FOREIGN MINISTER WALKS BACK HIS THREAT TO CUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005190

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER WALKS BACK HIS THREAT TO CUT
COOPERATION ON IRAQ

REF: ANKARA 5140 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: FonMin Gul told the press Sept. 13 that if
civilian casualties continue to mount in the Talafar
operation, Turkey would end its cooperation with the U.S. on
Iraq. Ambassador spoke with MFA Undersecretary-designate
Tuygan and A/DCM with MFA's spokesman Sept. 14 to register
our displeasure with Gul's comments, and Gul walked himself
back in comments to the press later the same day. We do not
believe Turkey's overall approach to Iraq has changed, but
the GOT seeks a broader dialogue on the future of Iraq. End
summary.


2. (C) According to Turkish press reports, upon his Sept. 13
return from a trip to the Baltic states, FonMin Abdullah Gul
stated that the coalition operation in the northern Iraqi
city of Talafar was harming the civilian, mainly Turkmen,
population there, and he threatened that if this were to
continue, Turkey would end its cooperation with the U.S. in
Iraq. (Comment: Gul's statement was wholly inconsistent with
what the GOT has been telling both the public and us. The
Turks' line up to now has been that they recognize the
necessity of the operation in Talafar, but urge that we can
to end the operation quickly, minimize civilian casualties,
and facilitate GOT efforts to provide humanitarian assistance
to the city (see refs). End comment.)


3. (C) A/DCM contacted Gul's spokesman, Namik Tan, Sept. 14
to seek clarification of Gul's statements from the previous
evening. A/DCM emphasized to Tan that the FonMin's comments
were inconsistent with both the private and public line the
GOT has taken, and passed the message that Embassy Ankara and
Washington were deeply disturbed by Gul's comments. Tan
(protect) responded that Gul had made his comments at an
event at which Tan was not present, and that he (Tan) had
worked hard during Gul's Baltic trip to keep the minister on
message. Tan went on to say that in his personal
interpretation Gul was really speaking to two audiences: the
Turkish people and the radicalized Arab world. Tan said that
the GOT, including Gul, was feeling pressure from the Turkish
people regarding the rising number of kidnapped and murdered
Turkish truckers in Iraq. Additionally, Tan surmised that
Gul was seeking to imply to radicalized Arabs that Turkey was
distancing itself from U.S. Iraq policy. Tan told A/DCM in a
subsequent conversation that he had spoken to Gul the morning
of Sept. 14, shared the embassy's concerns, and advised him
not to take such a tough line next time he had contact with
the press.


4. (C) Ambassador then contacted Undersecretary-designate Ali
Tuygan Sept. 14 to register our concerns and seek
clarification: Was the GOT contemplating ceasing our
cooperation on Iraq, including on humanitarian aid for
Talafar? Tuygan responded that the GOT is not planning to do
so, and indeed our cooperation was all the more urgent given
the Turks' desire to get humanitarian aid to Talafar. Tuygan
said that the Minister's statement was meant to highlight
Turkey's overall concerns about Iraq, and was broader than
just Talafar. He told the Ambassador that the GOT sought a
wider dialogue on Iraq policy with the U.S.; he noted that we
generally discussed only logistics and crises: kidnapped and
murdered Turkish truck drivers, the Incirlik cargo hub, and
now Talafar. Turkey shares the goal with us of a peaceful
and prosperous Iraq, Tuygan emphasized. Ambassador
registered the point, but also urged the Turkish embassy in
Baghdad to avail itself of both the IIG and our embassy there.


5. (U) Comment: We are trying to correct the public record on
Talafar, most recently when the Ambassador spoke to the press
following his meeting with U/S Tuygan on Sept. 13 (see
reftel). Ambassador emphasized that the operation was not
aimed at the city's civilian population and that eyewitness
accounts made clear that coalition and ING forces took "great
care to minimize civilian casualties." Ambassador
specifically took issue with characterizations by Turkmen
sources of "genocide" and that 95% of Talafar had been
destroyed. He urged everyone to operate on the basis of
facts, not outlandish charges. He also repudiated the notion
that TFO operations were intended to change the demographic
balance in Talafar. He added that we are working with GOT
authorities to get humanitarian assistance to Talafar.
Ambassador's remarks were widely picked up in the Turkish
press Sept. 14. We will seek other opportunities in the days
ahead to repeat this story.

6. (C) Comment, cont.: Namik Tan's counsel to his minister
appears to have worked, as Gul moderated his line in a press
availability the afternoon of Sept 14. He reiterated
Turkey's desire for a peaceful Iraq, then added: "We conveyed
our worries (on Talafar) to the U.S. at the highest levels,
asking for utmost attention. They promised to do so. Our
humanitarian aid to the region will continue."


7. (C) Comment, cont.: Whatever Gul's motivations--which we
believe include fatigue from a foreign trip and ignorance of
the high-level dialogue on Talafar we carried on with his
ministry in his absence--Turkey's overall position on Iraq
appears to be unchanged. It remains in our interest to
continue cooperation on facilitating Turkish humanitarian aid
to Talafar and to work through the issues on our mutual Iraq
agenda (a unified, federal Iraq; trucker security; continued
PKK presence in northern Iraq; Incirlik cargo hub). The GOT
is under pressure from both the press and its people to
disengage from Iraq, pressure that we need to counterbalance
by reminding the Turks of their long-term interests and also
by engaging them on their policy concerns. End comment.


8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN