TURKISH GENERAL STAFF J3 CHIEF DELIVERS TOUGH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005191

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2024
TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKISH GENERAL STAFF J3 CHIEF DELIVERS TOUGH
MESSAGES ON PKK AND IRAQ

REF: A. ANKARA 4893 AND PREVIOUS

B. ANKARA 3758

C. USDAO ANKARA IIR 6 898 0384 04

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: In his Sept. 8 introductory call by
incoming ODC Turkey Chief Maj. Gen. Pete Sutton, TGS J3 LTG
Metin Yavuz Yalcin accused the U.S. of meeting with PKK
operatives, failing to capture PKK leader Osman Ocalan, and
standing by while Kurds sought to alter Kirkuk's population.
He added that Turkish troops will remain in northern Iraq to
monitor the PKK even after U.S. troops depart. Yalcin
pressed the U.S. to take steps to improve security for
Turkish truckers in Iraq, adding that if the Turkish GLOC
closes the coalition would then be compelled to use the
Persian Gulf for supply. He noted the Oct. 3 target date for
dissolution of the Peace Monitoring Force in northern Iraq.
End summary.


2. (C) While most senior TGS leaders have been cordial and
generally anodyne in their meetings with incoming ODC Turkey
Chief Maj. Gen. Pete Sutton, TGS J3 LTG General Metin Yavuz
Yalcin took a more aggressive approach in their Sept. 8
courtesy call. Yalcin read from talking points on 3 x 5
cards, and started off by stating that he knew for a fact
that U.S. military officers had had meetings with the
PKK/Kongra-Gel in northern Iraq. How, asked the general
rhetorically, was this possible when the United States has
declared the PKK a terrorist organization? Yalcin stated
that there are 5000 PKK terrorists in northern Iraq, and 1500
carrying out ops in Turkey. He added that Turkish troops are
in Iraq to monitor the PKK, and that they will remain in Iraq
during the U.S. presence there and beyond.


3. (S/NF) Yalcin went on to recount the incident last March
in which Turkish intelligence provided us with information on
Osman Ocalan's whereabouts in northern Iraq, and accused the
U.S. of failing to capture him because we thought Ocalan had
moderated his views (ref c). (Comment: Yalcin's
understanding of this incident and of our views of the PKK
and Ocalan are quixotic at best, disingenuous at worst.
Conflicting signals from TGS and faulty Turkish intelligence
were the reasons Ocalan was not arrested. End comment.) He
lambasted our "failure" to capture Ocalan by asking if the
U.S. would pass up a chance to capture Osama bin Laden if he
were somehow to moderate his views. When MG Sutton asked if
Yalcin thought support for the PKK was now strengthening or
weakening, Yalcin responded that it did not matter to him one
way or the other: his job as a military man was to ignore
politics and defeat the terrorists.


4. (C) Yalcin repeated oft-heard Turkish concerns regarding
the population distribution in Kirkuk. He accused Iraqi
Kurds of displacing Kirkuk's Turkmen population and of
seeking hegemony over the area's natural resources. Yalcin
added that 40% of Iraq's oil resources is in this area and
should be used for the benefit of all Iraqis. "This is a
very sensitive issue and known by all U.S. troops," he said,
implying that we were standing by and allowing the Kurds to
take over Kirkuk.


5. (C) Yalcin pressed the U.S. to take active steps to
provide security for Turkish truck drivers in Iraq, many of
whom carry goods for coalition use (ref a). He claimed that
32 drivers have been murdered and over 70 attacked, and that
the Turkish MFA was working on the problem. He noted the
importance of the Turkish GLOC, and that if the GLOC were to
close (due to the unwillingness of drivers to drive) the
coalition would have to use the Persian Gulf for supply,
which would not be convenient.


6. (C) Yalcin noted the October 3 target date for dissolution
of the Peace Monitoring Force (PMF) in northern Iraq, noting
agreement among the Turkish MFA, MNF-North, and TGS. He
pointed out the issue that the IIG will need to provide
employment for the Iraqi members of this force (ref b).


7. (C) Comment: This combative style is typical for Yalcin,
but it is in strict contrast to the pleasant demeanor of most
Turkish flag and general officers. As J3, his job is
operations, and the infiltration of PKK/Kongra-Gel members
into Turkey from Iraq has become one of his biggest
challenges. This may explain why he, more than any other
military officer, would get so passionate about our lack of
action. End comment.


8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN