TIP IN TURKEY: AUSTRALIAN INVESTIGATION REPORT I

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 ANKARA 004503

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR G/TIP, G, INL, DRL, EUR/PGI, EUR/SE
DEPARTMENT FOR INR/IC/TIPOFF, CA/VO/L/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2014
TAGS: KCRM KVPR PGOV PHUM PREF SMIG TU AU PINR TIP IN TURKEY
SUBJECT: TIP IN TURKEY: AUSTRALIAN INVESTIGATION REPORT I

REF: ANKARA 4502

(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.4
(b,d).


1. (C) The following confidential investigation report
compiled by Australian Federal Police agent Shawn Selles
includes names and contact information for suspected human
smugglers described in reftel.

TURKISH-BASED PEOPLE SMUGGLING NETWORK OPERATING TO AUSTRALIA
AND OTHER COUNTRIES

Background

Under a whole-of-government, approach to combat people
smuggling to Australia, the Australian Government has funded
a dedicated joint agency People Smuggling Strike Team (PSST)
comprising both Australian Federal Police and Immigration
officials. This team has an intelligence and investigation
component and targets all aspects of organised people
smuggling to Australia.

On 4 November 2003, an Indonesian fishing vessel "Minasa Bone
2" (designated Suspect Illegal Entry Vessel 14 - SIEV 14),
arrived at Melville Island carrying 14 Turkish nationals and
4 Indonesian crew members on board. The 14 Turkish nationals
had been attempting to illegally enter Australia. Operation
SALVINI is the PSST investigation into the incident.

The PSST has identified a people smuggling network operating
within Turkey and Indonesia with some Australian connections
as being responsible for this venture. The aim of Operation
SALVINI is to disrupt or dismantle this network.

The principal member, Mehmet SERIBAN, was arrested in March
2004 by the PSST and is currently before court in Australia
facing several people smuggling charges. Another
investigation focus at the present is the collection of
evidence against Ali CETIN, residing in Sydney Australia, for
his involvement in the above venture. Longer term aspects of
the investigation will include prosecuting Muslim SERIBAN,
Bayram ASLAN, and Eyup BASAR, for their involvements in
people smuggling to Australia. To enable such outcomes, the
assistance of Turkish and Indonesian law enforcement
authorities will be important.

This document provides a basic overview of the various
persons of interest within this network. Source documents
for this information are retained by PSST members.


Overview - "Seriban" People Smuggling Network

The "Seriban" people smuggling network operates within Turkey
and Indonesia, and has some Australian connections. The
network is predominantly comprised of Turkish-born persons,
some of whom have obtained Australian citizenship. The
network also obtains significant assistance from a number of
Indonesian nationals. There are a number of family
connections between the Turkish born persons in this network.


Australia is the main destination country for the potential
illegal immigrants (PIIs) used by this network. Based on
intelligence obtained from various Australian authorities,
this network is believed to be responsible for the arrival of
over 250 Turkish / Kurdish illegal immigrants to Australia on
14 separate vessels from 1993 to the present.

In addition to Australia, there is intelligence which
indicates that the network may have smuggled persons to
Germany in the mid to late 1990,s. More recently,
intelligence has been received indicating that the network is
now shifting its focus to other possible destinations
including Canada, New Zealand, and possibly also Korea (B2).

The cost for smuggling to Australia has ranged from $4,000 to
$12,000 USD per person but generally averages between $5,000
- $7,000 USD per person. For the most recent venture (SIEV
14),the majority of the PIIs paid about $7,500 USD each. In
almost all instances, part payment would be made in Turkey to
cover the cost of airline tickets to Indonesia (the transit
country used by the network) plus some initial profit gain,
with the bulk of the monies to be paid after arrival in
Indonesia.

