AMBASSADOR'S SEPT. 1 MEETING WITH FONMIN GUL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 005029

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN MARR TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S SEPT. 1 MEETING WITH FONMIN GUL

(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador reiterated U.S. support for
Turkey's EU candidacy; pressed for Turkish agreement with
Greece/Cyprus to forego annual exercises in Aegean and
Cyprus; urged Turkey to use its weight in OIC to persuade
Sudan to abide by UNSC resolutions on Darfur; asked for a
rapid decision on the U.S. request to use Incirlik airbase as
an air mobility/logistics hub; urged an opening to ARMENIA
and a firm line on Iran; and probed FonMin Gul's thinking on
the future of U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations. Asserting he
had been firm with the Iranians regarding nukes, Gul gave
vague answers on the other subjects. In turn he expressed
frustration at EU delay on ending the isolation of Turkish
Cypriots and pressed for joint action on trucker security in
Iraq and U.S. action against the PKK. End summary.


2. (C) Opening by passing Gul the draft agenda for the Sept.
24 Forum for the Future (FFF) meeting on the margins of UNGA,
Ambassador underscored President Bush's enduring commitment
to BMENA and his realism regarding the long-term nature of
the initiative; the bipartisan support for BMENA means it
will remain a key element of U.S. policy. Turkey can play a
constructive role as well.


3. (C) Gul confirmed that he will attend the FFF meeting and
Turkey will also attend the U.S. Treasury-hosted separate
meeting for finance ministers. Concerning BMENA, Gul averred
that Turkey believes in the issues: "I am very sincere when I
say we want to be active," he asserted. But Turkey should be
more active on its own, he added; this is a strategic
position, and Turkish involvement through its own official
and unofficial efforts (NGOs, intellectuals) is at the top of
his agenda, he added.

--
EU
--


4. (C) Ambassador noted that a date for Turkey's accession
negotiations -- which the U.S. foresees the EU granting at
its December summit -- will not only be a great
accomplishment for Turkey but also validate 40 years of U.S.
support for Turkey's candidacy. We understand some EU member
states would prefer not to hear U.S. views, but the U.S. will
continue to support Turkey's candidacy in a helpful and
appropriate way. A the same time it will be crucial for
Turkey to take advantage of the Dutch presidency; in our
experience the Dutch Embassy in Ankara is committed to
improving the channels of communication between Ankara and
Brussels/capitals (Note: the Dutch Embassy has told us the
Turks do not make it easy for them to manage the process and
has acknowledged that the Turks find the Dutch Ambassador --
who has some of the broadest Turkish contacts among EU
Ambassadors -- overbearing. End note)


5. (C) Gul made as if to brush aside EU resentment of U.S.
support. An EU yes in December will have positive
repercussions in Muslim countries, which are closely
monitoring what happens to Turkey's candidacy, he said.
These countries think that a green light to Turkey's
accession negotiations will mean EU recognition of the need
not to isolate the Muslim world and expect that Turkey's
accession will provide a link for them to the EU.

--------------
Aegean/Cyprus Military Exercises
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador noted he had raised with D/CHOD Basbug the
Greeks' and Greek Cypriots' willingness to cancel this year's
Aegean and Cyprus exercises if Turkey will do so. Gul
responded that the MFA needs to consult with military experts
before taking a decision; in any event, relations are better
between Turkey and Greece.

--------------
Northern Cyprus
--------------


7. (C) Gul segued into strong Turkish discomfort at the EU's
failure to move expeditiously to end Turkish Cypriot
isolation. Months have passed and the Council's legal
committee, headed by a Greek, has decided there must be a
unanimous decision on the Council's program to end isolation,
a program which does not meet all of Turkey's and the Turkish
Cypriots' expectations. Turkey supported the Turkish
Cypriots' yes in the April referendum and the Turkish side is
being punished; the Greek Cypriots said no and are being
rewarded. Talat is also frustrated. The EU should act
wisely instead of small-mindedly; mutual trust depends on it.
At the same time Turkey appreciates U.S. efforts.

8 (C) Ambassador expressed disappointment at the EU approach,
a disappointment shared by the UK. The U.S. is working on
the possibility of direct flights, most likely through code
share arrangements with existing flights.

--------------
OIC and Darfur
--------------


9. (C) Underscoring Secretary Powell's personal engagement in
seeking Sudanese compliance with UNSC resolutions and a
end to the persecutions and killings in Darfur, Ambassador
noted that the Janjaweed militias continue to wreak havoc.
The U.S. always supported election of a Turk as OIC SecGen,
and we hope Turkey as ministerial chairman in office will use
its influence in OIC to have Sudan abide by UNSC resolutions.
Darfur will undoubtedly be an important subject when Gul
meets Secretary Powell at UNGA.


10. (C) Claiming he had advised the Sudanese FonMin during
the latter's recent visit to hew to UNSC resolutions, Gul
gave a general answer and expressed an interest in seeing the
situation on the ground for himself. One of his aides
present in the meeting chimed in that Gul would receive a
full briefing Sept. 2 and that Turkey will send two
planeloads of humanitarian assistance, accompanied by a
minister and MPs, within a couple of weeks.

