TURKS SEEK AVENUE TO GET HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 005140

SIPDIS

DEFENSE ALSO FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
BAGHDAD ALSO FOR DCM JEFFREY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/12/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: TURKS SEEK AVENUE TO GET HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
TO TALAFAR, REITERATE CONCERNS RE CASUALTIES AND ETHNIC
BALANCE

REF: A. ANKARA 5117


B. ANKARA 5100

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Turkey urgently seeks first-hand access to
Talafar to evaluate the situation there to provide
humanitarian assistance to this predominantly Turkmen Iraqi
city, MFA Undersecretary-designate Tuygan told the Ambassador
on Sept. 13. GOT continues to be concerned about getting
accurate casualty figures, the alleged presence of peshmerga
units in the city, and the ethnic future of not only Talafar,
but the entire Ninewah province. GOT is taking a moderate
public line, but is feeling pressure from the Turkish people
and an unhelpful press. Our facilitation of Turkish
humanitarian aid would take pressure off the GOT and head off
its contemplating steps harmful to our efforts in Iraq. End
summary.


2. (C) MFA Undersecretary-designate Ali Tuygan called in
Ambassador Sept. 13 to discuss the situation in Talafar (see
refs). Ambassador informed Tuygan that the USG was fully
apprised at very high levels of Turkish concerns regarding
this predominantly Turkmen city. Deputy Defense Secretary
Wolfowitz had also informed Ambassador that he had agreed to
the Turkish request for a POC to help coordinate the Turkish
effort to get humanitarian supplies into the city.


3. (C) U/S Tuygan said he appreciated the Ambassador's
readout, but reiterated several Turkish concerns. First, he
claimed that the Talafar region had been a peaceful one until
the latest round of operations. He noted reports that about
200 insurgents had entered the city, and questioned whether
the magnitude of force that the coalition had applied was
necessary for what he termed a relatively small number of
insurgents. Tuygan repeated GOT concerns (see ref a) about
the presence of peshmerga (in Iraqi uniform),and highlighted
the GOT's sensitivity about peshmerga operations in Talafar.


4. (C) Finally, Tuygan added that the GOT was having a hard
time getting a clear report from the ground on the situation
in Talafar, including accurate casualty figures, since the
Turkish Special Forces in the area do not have access to the
city. (Note: According to Task Force Olympia's LNO to the
Turkish military in northern Iraq, it is the Turkish military
itself which has ordered its SF in Talafar to hunker down
near the airport and not to venture into town. End note.)
Without first-hand knowledge, Tuygan said, the GOT is forced
to rely on U.S. reports, its own limited intelligence
reporting, and reports from Turkmen sources. (Comment: Some
Turkmen sources have wildly exaggerated civilian casualty
figures to the Turkish press, and the Iraqi Turkmen Front's
representative in Ankara has made extremely unhelpful
comments to the press, characterizing the coalition operation
as "genocide" and as a bid to wrest Talafar from Turkmen
control and hand it over to the Kurds. End comment.)
Ambassador noted that the Turkish LNOs at Task Force Olympia
HQ in Mosul are receiving full briefings on the operation,
but Tuygan responded that the GOT was seeking first-hand
reports.


5. (C) On the Turkish effort to send humanitarian assistance
to Talafar, Tuygan reported that the Turkish Embassy in
Baghdad had contacted the IIG's Acting Foreign Minister, who
had agreed to the Embassy's request to provide Turkish
assistance to the city. According to Tuygan, the minister
referred the embassy to the Governor of Mosul for "practical
arrangements." Tuygan reiterated the need for Turkish LNOs
to gain access to Talafar in order to assess the humanitarian
needs there and report to Ankara.