Source Country / Recruiting

Turkey is the source country of the PIIs for this network.
People of Kurdish ethnicity and of Alevi faith from the
Gaziantep and Adiyaman regions of south-eastern Turkey near
the Syrian border are the main targets for this network.
Turks are also targeted from these regions but to a lesser
extent. The PIIs are recruited through word of mouth (the
network has an established reputation in the region),and
also through active recruiting. Regarding the former, there
were a number of locations of interest known to be frequented
by the network members. These were mostly local coffee shops
and sometimes local travel agencies. Any person wishing to
seek out the network would go to those locations and ask the
relevant questions to establish contact.

In terms of active recruiting, individual PIIs are known to
be approached by members of the network and are asked to
recruit a certain number of people for upcoming ventures in
exchange for the waiving of their own cost of travel. At
other times the network members themselves would personally
travel in the region seeking clients,.

The members / smugglers known to operate in Turkey for this
network include (but are not limited to) Muslim SERIBAN, Eyup
BASAR, Bayram ASLAN, Hakan KARAOGLU, and Murat KARAOGLU.
Note that both Hakan and Murat operate Karaoglu Turizm - a
travel agency in Gaziantep which has an integral role in the
functioning of the network as will be described shortly.
Brief profiles of these people are also below.

As would be expected, part of the recruitment process
involves marketing the destinations (at least for Canada and
Australia). Consistent reports indicate that the network
members describe favourable working and living conditions.
Often the earning potential in Australia is grossly
exaggerated. The network members also emphasise their
previous successes to the PIIs - typically, the PIIs will be
told of other people in their own town or region who have
been smuggled by the network. It is normally around this
time that network members also provide information relating
to the immigration processes (Australia) to the PIIs and also
give them some initial coaching as to what to say when they
arrive in Australia to increase their success for refugee
claims. They are also coached as to what to say to law
enforcement officials if asked questions about the network
itself (eg, told to use false names and false descriptions,
told to tell officials they are tourists etc).

Once a PII decides to engage the services of this network,
the smugglers would then provide them with information about
how to obtain airline tickets (always return air tickets to
avoid suspicion from authorities) and passports. The tickets
are almost always organised by Hakan and Murat KARAOGLU of
the Karaoglu Turizm located in Gaziantep. Typically, the PII
is quoted an inflated price for the ticket and Hakan/Murat
then keep the balance as their commission,. Further
details about Hakan and Murat are below.

The PIIs typically apply for their own passports prior to
departing. In cases where this is not possible, the network
members ask the PIIs to supply passport photographs of
themselves and personal information as well as some
additional cash (usually a few hundred dollars). They then
use their own contacts (some reports indicate these are
government officials. One witness has said this was a "high
ranking" official) to obtain the passports. The passports
themselves are reportedly produced and manufactured
normally, and, except on a few known occasions, are
generally in the correct name of the PII. As the passports
are collected by the network in Indonesia or disposed of by
the passengers prior to arriving at the destination country,
no examples have been obtained by the PSST.

Prior to departing for Indonesia (the transit country used by
this network - see next section),the PII,s are given some
further basic instructions. Often this takes place at a
local coffee shop or the Karaoglu Turizm travel agency.
Except on a few rare occasions, each PII is told they will be
met at Jakarta airport by an agent of the network. In most
cases a name for this agent is provided prior to departing.
In some cases, the PIIs are told that the agent will approach
them. They are also instructed to pay that particular agent
the remaining amount of money. These instructions are often
given to small groups of PIIs and to a lesser extent on a
one-on-one basis.

The PIIs typically make their own arrangements to travel to
the international airport (almost always Istanbul). The PIIs
often travel in small groups to Istanbul generally no more
than five persons in each group. In most cases these are the
same PIIs who had earlier received instructions together.
Similarly, the PIIs often travel to Indonesia in small groups
at staggered times. Many PIIs have described meeting other
PIIs either at the international airport, on the flight, and
at Jakarta airport by chance (eg, were previously unaware of
the others).

