CYPRUS/MALTA PROBLEM: THE VIEW FROM ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006003 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR PDAS BRADTKE, EUR/RPM, EUR/ERA, AND EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL GR TU CY MT SUBJECT: CYPRUS/MALTA PROBLEM: THE VIEW FROM ANKARA REF: A. BRUSSELS 4082 ¶B. NICOSIA 1974 Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey will base its decision on how to break the impasse over Cyprus and Malta's participation in NATO-EU security cooperation on several factors: EU action to reach out to the Turkish Cypriots, EU leaders' Dec. 17 decision on beginning accession talks with Turkey, and Turkey's evaluation of other concrete elements of NATO-EU cooperation, such as Operation Althea and Turkish participation in the Battlegroups concept. In any case, we doubt Turkey will move until after, perhaps even well after, Dec. 17. When they are ready, we expect the Turks will insist on breaking the impasse on their own, very legalistic, terms. End summary. ¶2. (C) Embassy Ankara appreciates USEU-USNATO's thoughtful and coherent ref a suggestions--as well as Embassy Nicosia's equally helpful ref b analysis--for untying the knot of the impasse over the participation of Cyprus and Malta in NATO-EU strategic cooperation. From a Turkish perspective, this issue is wrapped up in the broad net of Cyprus and Turkey's status with the EU. Thus, we believe that there can be no Turkish movement on this problem until after, perhaps well after, the EU's leaders decide Dec. 17 on the core question of how they will proceed on accession negotiations with Turkey. The Cyprus Problem -------------- ¶3. (C) The Turks believe that the international community--and particularly the EU--has done little to reward the Turkish Cypriots (TCs) for their vote in the April referendum on the island, and that the Greek Cypriots (GCs) have avoided any negative consequences. Specifically, Turkey is angry that the GCs have apparently used their EU membership to block EU aid and direct trade regulations for the TCs. The GOT believes it has given enough concessions on Cyprus, especially given its recent decision to extend its Customs Union agreement with the EU to include Cyprus. Ankara showed the depth of its displeasure with the GCs and the EU in its willingness to cancel the EU-OIC Forum scheduled for earlier this month in Istanbul over the GOT's insistence on according the TC delegation a higher form of recognized representation than the GCs--and thus the EU--could live with. The GOT sees NATO-EU strategic cooperation as one of the few cards it holds in this game, and it could agree to move only after it is reassured by developments on the Cyprus issue. EU Accession Decision -------------- ¶4. (C) It goes without saying that what decision EU leaders take on Dec. 17 will have an impact on the Turks' attitude toward the EU. The Turks will reserve NATO-EU strategic cooperation for its menu of policy options to reward--or punish--the EU for whatever decision it takes in December. The GOT will also monitor very closely in particular the GOC's attitude toward Turkey's membership bid as Dec. 17 approaches. Other NATO-EU Strategic Cooperation Issues -------------- ¶5. (C) Parallel to the accession negotiation decision, Turkey is also tracking its satisfaction with other areas in NATO-EU strategic cooperation, specifically Operation Althea and the EU Battlegroup concept. So far, this appears to be the only unalloyed good news to announce. The Turks report that they are generally pleased with how the EU has worked with them on planning for the transition from SFOR to Althea. Additionally, we understand that the EU has opened its call for Battlegroup contributions to the Turks, and the Turks have responded enthusiastically. Indeed, Turkey is one of the few European countries that can offer real capabilities to Battlegroups or even make one on its own. By January the Turks will have more data points on both these key areas of strategic cooperation, and will enter these into their equation. The U.S. Influence -------------- ¶6. (C) Unfortunately, we have less influence with the Turks on these EU-NATO issues than we had when we negotiated the Istanbul Documents on ESDP. The Turks believed that if the Cyprus referendum failed we would persuade the Europeans to move smartly to reward both the Turks and the TCs in tangible ways. Instead, the Turks feel they have almost nothing to show for their forward-leaning position on the Annan Plan. At the same time, the Turks feel we have failed to deliver on a series of other issues related to Iraq, especially the PKK. As a result, our credibility with the Turks is not high at the moment. What Would a Solution Look Like? -------------- ¶7. (C) The Turks are legalistic and would likely be unwilling to agree to amend the December 2002 NAC decision which requires both PfP membership and signing the NATO security agreement for non-NATO EU countries who wish to engage in NATO-EU strategic cooperation discussions. For the Turks, this ensures they control the timing (blocking consensus until Ankara is ready to move). For Cyprus and Malta, they would have to apply for PfP. We note Embassy Nicosia's point (ref b) that Cypriot PfP membership might not be desirable given our efforts to eventually demilitarize the island, but we also do not see another alternative acceptable to the Turks. What we and the EU could do is to work on all three to ensure the necessary steps are nearly simultaneous, but, in our estimation, there is no point in trying with the Turks until there is movement on EU measures to reward the TCs for their April vote and/and Turkey has a date to begin EU accession negotiations. EDELMAN