Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA5712
2004-10-05 12:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH PRESIDENT SEZER OPENS PARLIAMENT WITH

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005712 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESIDENT SEZER OPENS PARLIAMENT WITH
CRITICISM OF U.S. NON-ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST PKK


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005712

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESIDENT SEZER OPENS PARLIAMENT WITH
CRITICISM OF U.S. NON-ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST PKK


(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (b,d).


1. (U) Summary: While underscoring the importance of
relations with the U.S., President Sezer used his Oct. 1
address to parliament twice sharply to criticize U.S.
non-action against the terrorist PKK sheltering in northern
Iraq. In a lengthy and wooden assessment of the domestic
state of affairs, Sezer repeatedly deprecated the performance
of Islam-influenced ruling AKP and warned that he and other
elements of the Ataturkist State will continue to oppose what
they assert is AKP's intention to subvert the secular order.
End summary.


2. (U) In his 75-minute Oct. 1 address to open the 2004-2005
session of the Turkish parliament, Sezer -- as is his custom
-- focused more on domestic affairs, in particular by drawing
secular red lines against the current Islam-influenced AKP
government (see below, paras 5-7).


3. (U) While casting a positive light on Turkey's foreign
policy achievements and aspirations in the remaining portion
of his address, he twice sharply criticized U.S. failure to
take action in northern Iraq against the separatist PKK,
e.g., "The U.S. and MFN's failure to take action against this
separatist organization...is in contradiction to
Turkish-American friendship and our alliance and to
obligations in the international war on terrorism."


4. (C) Other highlights of Sezer's foreign policy review:

--EU membership, a top priority, is key as an additional
guarantor for Turkey's multi-party, secular, democratic
political system and against all forms of extremism; Turkey
must not hesitate to correct its own mistakes, mistakes which
strengthen the hands of those who would keep Turkey outside
the EU. (Note: for Sezer, EU membership thus becomes a
shield against the threat to the secular state he perceives
AKP to be. End note.)

--Of equal fundamental priority are relations with the U.S.;
President Bush's June visit reflected the importance of
bilateral relations; collaboration between Turkey and the
U.S. from the Balkans to central Asia is a welcome

development; maintaining trans-Atlantic and NATO ties is of
key importance for Turkey. (Note: the warm tone, length of
his remarks about Turkish-U.S. relations, and his casting
them on an equal footing with the EU stand in contrast to
Sezer's cool, almost offhand reference to the U.S. in his
2003 address. His remarks appear to be a signal from the
secular Establishment to the U.S. that we should reciprocate
toward the Establishment, not AKP. Thus the two criticisms
of U.S. non-action against the PKK stand out even more
starkly. End note.)

--Sezer singled out for positive assessment relations with
Greece, with Russia ("of great importance" especially in
cooperation in "Eurasia he avoided any criticism of Putin's
policy on Cyprus, in north or south Caucasus or Putin's
reversion to authoritarianism),and with Iran (only a very
convoluted, vague and indirect reference to the need for Iran
to follow better policies, i.e., on nukes). He expressed
hope for improvement in relations with ARMENIA but put the
onus on Yerevan.


5. (C) As in 2003, Sezer made preservation of the Ataturkist
system, mainly secularism -- as defined in the Turkish way --
the centerpiece of his address. In this regard he aimed
repeated heavy criticism at AKP for what he called
irresponsible legislation and made clear his intention to
continue to veto laws he considers threatening to the methods
or Ataturkist nature of the current State.


6. (C) In a similar vein of criticism he emphasized the
overarching importance of a "law-based state" (hukuki
devlet),a way of implying that he expects the judiciary to
continue to act as a brake on AKP. His reiteration that all
three branches are equal was a reply to constant AKP
criticisms that the judiciary is blocking the will of the
parliament, i.e., the electorate. To repeated applause from
main opposition CHP, and in the context of expressing
wariness toward the BMENA initiative, he forcefully rejected
the concepts of Turkey as a model for "moderate Islam" and
Turkey as an "Islamic republic". By implication he thus
gratuitously recalled Secretary Powell's misstatement of
Turkey as an Islamic republic. Calling for continued
struggle against religious reactionism (irtica) -- which
Turkish secularists assert is AKP's real agenda -- he
underscored the incompatibility of even a "moderate"
theocracy (din devleti) and democracy. Praising the Turkish
armed forces as the symbol of modernity and progressiveness
in Turkey, he called for adequate support for the military's
modernization and for an adequate national military
industrial capability.


7. (U) In a more rational, grounded way than the
left-of-center CHP parliamentary opposition, Sezer criticized
AKP's economic performance, especially in the area of job
creation, and noted the need for reform of social security,
greater private investment, and foreign direct investment.
Implying neglect on AKP's part, he called for serious efforts
to improve education.

8. (C) Comment: Although underscoring the importance of
relations with the U.S., Sezer also signaled that U.S.
inaction against the PKK remains a barrier to fuller
cooperation.


9. (C) Comment, contd.: In greater part a ritual defense of
Ataturkist principles which have become no more than
hortatory slogans, in lesser part a cogent criticism of AKP's
approach and performance, Sezer's address would have had more
impact if he had not insisted on using the desiccated
ideology and artificial vocabulary of the arch-secularists
(neologisms with no resonance in everyday speech). With PM
Erdogan asserting that the legislative branch is paramount
over the judiciary and spreading the message that AKP will
aim to oust Sezer by passing constitutional changes to a
presidential system (possibly tailored for him) after getting
an EU start date for accession negotiations, Sezer threw down
the gauntlet from the other side. We can thus expect a
strong post-post-modern reaction from the Turkish State to
any AKP attempt to change the constitutional order. In sum,
2005 will be a tricky year for Turkey.
EDELMAN