Except on rare occasions, the network members are not at the
point of departure nor do they travel with the PIIs on the
plane. The PIIs interviewed have indicated they travelled
with either Gulf-Air, Emirates, Malaysian Airlines or Turkish
Airlines. Gulf-Air appears to be preferred as it is cheaper
than the others. The route is normally via a stop-over in
Bahrain and/or Dubai or Abu Dhabi, then a further stop-over
in either Bangkok or Singapore or Kuala Lumpur, then onto
Jakarta.

There have been instances of PIIs being detained and
questioned at Istanbul airport by the Istanbul Airport
Police. The questioning has been in relation to their
destination, at other times in relation to the smugglers.
Some of the questions asked points to the Turkish authorities
having some knowledge about the existence of this network.
In some cases the PIIs are released, in others they have paid
bribes to be released.
Transit Country Activity

Indonesia is the transit country used by this network. There
are a variety of favourable conditions for the network: they
have a wide range of local and Turkish-born contacts in
Indonesia; labour, and infrastructure (eg, crew and
vessels) is cheap; officials can be bribed; law enforcement
authorities operate in silo,s,; external and internal
borders are relatively porous; and there is an absence of
people smuggling legislation and therefore no Mutual
Assistance / Extradition treaties (at least with Australia).
Of course, Indonesia is also in close geographic proximity to
Australia and New Zealand.

When the PIIs arrive in Jakarta they are met either by Mehmet
SERIBAN or by an Indonesian associate after going through the
customs line. Some PIIs have stated that they encountered
problems with the Customs or Immigration officials by the
Indonesian authorities but these were successfully resolved
with a small bribe. The PIIs are then conveyed to a local
hotel or pension, usually one which has been used previously
by the network such as the Hotel Menteng 1 and 2 (these are
discussed later in this document),for a brief stay. The
PIIs are then moved to an outlying island, sometimes there
are several transits to these islands. The final staging
points have included Bali, Larantuka and Maumere (Flores),
Kupang (Timor),Makassar (Sulawesi),to name a few. As in
Jakarta, both hotels and pensions are used to accommodate the
PIIs on these islands. As noted previously, the PIIs
typically arrive in staggered small groups to Jakarta. These
small groups gradually accrete at points along the way right
up to the final departure point. The isolation of these
small groups by the network is effective such that the PIIs
often are not aware what their final number will be until at
the point of departure.

At all times, an Indonesian assistant or two maintains vigil
over each group to ensure that the PIIs do not encounter any
problems. Without exception, none of the Indonesian
associates used has spoken or understood Turkish. Mehmet
SERIBAN himself keeps at arms length from the PIIs with only
sporadic visits to the hotels/pensions. On these visits
Mehmet provides further instructions about the venture and
further coaching about what details to tell the authorities
if detected. Likewise, it is normally during one of these
visits that payment is made.
In early ventures, the network often accepted payment at
relatively late stages of the venture, that is, at the second
or third transit point or in some cases even at the final
point of departure. However, by that stage the PIIs had
often spent a proportion of their dedicated smuggling,
monies or refused to pay the full amount until after they had
arrived in Australia. Therefore, in more recent ventures the
network asked for payment from the PIIs very shortly after
arrival in Jakarta. In addition to ensuring they got their
agreed monies this had the added effect of increasing the
feelings of vulnerability in the PIIs in Indonesia and thus
increased their dependence on the network.
If the PIIs expressed any doubts about the venture or refused
to pay they were not physically threatened. Instead, they
would be subtly told they would be left to their own devices
in Indonesia. Abandonment was certainly seen as a threat by
the PIIs as they did not know anything about the local
conditions or language, they often had already had given
their passports and airline tickets to the smugglers, and
they had already outlaid significant sums of monies. Unlike
other networks known to operate to Australia, all the PIIs
spoken to said they were never threatened with, or subject to
physical violence at any stage, nor were any firearms/weapons
seen.

