USEB 58: Shia Leaders Petition on Behalf of Sadr

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000119 E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2024 TAGS: PGOV PINS KISL IZ SUBJECT: USEB 58: Shia Leaders Petition on Behalf of Sadr ¶1. (U) Classified by DCM James Jeffrey, Reason 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶2. (C) Summary: Last week, influential Shia leaders, including the Dawa and SCIRI parties, asked Prime Minister Allawi to defuse the tension in Najaf by dropping, at least temporarily, the charges against Muqtada al-Sadr. They told Allawi it would be preferable for Sadr's militia, the Jaysh Al Mahdi(JAM),to become a political movement. A senior IIG official said Allawi's initial reaction was skeptical but said the Prime Minister might be convinced to be more accommodating with Sadr and his unruly militia. End summary. -------------- TOP SHIA POLITICIANS PLEAD FOR SADR -------------- ¶3. (C) IIG National Security Advisor Moaffak Al-Rubaie told MNF-I LT. General McColl, and Embassy POLMIL and POL Counselors on July 7 that thirteen members of what he called the "Shia Caucus" (in Arabic, "Bayt Shia" or "Shia House") delivered a letter about defusing the problem with Muqtada al-Sadr to Prime Minister Allawi earlier this week. The thirteen included representatives from the Dawa party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, as well as the Badr Corps. Former Governing Council members Ahmed al-Barak and Mohammed Bahr al-Aloum were also in the group, he said. Al-Rubaie gave PolCouns a few minutes to read the signed Arabic letter (but wouldn't let us have a copy). ¶4. (C) The letter opened with the petitioners' referring to a recent letter from al-Sadr to the Bayt Shia asking for their help in defusing the problems between him and the IIG. It said the Bayt Shia wanted to build on the work of the Joint Coordination Committee now established between the Najaf governor and the Office of the Martyr Sadr in Najaf. The petitioners said they hoped the IIG would support the Bayt Shia's effort to move from a ceasefire in Najaf and Kufa to a period of "accord" ("ittifaq" in Arabic). They proposed four steps: -- Prime Minister Allawi would personally engage to help solve the problem with Muqtada al-Sadr. -- Armed men in the two holy cities of Najaf and Kufa would agree to leave and go home. (Comment: To Baghdad's Sadr City and elsewhere in Iraq. End comment.) They would thereby agree to end their occupation of mosques, religious schools and shrines, and government buildings. In addition, all sides would agree to cancel Sadr's Shari'a court rulings over an agreed period. -- The IIG would agree to suspend ("taaleeq") the legal case against Muqtada al-Sadr until the coming ("inbithaq") of an elected government in Iraq. -- The JAM would be developed into a political organization throughout Iraq. -------------- AN IMPORTANT BAGHDAD AYATOLLAH WEIGHS IN TOO -------------- ¶5. (C) Al-Rubaie told us that on the night of July 6 Allawi and Al-Rubaie called on Ayatollah Hussein al-Sadr at the Gadhimiya Mosque in Baghdad. According to Al-Rubaie, Hussein al-Sadr said it would be best for the IIG not to deal with Muqtada al-Sadr directly. Instead, the Ayatollah advised, the IIG should try to find suitable men around al- Sadr with whom the IIG can work. (Comment: Ayatollah al- Sadr advocates avoiding violence and has been friendly to the coalition, though in earlier meetings with CPA, he generally urged that we take a tough law-enforcement approach with his nephew, Muqtada. End comment.) -------------- PRIME MINISTER: INITIALLY SKEPTICAL, BUT... -------------- ¶6. (C) Al-Rubaie added that Allawi's initial reaction to the Bayt Shia petition was to recall that Muqtada al-Sadr had not recognized the IIG and instead had called it illegitimate. Allawi wondered why, in this case, the IIG should suspend the legal case. Al-Rubaie speculated, however, that Allawi might eventually decide it would be best to strike a more accomodating stance. ¶7. (C) POLMIL Counselor cautioned that the coalition would not want to work with Muqtada al-Sadr, given that al-Sadr was a criminal charged with a crime. Al-Rubaie stated that if Iran controlled al-Sadr then the IIG had to take a tougher line. Al-Rubaie commented in passing that if al- Sadr represented a more genuine constituency, then it would be harder to exclude him. He thought the Prime Minister might ultimately draw the same conclusion. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (C) As we are reported earlier, the JAM remains very much present in Najaf and Kufa, including at the Imam Ali Shrine; the custodian of the Imam Ali Mosque, for example, has not been able to return to Najaf. It seems likely, therefore, that the petitioners received at least an informal blessing for their approach from key Najaf Hawza figures such as Ayatollahs Sistani and Mohammed said al- Hakim. It is more surprising that the Bayt Shia would support the JAM becoming a political movement, as an al- Sadr political movement could poll well in some parts of Iraq at the expense of Dawa and SCIRI. The more moderate Shia religious parties may reason that Muqtada al-Sadr would add Islamist seats to the parliament overall and they would thus be in a better position to form a largely Shia Islamist coalition with him. Provided Muqtada al-Sadr and his supporters avoid provocation, this petition and the advice from Ayatollahs such as Hussein al-Sadr will make it harder for Allawi to exclude Muqtada's supporters from the political process. NEGROPONTE