TURKISH PRESIDENT SEZER OPENS PARLIAMENT WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005712 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS ECON TU SUBJECT: TURKISH PRESIDENT SEZER OPENS PARLIAMENT WITH CRITICISM OF U.S. NON-ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST PKK (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O. 12958 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (U) Summary: While underscoring the importance of relations with the U.S., President Sezer used his Oct. 1 address to parliament twice sharply to criticize U.S. non-action against the terrorist PKK sheltering in northern Iraq. In a lengthy and wooden assessment of the domestic state of affairs, Sezer repeatedly deprecated the performance of Islam-influenced ruling AKP and warned that he and other elements of the Ataturkist State will continue to oppose what they assert is AKP's intention to subvert the secular order. End summary. ¶2. (U) In his 75-minute Oct. 1 address to open the 2004-2005 session of the Turkish parliament, Sezer -- as is his custom -- focused more on domestic affairs, in particular by drawing secular red lines against the current Islam-influenced AKP government (see below, paras 5-7). ¶3. (U) While casting a positive light on Turkey's foreign policy achievements and aspirations in the remaining portion of his address, he twice sharply criticized U.S. failure to take action in northern Iraq against the separatist PKK, e.g., "The U.S. and MFN's failure to take action against this separatist organization...is in contradiction to Turkish-American friendship and our alliance and to obligations in the international war on terrorism." ¶4. (C) Other highlights of Sezer's foreign policy review: --EU membership, a top priority, is key as an additional guarantor for Turkey's multi-party, secular, democratic political system and against all forms of extremism; Turkey must not hesitate to correct its own mistakes, mistakes which strengthen the hands of those who would keep Turkey outside the EU. (Note: for Sezer, EU membership thus becomes a shield against the threat to the secular state he perceives AKP to be. End note.) --Of equal fundamental priority are relations with the U.S.; President Bush's June visit reflected the importance of bilateral relations; collaboration between Turkey and the U.S. from the Balkans to central Asia is a welcome development; maintaining trans-Atlantic and NATO ties is of key importance for Turkey. (Note: the warm tone, length of his remarks about Turkish-U.S. relations, and his casting them on an equal footing with the EU stand in contrast to Sezer's cool, almost offhand reference to the U.S. in his 2003 address. His remarks appear to be a signal from the secular Establishment to the U.S. that we should reciprocate toward the Establishment, not AKP. Thus the two criticisms of U.S. non-action against the PKK stand out even more starkly. End note.) --Sezer singled out for positive assessment relations with Greece, with Russia ("of great importance" especially in cooperation in "Eurasia he avoided any criticism of Putin's policy on Cyprus, in north or south Caucasus or Putin's reversion to authoritarianism),and with Iran (only a very convoluted, vague and indirect reference to the need for Iran to follow better policies, i.e., on nukes). He expressed hope for improvement in relations with Armenia but put the onus on Yerevan. ¶5. (C) As in 2003, Sezer made preservation of the Ataturkist system, mainly secularism -- as defined in the Turkish way -- the centerpiece of his address. In this regard he aimed repeated heavy criticism at AKP for what he called irresponsible legislation and made clear his intention to continue to veto laws he considers threatening to the methods or Ataturkist nature of the current State. ¶6. (C) In a similar vein of criticism he emphasized the overarching importance of a "law-based state" (hukuki devlet),a way of implying that he expects the judiciary to continue to act as a brake on AKP. His reiteration that all three branches are equal was a reply to constant AKP criticisms that the judiciary is blocking the will of the parliament, i.e., the electorate. To repeated applause from main opposition CHP, and in the context of expressing wariness toward the BMENA initiative, he forcefully rejected the concepts of Turkey as a model for "moderate Islam" and Turkey as an "Islamic republic". By implication he thus gratuitously recalled Secretary Powell's misstatement of Turkey as an Islamic republic. Calling for continued struggle against religious reactionism (irtica) -- which Turkish secularists assert is AKP's real agenda -- he underscored the incompatibility of even a "moderate" theocracy (din devleti) and democracy. Praising the Turkish armed forces as the symbol of modernity and progressiveness in Turkey, he called for adequate support for the military's modernization and for an adequate national military industrial capability. ¶7. (U) In a more rational, grounded way than the left-of-center CHP parliamentary opposition, Sezer criticized AKP's economic performance, especially in the area of job creation, and noted the need for reform of social security, greater private investment, and foreign direct investment. Implying neglect on AKP's part, he called for serious efforts to improve education. ¶8. (C) Comment: Although underscoring the importance of relations with the U.S., Sezer also signaled that U.S. inaction against the PKK remains a barrier to fuller cooperation. ¶9. (C) Comment, contd.: In greater part a ritual defense of Ataturkist principles which have become no more than hortatory slogans, in lesser part a cogent criticism of AKP's approach and performance, Sezer's address would have had more impact if he had not insisted on using the desiccated ideology and artificial vocabulary of the arch-secularists (neologisms with no resonance in everyday speech). With PM Erdogan asserting that the legislative branch is paramount over the judiciary and spreading the message that AKP will aim to oust Sezer by passing constitutional changes to a presidential system (possibly tailored for him) after getting an EU start date for accession negotiations, Sezer threw down the gauntlet from the other side. We can thus expect a strong post-post-modern reaction from the Turkish State to any AKP attempt to change the constitutional order. In sum, 2005 will be a tricky year for Turkey. EDELMAN