THE TURKISH MILITARY: OZKOK TRIES TO STRIKE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 003728

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2029
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL TU PINR
SUBJECT: THE TURKISH MILITARY: OZKOK TRIES TO STRIKE
BALANCE AS DECEMBER 2004 APPROACHES

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.4 (B and D).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Turkish General Staff (TGS) CHOD GEN Ozkok continues
to balance the promotion of Turkey's EU membership prospects
by reducing the Turkish military's past position at the
commanding heights of politics with a desire to ensure that
the Turkish military is able to intervene in domestic
politics if/when necessary and appropriate. While skeptical
about PM Erdogan's intentions and capabilities, Ozkok
continues to be reluctantly open to working with Erdogan on
those reform areas that he deems necessary to give Turkey the
best shot possible at securing a favorable response from the
EU in December. He understands the concern of his service
chiefs, other senior officers and the rest of the secular
establishment that PM Erdogan and the AK Party (AKP) aim to
weaken the "secular" state. At the same time, he has taken
measures to control the message by clamping down on the
service chiefs and other members of the Turkish military,
including restricting their access to USG officials. This
has produced an apparently contradictory attitude by some
senior military officers and other committed secularists who
simultaneously attribute AKP's coming to power to
unwarranted, conspiratorial US support, and are increasingly
trying to woo US support.


2. (C) We expect these disgruntled senior military officers
to increase their efforts to reach out to US officials to try
to express their concerns and possibly undermine what Ozkok
and Erdogan appear to be doing to make the best case for
Turkey in December 2004. We recommend that Washington and
others, if approached, encourage TGS interlocutors to use
existing official channels to convey their views to ensure
that we stay on message and speak with one voice. End
summary.

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UNLIKELY BEDFELLOWS, BUT (CURRENTLY) NO CHOICE
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3. (C) TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok and PM Erdogan are not comfortable
in their relationship with one another. They continue to
meet (often one-on-one) as they have since Ozkok became CHOD
in August 2002. While their reasons may differ, Ozkok and
Erdogan share the view espoused by the majority of the
Turkish public that a Turkey anchored in the West and the EU
is the best recipe for political and economic success. Each
has a segment of his constituency that is wary of the EU and
does not believe it is in Turkey's interest to make the
necessary reforms to secure a date for accession talks in
December. Yet, there is no love lost between the two, and
the question remains whether the modus vivendi they appeared
to have established initially has held up as Ozkok has become
disillusioned with Erdogan's and AKP's behavior.


4. (C) Erdogan and Ozkok engaged in a complex game of
maneuver on Cyprus, with Ozkok making it crystal clear in his
unusual mid-April press briefing that he considered Erdogan
and the government to have veered away from the
government-military understanding on Cyprus reached at the
January 23 National Security Council meeting. How closely
the two are coordinating on Iraq also remains an unresolved
question for us.


5. (C) By all accounts, Ozkok is as ardent a defender of the
secular republic as any senior military officer and, as such,
remains highly distrustful of Erdogan and AKP's intentions.
The recent controversy over a government proposal to reform
higher education and give graduates of vocational high
schools (including religious high schools) greater access to
high education intensified the establishment's suspicion.
But the divisions between AKP and the secular establishment
are more than philosophical: Erdogan, his government and the
Anatolian heartland they represent threaten the
establishment's traditional monopoly of control over the
economy. Thus, while philosophical controversies like that
with vocational high schools may be resolved or indefinitely
postponed, the differences between AKP and the secular elite
remain profound.


6. (C) Nonetheless, Ozkok is a pragmatist and a realist: with
AKP firmly in charge of the political landscape in Turkey and
without an effective political opposition, Ozkok has no
viable alternative with whom to work. While some within the
Turkish military and the public see the military as the only
existing, functioning opposition to AKP, Ozkok correctly
recognizes the limitations (some of which have been
self-imposed by Ozkok) on the military's ability to directly
govern the country in 2004. No one is looking for the
Turkish military to take over running the country, a step
that would be the kiss of death for Turkey's EU bid and
likely for Turkey's economy as well. As a result, Ozkok has
little real alternative but to work with Erdogan to the
extent he can while allowing the military to look for ways
indirectly to exploit and exacerbate Erdogan's and AKP's
manifest weaknesses.

