Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA90
2004-01-08 10:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
FEAR OF REJECTION KEEPS ANKARA FROM ASKING IGC FOR
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000090
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPTION 1.6 X5, X6
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: FEAR OF REJECTION KEEPS ANKARA FROM ASKING IGC FOR
PKK STATEMENT
REF: A. CPA 423
B. ANKARA 7952
(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Deutsch.
Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000090
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPTION 1.6 X5, X6
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: FEAR OF REJECTION KEEPS ANKARA FROM ASKING IGC FOR
PKK STATEMENT
REF: A. CPA 423
B. ANKARA 7952
(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Deutsch.
Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d).
1. (C) DCM briefed MFA Director General for Middle East
Burcuoglu on US strategy for Iraq on January 2, drawing from
ref a and recent policy statements. He noted that CPA would
appreciate a readout by the planned GOT fact-finding mission
to Iraq (ref b) towards the end of its time there.
(Burcuoglu did not provide any details on the composition or
timing of this visit.)
2. (C) In response to the presentation, Burcuoglu said he was
encouraged by most of the USG strategy, noting that "the only
point of divergence" between the US and Turkey on Iraq was
federalism. He repeated much of the usual GOT concerns about
disproportionate Kurdish influence in the IGC and on the US,
and how the Kurds were attempting to exploit their current
advantages to the disadvantage of the future Iraq. He
worried about recent events in Kirkuk, which could "explode"
if the Kurds did not moderate their demands. He said the
main message Turkey had was that the Kurds should be
realistic and should not try to impose their will on other
groups.
3. (C) Burcuoglu stated that many Sunni groups complained
about a sense of lack of representation or influence in the
IGC to the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad (which is reporting
prolifically these days). Former Foreign Minister Pachachi
"has no ambition to represent the Sunnis," he said. The
Turkish Ambassador had invited Pachachi to visit Turkey in
late January, but he refused because the dates conflicted
with the Davos meeting. There was a possibility that PM
Erdogan might see him there. Regarding other visits, he said
Assyrian Democratic Movement Chairman (and IGC member)
Yonadan Kana would visit Ankara January 13-14. Kurdish
Democratic Party chief Barzani "would be welcome in February"
when he will be serving as IGC president, just as PUK leader
Talabani was during his time in that position. (Comment: We
understand that the Turks also invited Abdel Aziz Hakim to
visit in December when he held the IGC presidency; he
couldn't make it then but will instead visit Ankara the week
of January 12.)
4. (C) DCM noted that CPA had approached the IGC to issue a
statement opposing the continued presence of the PKK/KHK in
Iraq, similar to what the IGC did with regards to MEK.
Turkey should make a similar request, he urged. Burcuoglu
responded that a negative reply to a formal request would
necessitate a response. This might include closing the
Iraq-Turkey border to all but OIF-related traffic. Ankara
did not want to take this risk, he averred. He took note,
however, of the DCM's suggestion that the Turkish mission
could sound out individual IGC members in the course of their
broader discussions.
DEUTSCH
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: EXEMPTION 1.6 X5, X6
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER IZ TU
SUBJECT: FEAR OF REJECTION KEEPS ANKARA FROM ASKING IGC FOR
PKK STATEMENT
REF: A. CPA 423
B. ANKARA 7952
(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires Robert S. Deutsch.
Reasons: 1.5 (b) and (d).
1. (C) DCM briefed MFA Director General for Middle East
Burcuoglu on US strategy for Iraq on January 2, drawing from
ref a and recent policy statements. He noted that CPA would
appreciate a readout by the planned GOT fact-finding mission
to Iraq (ref b) towards the end of its time there.
(Burcuoglu did not provide any details on the composition or
timing of this visit.)
2. (C) In response to the presentation, Burcuoglu said he was
encouraged by most of the USG strategy, noting that "the only
point of divergence" between the US and Turkey on Iraq was
federalism. He repeated much of the usual GOT concerns about
disproportionate Kurdish influence in the IGC and on the US,
and how the Kurds were attempting to exploit their current
advantages to the disadvantage of the future Iraq. He
worried about recent events in Kirkuk, which could "explode"
if the Kurds did not moderate their demands. He said the
main message Turkey had was that the Kurds should be
realistic and should not try to impose their will on other
groups.
3. (C) Burcuoglu stated that many Sunni groups complained
about a sense of lack of representation or influence in the
IGC to the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad (which is reporting
prolifically these days). Former Foreign Minister Pachachi
"has no ambition to represent the Sunnis," he said. The
Turkish Ambassador had invited Pachachi to visit Turkey in
late January, but he refused because the dates conflicted
with the Davos meeting. There was a possibility that PM
Erdogan might see him there. Regarding other visits, he said
Assyrian Democratic Movement Chairman (and IGC member)
Yonadan Kana would visit Ankara January 13-14. Kurdish
Democratic Party chief Barzani "would be welcome in February"
when he will be serving as IGC president, just as PUK leader
Talabani was during his time in that position. (Comment: We
understand that the Turks also invited Abdel Aziz Hakim to
visit in December when he held the IGC presidency; he
couldn't make it then but will instead visit Ankara the week
of January 12.)
4. (C) DCM noted that CPA had approached the IGC to issue a
statement opposing the continued presence of the PKK/KHK in
Iraq, similar to what the IGC did with regards to MEK.
Turkey should make a similar request, he urged. Burcuoglu
responded that a negative reply to a formal request would
necessitate a response. This might include closing the
Iraq-Turkey border to all but OIF-related traffic. Ankara
did not want to take this risk, he averred. He took note,
however, of the DCM's suggestion that the Turkish mission
could sound out individual IGC members in the course of their
broader discussions.
DEUTSCH