal that the al-Mahdi Militia are
sneaking weapons from the shrine area. Finally, it can not
be said conclusively that those fighters who make up the
majority of the Jasyh al-Mahdi's base, mostly unemployed
and uneducated young men, will feel constrained by
SISTANI's opinion.
8. (S) That said, al-Sadr is now deprived of his primary
trump card--the holy mosques with their religious
significance and "citadel" character that made it difficult
to use coalition forces to expel the al-Mahdi militia. He
has suffered grievous losses among some of his better
fighting units and was clearly maneuvered into a difficult
position by the impromptu alliance of secular Shi'a PM
Allawi and religious Shi'a leader SISTANI. If the
agreement holds this will have significance throughout
Shi'a Iraq and beyond. END COMMENT.
NNNN