In several instances, the PIIs were detected by Indonesian
law enforcement officials (in the "Gnowangerup" venture, the
police in Kupang actually turned back the same PIIs on three
occasions after arriving from Bali). There are no known
examples of a venture being wholly disrupted by Indonesian
law enforcement officials but there has been interference
with has meant that plans were changed such as using a
different departure point. There are several mentions of
Indonesian law enforcement officials being bribed to either
ignore the PIIs and, in some cases, to facilitate their
movement.

Information from PIIs travelling on the last several most
recent SIEVs, is that Mehmet SERIBAN made the arrangement for
the vessels only after the PIIs had arrived or begun to
arrive in Indonesia. Evidence indicates, and Mehmet SERIBAN
himself has admitted, that he often used local Indonesians as
interlocutors with local fishermen to make the arrangements
for the fishing vessels and crew to take the PIIs to
Australia. In the most recent venture (SIEV 14),Mehmet
SERIBAN paid 130 million Indonesian Rupiah (roughly $20,000
AUD) for the hiring of the vessel and four Indonesian crew
members (one of which was the boat owner). Anecdotally,
Indonesian crew members will try and avoid apprehension by
Australian authorities. However, it is well known that if
they are caught their sentence will be relatively light
(typically several months for first offenders) and that
conditions in Australian prisons can actually be more
favourable to their own normal living conditions.

Once a vessel is arranged, the PIIs are given only short
notice that they will be departing. They are then conveyed
to a secluded departure location, usually a deserted stretch
of beach. In some cases the vessel was at the location
already but in most cases the PIIs were required to hide and
wait for several hours sometimes days until the vessel
arrived. The unreliability of the Indonesian crew and vessel
resulted in many false starts, at the final departure
point. Mehmet SERIBAN himself is sometimes at the final
departure point, but more often delegates that role to an
Indonesian associate. It is normally just before the PIIs
are about to board the vessel that the airline tickets and
passports are collected. It is likely they are not collected
earlier in case the PIIs are approached by local authorities.


In all instances, the vessels used have been wooden
Indonesian fishing vessels of limited size, and powered by
sail and diesel engine. As expected, the food on these
vessels is of poor quality (often rotten) and water is
limited. Lifejackets are non-existent. Unlike some other
people smuggling networks, Mehmet and others have never
invested, in upgrading or reconditioning the engine or
vessel. Many PIIs were led to believe, whether by design or
otherwise, that they would travel on large metal-hulled ships
to Australia. Understandably they were shocked when they saw
their transport.

The network members take advantages of any opportunities that
present themselves. In a number of ventures other well known
people smugglers in Indonesia have partnered with Mehmet
SERIBAN and arranged for their own PIIs to travel on vessels
organised by him (eg, SIEVs "Ord", "Isa", Tabletop"). In the
case of SIEV 06 ("Draco") the roles were reversed and Mehmet
had in fact arranged for his PIIs to travel on a vessel
organised by others.

Arrivals in Australia
With the exception of SIEV 14 (Melville Island) and SIEV
"Draco" (Christmas Island),all vessels from this network
went to Ashmore Reef which is an outlying territory of
Australia in the Timor Sea - about 840 kilometers west of
Darwin and 610 kilometers north of Broome. After September
2001 this reef/island system (amongst others) was excluded
from Australia,s migration zone by the Government as a
policy response to the increasing problem of illegal boat
arrivals.

The network often relied on Australian media coverage to
learn of the success of their venture. Some PIIs actually
contacted the network members by phone and informed them they
had arrived. For example, in the"Gnowangerup" matter Mehmet
stated that he was contacted by at least two of the 14 PIIs
who told him not only that they had arrived, but also that
they had reported him to the authorities due to the anger
they felt at the "condition" of the boat and the
circumstances of their voyage.

