TURKEY'S FIRST CIVILIAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006000

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2029
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL PTER TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S FIRST CIVILIAN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARY-GENERAL IS SETTLING IN

SIPDIS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ERIC. S. EDELMAN, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (S) Summary: In an October 15 introductory call by the
Ambassador, Yigit Alpogan, the first civilian
Secretary-General in the seventy year history of the Turkish

SIPDIS
National Security Council (NSC),outlined plans to downsize
and further "civilianize" the NSC staff. Alpogan provided
little substance on Turkey's security concerns, opining only
that Turkey did not view Iran's nuclear program as an
immediate threat and expressing the hope that the US would
take action against the PKK once the US Presidential
elections had passed. Alpogan's reticence to speak about
Iraq and other priority issues for Turkey may be a function
of his lack of tenure in the job or could signal further
marginalization of the NSC as Turkey consolidates reforms in
anticipation of an EU decision in December to start accession
talks. It is too early to tell but we have an opportunity to
help shape the NSC's development. As he settles into the job
we may seek an APNSA Rice call Alpogan to congratulate him on
his appointment and offer US assistance to his effort to
restructure the NSC staff. End Summary.

--------------
CIVILIANIZING THE NSC
--------------


2. (C) Ambassador, accompanied by DCM and Acting POLMILCOUNS,
called on Turkey's first civilian NSC Secretary-General,
Yigit Alpogan, during his second week on the job. Alpogan,
who was unaccompanied during the meeting, said he was still
learning the organization's structure and didn't plan to make
any immediate changes. However, he expected the current NSC
staffing of 300 to decline and diversify from the traditional
reliance on military personnel. In Alpogan's estimation, the
military was already well-represented at the NSC and
additional military personnel would be unnecessary. In line
with that, Alpogan's Principal Deputy was a Major General, a
downgrade from the three-star position it was when the SecGen
position was held by a four-star general, and his other
deputies were civilians with military backgrounds. In
addition, Alpogan had requested from the MFA three foreign
service officers to serve as personal advisors. In response
to Ambassador's offer to share the USG experience in
establishing a National Security Council and adjusting it to
serve the needs of different administrations, Alpogan
welcomed relevant historical information.

--------------
REGIONAL SECURITY
--------------


3. (S) In a discussion of Turkey's regional security issues,
Alpogan revealed very little. When prompted by the
Ambassador, Alpogan acknowledged there had been a high level
discussion between the Prime Minister, the MFA and the
Turkish General Staff on Turkey's concerns in Iraq, in which
the NSC did not participate. He said the GOT was closely
watching the US election process and hoped that the USG would
take some steps against the PKK after November 2. Ambassador
noted USG actions already taken to get the PKK listed as a
terrorist organization by the EU and to engage the Iraqi
Interim Government (IIG) in a trilateral effort against the
PKK. He emphasized that the USG took seriously Turkey's
concerns about demographic changes in Kirkuk and that we had
been working to counsel all sides. In response to
Ambassador's mention of Coalition Provisional Authority Paul
Bremer's discussions with Barzani and Talabani, Alpogan
opined that guarantees from Barzani didn't mean much.


4. (S) Regarding Iran's nuclear program, Alpogan said the
issue had not crossed his desk but, judging by Prime Minister
Erdogan's September visit to Tehran, Turkey would try to
convince Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. Alpogan indicated
support for the EU-3 efforts to sway Tehran. In response to
the Ambassador's enumeration of the many countries who had
dismantled their nuclear capabilities, Alpogan stressed his
belief that Iran was different. There was an internal
struggle between the "so-called conservatives" and the
reformers that had even impacted Turkish companies whose
contracts for a new airport and cellular service were
canceled. In his view the reformers wouldn't gain power
anytime soon.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


5. (S) Alpogan's appointment as the first civilian
Secretary-General in the 70-year history of Turkey's NSC is

SIPDIS
the latest stage in reforming this institution to comply with
EU norms. Previously a military-dominated organization with
significant operational responsibilities, the NSC now has
more civilian members and offers advice, not edicts, to the
government. The reduction in rank of the deputy SG position
may suggest that the flow of information between the military
and the NSC staff will be diminished; in any event, the
elimination of a four-star SecGen and a three-star deputy
will reduce the staff's access to military leaders.


6. (S) It is too early to tell how much influence the NSC
staff will have on Turkey's security decision, but its new
role will depend more on analysis and insight than on orders,
so Alpogan's desire to add MFA personnel to the staff makes
sense. Alpogan, previously Turkey's ambassador in Athens, is
a reliable interlocutor with solid credentials who may prove
to be an important player in shaping Turkey's foreign policy.
Post believes we should take the opportunity now to
cultivate a close relationship with him and try to influence
the direction of organizational reforms that Alpogan
undertakes to the extent possible. Much will depend on how
successful he is in adapting the institution to Turkey's
changing EU circumstances. We will keep watch as Alpogan
settles into his new responsibilities and we may seek a call
from Dr. Rice to offer engagement as he seeks to reshape the
organization. End Comment.


7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN