Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA6841
2004-12-09 14:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

CHP LEADERSHIP: SECULAR ELITISTS ALIENATE FELLOW

Tags:  PGOV PREL TU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006841 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: CHP LEADERSHIP: SECULAR ELITISTS ALIENATE FELLOW
TURKS

REF: ANKARA 6839

Classified By: POLCOUNS John Kunstadter; reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006841

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL TU
SUBJECT: CHP LEADERSHIP: SECULAR ELITISTS ALIENATE FELLOW
TURKS

REF: ANKARA 6839

Classified By: POLCOUNS John Kunstadter; reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. The ability of the Republican People's Party
(CHP) to broaden its electoral and political support beyond
its current base is limited by the sociological realities of
the Turkish electorate, the public's negative perception of
the party, and the failures of the party leadership. The
party will be unable to overcome the current limits to its
popularity and political viability unless it is able to
narrow the chasm between its ideological preferences and
contemporary Turkish realities. End Summary.


2. (C) CHP is the party of most of Turkey's secular elite.
Most party members, accordingly, describe CHP as a
contemporary, secular, and social democratic party.
Left-of-center parties, however, have never received a
majority of the vote in Turkey since the competitive
multi-party system began in 1950. Since 1983, the combined
vote for all left-of-center parties has fluctuated between 25
percent and 35 percent. CHP received 11 percent of the vote
in 1995, 9 percent of the vote in 1999, and 19 percent of the
vote in 2002.


3. (C) CHP receives most of its electoral support from
relatively small ideological and sociological groups, e.g.
"secularists", leftists, social democrats, Alevis, and "White
Turks". (Note: Alevis are heterodox Muslims who comprise
about 10 percent of the Turkish population. "White Turks" is
a term understood to refer to the narrow elite descending
from Islamized Balkan Slavs, Caucasians, and Jews who are
widely seen as having only nominally converted to Islam,
i.e., "White Turks" are people with no acknowledged roots in
Anatolia. In traditional usage, the 90 percent of the rest
of the population is referred to as "Black Turks." End
note.) Hard-core secularists, according to CHP MP Hasan
Aydin, represent only 10-15 percent of the electorate.
Pre-eminent national security analyst Faruk Demir estimates
that "White Turks" comprise at most 10 percent of the
population. Alevis, have historically voted for pro-secular,
left-of-center parties, but have more recently split their
vote between the left and the right, according to
center-right Alevi politician Reha Camuroglu.


4. (C) There is, however, a great deal of overlap between

these groups. Most leftists, Alevis, and "White Turks", for
example, are secular. Even if CHP adopted a new dynamic
leadership and ran a professional modern electoral campaign,
it would be very hard pressed to win more than 25 percent of
the vote, unless it broadened its appeal beyond its current
base.


5. (C) CHP has a reputation for being the party of "rich
atheists," according to Aydin. Deniz Baykal, the leader of
CHP, and his inner circle have done little to alter this
impression. CHP's leaders are often dismissive of Islam.
CHP vice chairman (and former career ambassador) Onur Oymen,
for example, has publicly stated that Islam and democracy are
incompatible and that Turkish democracy is impossible without
secularism. Baykal, a former university professor, and other
CHP leaders tend to lecture in public speeches and they have
a very condescending manner. Most CHP politicians, moreover,
dislike rubbing shoulders with the common voter or canvassing
for votes. CHP's leaders make little effort to listen to the
man in the street's concerns. They tend to believe that it
is their responsibility to express their views and it is the
people's responsibility to follow them.


6. (C) This behavior is rooted in the fact that CHP's leaders
are "White Turks". In the late Ottoman Empire, forefathers
of this group were accustomed to being a privileged elite and
ruling over a subject people. They promoted Westernizing
ideas, a negative view of Anatolian Turks, and a skepticism
towards religion. During the early years of the Republic,
"White Turks" had a monopoly on positions of power in the
military, government bureaucracy, and academia. "White
Turks" also dominated the leadership positions in CHP.
Finally, "White Turks" were able to take a leadership role in
business because many of them received economic advantages
from the state -- some "White Turks" started companies that
received generous government contracts and others were
awarded with businesses or property that had been abandoned
by Greeks or ARMENIAns fleeing Turkey or killed during World
War I (1914-18) and the War of Independence (1919-22),or
expropriated or taxed into abandonment starting in the
mid-1930's.


7. (C) Comment. CHP has been unable to evolve ideologically,
alter its condescending demeanor, develop coherent public
policies, or expand its electoral base because Baykal and his
circle are content to maintain the status-quo and wait in the
belief that the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP)
will fail (REFTEL). Lacking the imagination to broaden its
base, CHP continues to defend a rigid "secularism" in such a
way that it appears atheist or anti-Muslim. CHP leaders must
also shed their arrogance -- they need to listen to common
voters and respond to common concerns. Finally, the party
must match the skill that AKP has shown for canvassing and
block by block party building. The current aversion to
grassroots electioneering is no way to build a successful
party. End comment.
EDELMAN