6. (C) Tuygan then turned to Turkish concerns regarding the
future of Talafar's ethnic makeup. He requested that by no
means should U.S. forces withdraw and leave peshmerga in
charge of the city. He said that for the GOT, the ethnic
makeup of Talafar was related to its concerns that Kurds are
attempting to shift the ethnic balance in Kirkuk in their
favor. Tuygan said the Turks do not want ethnic strife to
come to Talafar. MFA Deputy DG for the Middle East Safak
Gokturk added that Turkey was concerned that Talafar could
now be seen by those Kurds who are now seeking to disrupt
Kirkuk as a soft target, a place where the ethnic balance in
Iraq could be shifted. The entire province of Ninewah could
be in play, he said.


7. (C) Ambassador made three main points in response to
Tuygan. First, since we are dealing with a real-time
battlefield situation, we should be cautious about claims
made in the press, especially those by organizations such as
the ITF. He cited outlandish reports in the Turkish press,
such as that 95% of the city had been destroyed. Ambassador
noted the care that coalition troops took to spare the
civilian population, and also cited our own preliminary
estimates of anywhere from 12-20 civilians killed and 20-50
wounded. He added that Iraqi doctors had reported that most
of the injuries seemed to be from mortar (e.g., insurgent)
fire, flying debris, and indirect fire.


8. (C) Second, Ambassador rejected Tuygan's claim that
coalition use of force was disproportionate to the threat
("only" 200 or so insurgents). He noted that the USG and GOT
share the goal of returning full sovereignty to the Iraqis,
and that by rooting out the insurgency the coalition was
seeking to help the IIG assert its authority. Najaf and
Fallujah regrettably showed that it only takes a relatively
small number of insurgents to cause widespread disorder,
noting reports that up to 50,000 people fled Talafar when the
insurgents moved in, well in advance of the coalition
operation there. He reminded Tuygan of what life had been
like in Najaf under Muqtada al-Sadr.


9. (C) Third, Ambassador addressed the issue of ethnic
balance. He said there have been no widespread attempts by
Kurds to take over Turkmen houses or flood the city with
Kurds. Moreover, coalition forces have set up control
checkpoints in and around Talafar to deter any such attempts.
Ambassador also pointed out that there are in fact no
peshmerga units in Talafar, though there are some Iraqi Kurds
in ING forces there. Finally, Ambassador said he is working
closely with Washington and Baghdad to ensure that everyone
understands the extreme sensitivity that surrounds the ethnic
make-up of Talafar's new civilian administration.


10. (C) Tuygan responded that the current situation in
Talafar should not be viewed in isolation. The GOT is
concerned that the Turkmen are dissatisfied with their
participation in the new Iraq, and complained that first CPA
and now the IIG have made insufficient efforts to recruit
Turkmen into the ING. Perhaps if this had happened, Tuygan
mused, local Talafar authorities could have defended
themselves better against the insurgents in the first place.


11. (C) Ambassador responded that we understand that the
Turkmen of Talafar have generally tried to avoid being drawn
into the conflict, that the town's residents were primarily
merchants, not fighters, and for that very reason was
vulnerable to the insurgency.


12. (C) Tuygan took the Ambassador's point regarding
irresponsible statements by the ITF, and added that in its
own statements the GOT has tried to be balanced and to point
out that the battle in Talafar is neither between the U.S.
and Turkey nor the U.S. and the Turkmen people. He
reiterated his point that for the GOT, getting humanitarian
assistance to Talafar and accessing the city were of greatest
importance now. Ambassador repeated our offer to assist on
both scores.


13. (C) Comment: While it is true that at times the Turks
have invoked the Turkmen minority in Iraq as a wedge to
insert its own interests there, Turkish public opinion
regarding the Turkmen is of genuine concern, especially when
paired with the press asking why the U.S. military will exert
such an effort to root out 200 insurgents but will not take
action against the PKK, a terrorist organization responsible
for the death of thousands of innocent Turkish civilians over
the years. The GOT has sought to take a moderate stance, but
it must demonstrate to the Turkish people that it is capable
of helping the Turkmen. Our facilitation of Turkish efforts
to get humanitarian assistance to Talafar is therefore
essential, as it will take pressure off the GOT and preclude
its consideration of steps detrimental to our efforts in
Iraq. End comment.


14. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN