Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04BAGHDAD119
2004-07-12 18:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

USEB 58: Shia Leaders Petition on Behalf of Sadr

Tags:  PGOV PINS KISL IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
P 121821Z JUL 04
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0163
INFO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC
IRAQ COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000119 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2024
TAGS: PGOV PINS KISL IZ
SUBJECT: USEB 58: Shia Leaders Petition on Behalf of Sadr

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000119


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2024
TAGS: PGOV PINS KISL IZ
SUBJECT: USEB 58: Shia Leaders Petition on Behalf of Sadr


1. (U) Classified by DCM James Jeffrey, Reason 1.4 (B) and
(D).


2. (C) Summary: Last week, influential Shia leaders,
including the Dawa and SCIRI parties, asked Prime Minister
Allawi to defuse the tension in Najaf by dropping, at least
temporarily, the charges against Muqtada al-Sadr. They
told Allawi it would be preferable for Sadr's militia, the
Jaysh Al Mahdi(JAM),to become a political movement. A
senior IIG official said Allawi's initial reaction was
skeptical but said the Prime Minister might be convinced to
be more accommodating with Sadr and his unruly militia.
End summary.

--------------
TOP SHIA POLITICIANS PLEAD FOR SADR
--------------


3. (C) IIG National Security Advisor Moaffak Al-Rubaie told
MNF-I LT. General McColl, and Embassy POLMIL and POL
Counselors on July 7 that thirteen members of what he
called the "Shia Caucus" (in Arabic, "Bayt Shia" or "Shia
House") delivered a letter about defusing the problem with
Muqtada al-Sadr to Prime Minister Allawi earlier this week.
The thirteen included representatives from the Dawa party
and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
as well as the Badr Corps. Former Governing Council
members Ahmed al-Barak and Mohammed Bahr al-Aloum were also
in the group, he said. Al-Rubaie gave PolCouns a few
minutes to read the signed Arabic letter (but wouldn't let
us have a copy).


4. (C) The letter opened with the petitioners' referring to
a recent letter from al-Sadr to the Bayt Shia asking for
their help in defusing the problems between him and the
IIG. It said the Bayt Shia wanted to build on the work of
the Joint Coordination Committee now established between
the Najaf governor and the Office of the Martyr Sadr in
Najaf. The petitioners said they hoped the IIG would
support the Bayt Shia's effort to move from a ceasefire in
Najaf and Kufa to a period of "accord" ("ittifaq" in
Arabic).

They proposed four steps:

-- Prime Minister Allawi would personally engage to help
solve the problem with Muqtada al-Sadr.

-- Armed men in the two holy cities of Najaf and Kufa would
agree to leave and go home. (Comment: To Baghdad's Sadr
City and elsewhere in Iraq. End comment.) They would
thereby agree to end their occupation of mosques, religious
schools and shrines, and government buildings. In

addition, all sides would agree to cancel Sadr's Shari'a
court rulings over an agreed period.

-- The IIG would agree to suspend ("taaleeq") the legal
case against Muqtada al-Sadr until the coming ("inbithaq")
of an elected government in Iraq.

-- The JAM would be developed into a political organization
throughout Iraq.

--------------
AN IMPORTANT BAGHDAD AYATOLLAH WEIGHS IN TOO
--------------


5. (C) Al-Rubaie told us that on the night of July 6 Allawi
and Al-Rubaie called on Ayatollah Hussein al-Sadr at the
Gadhimiya Mosque in Baghdad. According to Al-Rubaie,
Hussein al-Sadr said it would be best for the IIG not to
deal with Muqtada al-Sadr directly. Instead, the Ayatollah
advised, the IIG should try to find suitable men around al-
Sadr with whom the IIG can work. (Comment: Ayatollah al-
Sadr advocates avoiding violence and has been friendly to
the coalition, though in earlier meetings with CPA, he
generally urged that we take a tough law-enforcement
approach with his nephew, Muqtada. End comment.)

--------------
PRIME MINISTER: INITIALLY SKEPTICAL, BUT...
--------------


6. (C) Al-Rubaie added that Allawi's initial reaction to
the Bayt Shia petition was to recall that Muqtada al-Sadr
had not recognized the IIG and instead had called it
illegitimate. Allawi wondered why, in this case, the IIG
should suspend the legal case. Al-Rubaie speculated,
however, that Allawi might eventually decide it would be
best to strike a more accomodating stance.


7. (C) POLMIL Counselor cautioned that the coalition would
not want to work with Muqtada al-Sadr, given that al-Sadr
was a criminal charged with a crime. Al-Rubaie stated that
if Iran controlled al-Sadr then the IIG had to take a
tougher line. Al-Rubaie commented in passing that if al-
Sadr represented a more genuine constituency, then it would
be harder to exclude him. He thought the Prime Minister
might ultimately draw the same conclusion.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) As we are reported earlier, the JAM remains very
much present in Najaf and Kufa, including at the Imam Ali
Shrine; the custodian of the Imam Ali Mosque, for example,
has not been able to return to Najaf. It seems likely,
therefore, that the petitioners received at least an
informal blessing for their approach from key Najaf Hawza
figures such as Ayatollahs SISTANI and Mohammed said al-
Hakim. It is more surprising that the Bayt Shia would
support the JAM becoming a political movement, as an al-
Sadr political movement could poll well in some parts of
Iraq at the expense of Dawa and SCIRI. The more moderate
Shia religious parties may reason that Muqtada al-Sadr
would add Islamist seats to the parliament overall and they
would thus be in a better position to form a largely Shia
Islamist coalition with him. Provided Muqtada al-Sadr and
his supporters avoid provocation, this petition and the
advice from Ayatollahs such as Hussein al-Sadr will make it
harder for Allawi to exclude Muqtada's supporters from the
political process.

NEGROPONTE