Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04ANKARA5195
2004-09-14 15:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

GROWING TURKISH GOVERNMENT FRUSTRATION OVER LACK

Tags:  CY PREL TU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005195 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014
TAGS: CY PREL TU
SUBJECT: GROWING TURKISH GOVERNMENT FRUSTRATION OVER LACK
OF MEASURES FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS

REF: A. ANKARA 5180


B. ANKARA 5115

C. ANKARA 5029

D. ANKARA 4921

E. ANKARA 4886

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005195 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2014 TAGS: CY PREL TU SUBJECT: GROWING TURKISH GOVERNMENT FRUSTRATION OVER LACK OF MEASURES FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS REF: A. ANKARA 5180 ¶B. ANKARA 5115 ¶C. ANKARA 5029 ¶D. ANKARA 4921 ¶E. ANKARA 4886 (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: GOT frustration at the perceived lack of measures to ease Turkish Cypriots' isolation is growing. GOT interlocutors at all levels have expressed this frustration to us in recent meetings; Secretary Powell will hear much the same if he meets with FM Gul at UNGA. For now, the EU is the primary target of GOT irritation; however, criticism could soon focus on the U.S. To prevent this from becoming an irritant, we need to demonstrate concrete progress toward ending TC isolation, even if it is not as dramatic or as rapid as the Turks would like. End Summary. GOT Frustration at All Levels -------------- ¶2. (C) GOT interlocutors at all levels have recently expressed frustration to us at the perceived lack of measures to end TCs' isolation. The EU has been the primary target, but some interlocutors cast their criticism at a larger circle: -- In a September 13 meeting with the Ambassador, MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin told the Ambassador PM Erdogan and FM Gul feel the TCs has been put "on the back burner" (ref a); -- In a September 8 meeting with the Ambassador, TGS DCHOD Basbug called the lack of measures for the TCs "worrisome" (ref b); -- In a September 1 meeting with the Ambassador, FM Gul expressed strong discomfort at the lack of EU measures for TCs (ref c); -- In an August 30 meeting, MFA Cyprus Department Head Bilman was pessimistic that the EU would be able to overcome GC obstruction of trade and aid measures for the TCs (ref d); -- On August 26, MFA Maritime and Aviation Affairs DDG Gokdenizler expressed impatience at perceived lack of movement on direct flights between the U.S. and the north (ref e); -- On August 18, TGS J-5 Cyprus/Greece Section Chief RADM Sislioglu told Pol/Mil Counselor Turkey is disappointed over the lack of "international" response to the TCs' approval of the April referendum. More Trouble on the Horizon -------------- ¶3. (C) Two events on the horizon will sharpen Turkish frustration. Before December, in order to get a date to begin EU acce
ssion negotiations, the GOT will have extend Customs Union recognition to the ROC. The Turks hope for a GC concession, particularly on measures for TCs, to provide political cover for recognition. Absent a concession, those within the GOT who push for recognition will come under fire from a broad coalition of nationalists for failure to gain benefits for the TCs in return. ¶4. (C) Our GOT contacts are also focused on Greek Cypriot property compensation cases in the ECHR. The GOT hoped the issue would be put to rest with one-time compensation in the Loizidou case coupled with Annan Plan settlement. ECHR admission of another case will prompt renewed criticism of the Loizidou settlement, fears of massive compensation claims, and wider debate about what Turkey and TCs have gained in exchange for their pro-settlement stance. U.S. Not Yet the Focus of Criticism -- But We Could Be -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Thus far, the EU, not the U.S. is the primary focus of Turkish criticism, both privately and in the media. Most of our GOT contacts, like FM Gul, acknowledge U.S. efforts. However, we expect pointed criticism of the U.S. in the near future if there is a continued perception that the U.S. has not meaningfully reached out to TCs. As GCs continue to block and delay EU measures, Turkish hopes will shift to measures from the U.S., over which the ROC has no veto. While they recognize that the U.S. cannot provide TCs the same tangible economic benefits as the EU, the Turks will look to us to provide symbolic leadership that they assert will encourage others to follow suit. All Concrete Measures Help -------------- ¶6. (C) Direct flights are Turkey's highest priority and the GOT will react positively to concrete steps to that end -- for example, TSA inspection of Ercan airport. Concrete measures in other areas also help: in his September 13 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy U/S Ilkin appeared to welcome the prospect of a FAS visit to the north. ¶7. (C) When we take concrete steps, we should make sure the GOT and Turkish media are aware. Where progress is slow, we need to explain the difficulties, manage GOT expectations, and make sure the GOT does not misjudge our political will. We should make clear to the EU and capitals that reaching out to the TCs, including bilaterally, promotes their integration into Europe and overall Cyprus settlement. Even if U.S. measures for TCs are not as dramatic or as rapid as the Turks want, our ability to demonstrate concrete progress will prevent the issue from becoming a bilateral irritant, preserve pro-settlement sentiment in Ankara, and create the right atmosphere for Ankara to take more steps toward Cyprus settlement. EDELMAN

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