--------------
ARMENIA
--------------


11. (C) As Ambassador explained how steps by Turkey to open
its border or allow increased economic exchanges will help
the Administration manage the "ARMENIAn Genocide" issue.
Ambassador continued: a tripartite meeting with Gul's
ARMENIAn and Azerbaijani counterparts on the margins of UNGA
which moved the ball forward or Turkish success in getting
Russia to persuade ARMENIA to be more forthcoming on some of
the occupied territories would also be helpful.


12. (C) Gul responded that he hoped to meet his counterparts
in New York and hoped such a meeting would be more meaningful
than previous ones. Turkey should indeed have relations with
its smaller neighbor, and has shown its good intentions by
allowing charter flights and transit of third-country goods.
However, ARMENIA needs to make a gesture, for instance
withdrawal from a few of the occupied regions. Turkey has
told Azerbaijan that the situation cannot continue as is; at
the same time ARMENIA must make a move. Oskanian is clever
and rational, but we don't know if he is capable of movement;
Turkey will ask the Russians (note: Putin was scheduled to
pay a Sept. 2-3 visit, but postponed at last minute. End
note) to use their leverage on the ARMENIAns, but we don't
know if the Russians prefer the problem to be solved or not,
Gul stated.

--------------
Incirlik Military Transport Hub
--------------


13. (C) Ambassador reiterated the U.S. request to use the
Incirlik airbase as an air mobility and logistics hub; the
sooner the Turks could respond, the better. Gul limited
himself to noting that the GOT is working the issue and
continues to consult with the Turkish military.

--------------
Whither Bilateral Relations?
--------------


14. (C) Recalling that a new poll shows Turkish approval of
the U.S. even lower than the poll results from France,
Ambassador noted the U.S. view that Turkey does not have to
choose between the U.S. and Europe but asked Gul how he sees
bilateral relations evolving in the longer term if Turkey
indeed gets an accession negotiation start date from the EU
and moves closer to Europe.


15. (C) Initially at a loss for words, and with his
notetakers -- all career diplomats -- looking uncomfortable,
Gul then made a series of general remarks about relations not
being artificial or conjunctural but continuing "as they
are." Ambassador recalled that he had previously encountered
the Eurasia theory when dealing with then-Russian FonMin,
later PM, Primakov, and was surprised to find a similar
discourse in Turkey, with figures across the spectrum on both
right and left espousing Eurasianism as an alternative to the
U.S. or EU. Gul's special assistant Turkoglu jumped in to
characterize Eurasia's adherents as very marginal. Another
notetaker from MFA Policy Planning also hastened to dismiss
Eurasia as an alternative to good relations with the U.S.
Gul then stated that both "intellectually" and as a statesman
he thinks Turkish-U.S. relations "will always be very
special."

--------------
Iran
--------------


16. (C) Noting Graham Fuller's recently articulated view that
the U.S. has to take account of Turkey's increased role in
peripheral regions, Ambassador underscored that what will
draw Washington's attention is Turkey's policy toward an Iran
pursuing nukes. Gul asserted he had warned a high ranking
Iranian emissary a few months ago that Iran could not manage
to pull this policy off and should take a lesson from what
happened to Saddam. The Iranians, who had come looking for
Turkish support, were upset, Gul claimed, "because they
didn't expect to hear this message from me."

--------------
Turkish Driver/Worker Security in Iraq
--------------


17. (C) Gul expressed concern that the problem of security
for Turkish drivers and workers is getting more serious. The
Turks have intelligence that Iraqi kidnappers have sources
inside the compounds. On at least five occasions Iraqi
police have worked in league with kidnappers by alerting them
to the onward route of Turkish drivers they temporarily
detain at police stations. therefore it is crucial to work
together to increase security, Gul stated. Ambassador noted
he had spoken to Minister for Foreign Trade Tuzmen Aug. 30
and, at Tuzmen's invitation, would call on him shortly to
continue to discuss security cooperation; to the Turkish
Union of Chambers; the truck drivers' association; and to
high-ranking USG officials, asking for help from Washington
and from the U.S. embassy and military in Iraq.

---
PKK
---


18. (C) Gul recalled his previous day's TV interview in which
he had warned Turkey would keep all its options open,
including cross-border incursions into Iraq. Every day
Turkey is losing soldiers in the renewed fighting with the
PKK, and the Turkish people are susceptible to the resulting
anti-American propaganda. Ambassador noted our continuing
joint intelligence work and the non-military actions we are
considering. Regarding how to deal with the PKK stronghold
on Kandil Mountain, the TGS would agree -- from its own
experience -- how tough it would be to take out the
stronghold militarily. In addition, the U.S. continues to
confront serious disorder elsewhere in Iraq.

--------------
Aiyos Mamas Church
--------------


19. (C) At meeting's end Ambassador raised the lack of a GOT
statement condemning the Aug. 27 bomb attack on Aiyos Mamas
church in Guzelyurt/Morphou, northern Cyprus. A statement
would help in the runup to the EU's December summit. Gul
answered coldly that "PM" Talat had issued a statement and
that his (Gul's) own general comment had been overlooked by
the press. At this point DDG for the Americas Ilicak jumped
in to point out that the MFA spokesman might have an
opportunity to say something at the regular press conference
later.
EDELMAN