Other PIIs (particularly the "Ord" and "Warrego" SIEVs) have
stated that Mehmet SERIBAN has used associates and relatives
in Australia to contact them. The common theme in these
phone calls is that Mehmet SERIBAN had indicated that he was
poor, that things were not well in Indonesia as the
Australians and Indonesians were pursuing him, and he then
asked those persons if they could transfer some money to him
to help them out. It appears that Mehmet believed that the
PIIs owed him for the service he provided and believed he was
still on good terms with these people - a sentiment not
shared by those PIIs he contacted. In March / April 2004,
just before his arrest, Mehmet contacted a witness whom had
been approached by the media and told them various
information about Mehmet SERIBAN. On this occasion Mehmet
indicated he would "settle accounts" (eg, threatened) with
the witness for reporting those things in the media.
Activity of the Network Since Mehmet SERIBAN,s Arrest

In February 2004, the PSST received information that Bayram
ASLAN and Muslim SERIBAN were recruiting PIIs in Gaziantep
and Adiyaman for an upcoming venture (F6). In March 2004,
further information was received indicating that Muslim
SERIBAN was about to travel to Indonesia with a group of PIIs
(C3). In April 2004, checks confirmed that Muslim SERIBAN
and three Turkish nationals (identified by the PSST) had
travelled to Indonesia. Their activities were monitored in
Indonesia. An overt approach was eventually made by
Indonesian and Australian law enforcement authorities to
Muslim and the three PIIs at their hotel. They all stated
they were tourists and denied any involvement in people
smuggling. Within a few days they had all returned to
Turkey.

Although not confirmed, PSST intelligence strongly points to
Muslim SERIBAN attempting to put those three persons on a
vessel being organised by another well-known smuggling group.
It is believed that this vessel was bound for New Zealand.

The PSST has information that Muslim is now residing in
Gaziantep. He is reported as saying that the Indonesian
authorities were cracking down, on Turks in Indonesia,
that he now wanted to travel to New Zealand to live and would
take three or four persons with him to New Zealand to fund
his own travel. It is not known how he intends to enter New
Zealand. He has also mentioned sending people to Canada but
has said it is difficult to send people there. These details
have been provided to the relevant New Zealand and Canadian
authorities.

Information obtained in late June 2004 was that an associate
of Mehmet SERIBAN, Garip BUKDACI, who is living in Indonesia,
together with a person called "Mahmut" (no further details),
had received a number Turkish PIIs in Indonesia. These PIIs
had allegedly travelled to Indonesia via Thailand. The
intended destination for this nascent venture is not yet
known.

PSST members were until recently in regular contact with the
SIEV 14 PIIs (these persons were refused entry to Australia,
later detained in Indonesia, and then deported to Turkey).
These persons stated they had made a complaint to the local
Adiyaman police after their attempts to get their money back
from the organisers (notably Bayram ASLAN who was still in
Adiyaman at the time) had been unsuccessful. In April 2004
these persons reported that Bayram ASLAN had been arrested by
the local authorities as a result of their complaint. The
PSST has requested details from the Turkish authorities to
confirm this information as well as the nature of the
charges, however, no details have yet been received.
However, the PSST has obtained six copies of the statements
provided by those PIIs.

In July 2004, one of the witnesses reported that Bayram ASLAN
had been released on bail and had fled to Korea about one
month previously. This has not been corroborated and the
reliability of this witness is questionable (eg, this fact
had not been mentioned in previous correspondence with the
PSST).

Recent HS information arising from this investigation
indicated the presence of at least two other people smuggling
networks operating in Besni and Gaziantep respectively who
are smuggling people to Canada. The Gaziantep network is
alleged to have previously assisted in recruiting passengers
for SERIBAN to send to Australia. The Besni network is
alleged to have attempted to enter partnership with the
SERIBANs some time ago, but they (the SERIBANs) reportedly
refused. Both the Besni and Gaziantep networks are still
apparently active and this information has been passed to the
relevant Canadian authorities.

DATE OF REPORT: 2 AUGUST 2004
EDELMAN