TURKEY CONSIDERING STEPPING (BACK) UP ITS PSI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007210 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2029 TAGS: PARM PREL TU SUBJECT: TURKEY CONSIDERING STEPPING (BACK) UP ITS PSI PARTICIPATION; MAY TAKE PSI INTO BLACK SEA REF: A. ANKARA 6261 ¶B. ANKARA 5380 ¶C. ANKARA 5015 ¶D. STATE 188228 (ALL NOTAL) Classified By: Acting DCM Gerri H. O'Brien for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This is an action request. See para 4. ¶2. (C) Summary: Turkey is preparing to step its participation up in the Proliferation Security Initiative -- participating in events in 2005 in Portugal and Spain, sending experts from Ankara to operational expert meetings even outside of Turkey's immediate region, and considering hosting a PSI exercise in 2006, perhaps in the Black Sea. MFA requests the time and location of the next operational experts meeting and for information on Black Sea littoral states' positions regarding PSI. While Ankara appears prepared to increase its participation in PSI even without formal membership in the Core Group, we are told that a meeting of the core group that excludes Turkey would derail Turkey's participation in PSI. End Summary. ¶3. (C) The new MFA Deputy Director General for Disarmament and Arms Control, Bulent Meric, informed PolMilCouns and PolMilOff December 29 that the GOT was preparing to step up its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Although Turkey did not participate in the Sydney operational experts group meeting, Meric said the GOT was going to participate in future meetings with officials from Ankara. He asked when and where the next PSI experts group meeting would be held. ¶4. (C) Meric confirmed that Turkey intends to participate in PSI exercises hosted by Portugal and Spain in 2005. He added that the GOT was considering whether to host a PSI exercise in 2006, and so far the indications from other agencies were positive. PolMilCouns noted that one place where Turkey could make a unique contribution to PSI might be in the Black Sea region were Turkey already was running Operation Black Sea Harmony (a counter-trafficking operation akin to (and sharing data with) NATO's Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean) which might provide Turkey with relevant experience on which to base an exercise. Meric said he had also been thinking about raising PSI at the February meeting of BLACKSEAFOR political experts. (Note: BLACKSEAFOR was a Turkish initiate in 2001 to build cooperation among Black Sea littoral states' navies. Beginning as annual exercises, BLACKSEAFOR has developed a political dialogue at the vice ministerial level and a rotating command structure. In June 2004, participants agreed to expand the mandate to include naval cooperation to counter terrorism and WMD proliferation. End note.) His hope would be to win agreement for a PSI exercise centered on BLACKSEAFOR, although as a PSI exercise it would be open to all PSI participants. He asked whether we had information on littoral states' position on PSI -- he was aware that Ukraine and Russia had joined PSI, but was less clear about Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia. ¶5. (C) The one potential problem to this increased participation would be a meeting of the Core Group that did not include Turkey, Meric stated. That would be a huge problem, he said. ¶6. (C) Comment: Meric's warning that a Core Group meeting without Turkey would undermine this newfound resolve to actively participate in PSI is serious. The slight perceived from Turkey's exclusion from the Core Group led to the self-imposed limit on Ankara's participation to events in Turkey's own region only. We have been encouraging Meric (who was previously the MFA Disarmament Department Head) and officers at the Turkish General Staff (TGS) to reconsider this limitation. Our arguments that the operational experts gatherings are the real engine driving the initiative and that we had no plan to convene the core group in the foreseeable future appear to have resonated more with Meric than his predecessor, Haluk Ilicak. Ilicak sold PSI to a reluctant interagency process in Ankara by promising that if Turkey participated vigorously in the initiative, it would be recognized with a seat at the table of the initiative's policy making body. With that not in the cards, Meric appears to have sold greater participation on the basis that, with no core group meetings expected, the experts group is where real decisions are made. A core group meeting without Turkey would undermine this argument. End comment. ¶7. (C) Action request: Presuming we still foresee no need to reconvene the core group anytime soon, we should encourage Meric's efforts to re-energize Turkey's participation in PSI. To that end, we request Washington provide answers to Meric's questions: When and where will the next operational experts group meeting occur; and, whether Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia have subscribed to the founding principles of PSI. EDELMAN