TURKISH GENERAL STAFF J3 CHIEF DELIVERS TOUGH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005191 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2024 TAGS: PREL PTER PINR MOPS TU IZ SUBJECT: TURKISH GENERAL STAFF J3 CHIEF DELIVERS TOUGH MESSAGES ON PKK AND IRAQ REF: A. ANKARA 4893 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. ANKARA 3758 ¶C. USDAO ANKARA IIR 6 898 0384 04 Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In his Sept. 8 introductory call by incoming ODC Turkey Chief Maj. Gen. Pete Sutton, TGS J3 LTG Metin Yavuz Yalcin accused the U.S. of meeting with PKK operatives, failing to capture PKK leader Osman Ocalan, and standing by while Kurds sought to alter Kirkuk's population. He added that Turkish troops will remain in northern Iraq to monitor the PKK even after U.S. troops depart. Yalcin pressed the U.S. to take steps to improve security for Turkish truckers in Iraq, adding that if the Turkish GLOC closes the coalition would then be compelled to use the Persian Gulf for supply. He noted the Oct. 3 target date for dissolution of the Peace Monitoring Force in northern Iraq. End summary. ¶2. (C) While most senior TGS leaders have been cordial and generally anodyne in their meetings with incoming ODC Turkey Chief Maj. Gen. Pete Sutton, TGS J3 LTG General Metin Yavuz Yalcin took a more aggressive approach in their Sept. 8 courtesy call. Yalcin read from talking points on 3 x 5 cards, and started off by stating that he knew for a fact that U.S. military officers had had meetings with the PKK/Kongra-Gel in northern Iraq. How, asked the general rhetorically, was this possible when the United States has declared the PKK a terrorist organization? Yalcin stated that there are 5000 PKK terrorists in northern Iraq, and 1500 carrying out ops in Turkey. He added that Turkish troops are in Iraq to monitor the PKK, and that they will remain in Iraq during the U.S. presence there and beyond. ¶3. (S/NF) Yalcin went on to recount the incident last March in which Turkish intelligence provided us with information on Osman Ocalan's whereabouts in northern Iraq, and accused the U.S. of failing to capture him because we thought Ocalan had moderated his views (ref c). (Comment: Yalcin's understanding of this incident and of our views of the PKK and Ocalan are quixotic at best, disingenuous at worst. Conflicting signals from TGS and faulty Turkish intelligence were the reasons Ocalan was not arrested. End comment.) He lambasted our "failure" to capture Ocalan by asking if the U.S. would pass up a chance to capture Osama bin Laden if he were somehow to moderate his views. When MG Sutton asked if Yalcin thought support for the PKK was now strengthening or weakening, Yalcin responded that it did not matter to him one way or the other: his job as a military man was to ignore politics and defeat the terrorists. ¶4. (C) Yalcin repeated oft-heard Turkish concerns regarding the population distribution in Kirkuk. He accused Iraqi Kurds of displacing Kirkuk's Turkmen population and of seeking hegemony over the area's natural resources. Yalcin added that 40% of Iraq's oil resources is in this area and should be used for the benefit of all Iraqis. "This is a very sensitive issue and known by all U.S. troops," he said, implying that we were standing by and allowing the Kurds to take over Kirkuk. ¶5. (C) Yalcin pressed the U.S. to take active steps to provide security for Turkish truck drivers in Iraq, many of whom carry goods for coalition use (ref a). He claimed that 32 drivers have been murdered and over 70 attacked, and that the Turkish MFA was working on the problem. He noted the importance of the Turkish GLOC, and that if the GLOC were to close (due to the unwillingness of drivers to drive) the coalition would have to use the Persian Gulf for supply, which would not be convenient. ¶6. (C) Yalcin noted the October 3 target date for dissolution of the Peace Monitoring Force (PMF) in northern Iraq, noting agreement among the Turkish MFA, MNF-North, and TGS. He pointed out the issue that the IIG will need to provide employment for the Iraqi members of this force (ref b). ¶7. (C) Comment: This combative style is typical for Yalcin, but it is in strict contrast to the pleasant demeanor of most Turkish flag and general officers. As J3, his job is operations, and the infiltration of PKK/Kongra-Gel members into Turkey from Iraq has become one of his biggest challenges. This may explain why he, more than any other military officer, would get so passionate about our lack of action. End comment. ¶8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. EDELMAN