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OZKOK: IN CONTROL, TIGHTENING THE REIGNS
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7. (C) Ozkok continues the process of strengthening his
control over the TGS and the services he began at his first
High Military Council meeting as CHOD in August 2003. Many
of the three-star generals who ran divisions at TGS were then
retired or reassigned, and replaced by individuals with
similar backgrounds and outlooks as Ozkok. Ozkok's
preference for officers with broad international experience,
including assignments at NATO and deployments to Bosnia and
Kosovo, can be seen down to the 06 (colonel) branch chief
level in TGS. Ozkok is expected to strengthen his control
over TGS and the services through the annual promotion and
assignment process this August. For example, we do not
expect him to have difficulties with First Army Commander
(and former TGS deputy) GEN Buyukanit if the latter becomes
Land Forces Commander this summer (as expected),since
Buyukanit wants to succeed Ozkok as CHOD.


8. (C) Ozkok also has re-instituted the monthly TGS press
conference, where TGS deputy Basbug ("the face of TGS,"
according to one well-connected MFA official) delivers
lengthy statements on important foreign policy (Iraq and
Cyprus) and domestic issues, and takes questions from the
press. The purpose of these press conferences is two-fold:
to remind governing AKP and the Turkish public that the
military is following closely the many important foreign and
domestic policy issues that confronting Turkey; and two, to
let the same group know that TGS -- as opposed to the service
chiefs or retired generals -- speak for the Turkish military.
Two recent signs of efforts by Ozkok and Basbug to control
access (and thus the message) involve us: one, TGS (through
the MFA) denied the Ambassador's request to meet with the
Service chiefs (we had requested the appointments after
hearing from well-connected contacts that the Service chiefs
were feeling neglected); and second, TGS declined an
invitation from the Deputy Chief of Mission to host TGS J5
Lt. Gen. Babaoglu and his J5 general officers for a working
lunch. This kind of limited access was more the norm before
the Iraq War; reinstituting these restrictions increases
Ozkok's control over the content and timing of messages
emanating from the military. At the same time, Ozkok and
Basbug continue to make themselves readily accessible to
visiting US officials and the Ambassador, and, in a departure
from their predecessors, Ozkok and Basbug also meet with the
UK Ambassador here.


9. (C) The service chiefs and other senior members of the
military remain highly suspicious of AKP and are convinced
that Ozkok is selling out the military and the Republic
through his reluctant willingness to work with Erodgan to
move the country forward. Most of these individuals were
selected by Ozkok's predecessors, do not possess his
international experience or Western outlook, and question
whether secular Turkey and the Turkish military will be
better off with Turkey as a member of the EU. While a number
of senior military officers attribute AKP's coming to power
to unwarranted, conspiratorial US support, they paradoxically
also appear to be searching for unconventional ways (i.e.
conferences in Europe) to get their message across to
sympathetic senior US official officials.

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DECEMBER 2004
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10. (C) We expect Ozkok and Erdogan to continue warily to
work together during the next six months to take the
necessary steps to secure an EU accession negotiation date
from the EU in December. While Ozkok's hand is likely to be
further strengthened by the retirement of two of the most
outspoken service chiefs (Land Forces Commander GEN Yalman
and Jandarma Commander GEN Eruygur) this summer, he is still
likely to face some opposition within the military as he
attempts to move the military and the country forward. The
remaining two service chiefs and other senior military
officers who are distrustful of Ozkok's perceived
accommodation with Erdogan and fearful that the military's
sacred place in Turkey's society might be weakened by
Turkey's drive for entry in to the EU can be expected to
complicate Ozkok's efforts. We expect these disgruntled
senior military officers to increase their efforts to reach
out (both directly and through intermediaries) to US
officials to try to express their concerns and possibly
undermine efforts by Ozkok and Erdogan to secure a favorable
decision from the EU this December. We recommend that
Washington and others, if approached, encourage GOT officials
to use existing official channels to convey their views to
ensure that we stay on message and speak with one voice.
EDELMAN