TURKISH P.M. ERDOGAN GOES TO WASHINGTON: HOW STRONG A LEADER IN THE FACE OF STRONG CHALLENGES?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000348



SIPDIS





E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/07/2014

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, TU

SUBJECT: TURKISH P.M. ERDOGAN GOES TO WASHINGTON: HOW

STRONG A LEADER IN THE FACE OF STRONG CHALLENGES?





(U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman; reasons: 1.5 (b,d).





1. (C) Summary: P.M. Erdogan expects Washington to focus on

Cyprus, economic reform, and anti-terrorism cooperation among

other issues. In turn he will press for (1) concrete U.S.

actions to block what Turks believe is the formation by

accretion of a de facto Kurdish state in n. Iraq; (2)

concrete U.S. actions against the PKK in Iraq; and (3) clear

USG support for his government. While the Turkish side sees

the visit as mainly about developing our broad common

strategy, Erdogan is also looking for a public outcome he can

characterize as concrete results. At the same time, although

Erdogan is currently unchallenged as the paramount political

figure in Turkey, he and his party face deep challenges

which, if he cannot rise to them, will affect his longevity

in government, Turkey's democratic development, and

U.S.-Turkish cooperation. End summary.





2. (C) P.M. Erdogan appears to be riding a political high and

uncommon luck as he prepares for his Jan. 28-29 visit to

Washington, where he hopes to demonstrate the Administration

recognizes him as an equal partner.





3. (C) Erdogan has been primed to hear plainspoken

expressions of U.S. interest in Turkish action (1) to reach a

Cyprus settlement by May 1; (2) to hew to credible economic

reform and macro policies; (3) to cooperate unreservedly

against terrorist groups of all stripes, including Islamist

ones (he rejects the term "Islamic terrorism"); (4) to

cooperate on Iraq; (5) to open the border with Armenia; and

(6) to reopen the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Halki seminary in

a way acceptable to the Patriarchate.





4. (C) In turn Erdogan will argue that raising U.S.-Turkish

relations to a higher level depends directly on (1) clear USG

political and diplomatic actions to dispel the conviction and

consequent resentment among Turks of all political stripes

that the U.S. is tolerating step-by-step formation of a de

facto independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq; (2)

concrete USG actions to remove the PKK threat from Iraq; (3)

high-level, sustained USG support for the GOT's new Cyprus

initiative; and (4) the clearest possible signal that the

U.S. stands behind the democratically-elected government.





WHO ARE WE DEALING WITH?

--------------





5. (C) Charismatic, and possessing a common touch and

phenomenal memory for faces and functions of thousands of

party members across the country, Erdogan has a strong

pragmatic core. His pragmatism has led him away from the

radical Islamist milieu of his past, a point noted to us

unhappily by his (radical) former spiritual leader Kemal

Hoca. His pragmatism has also led him to avoid precipitously

pushing Islamic agenda items such as the wearing of Islamist

headscarves while using his outstanding preacher skills and

persona as someone persecuted by the secularist Establishment

to maintain his hold on the hearts of his more religious

supporters.





6. (C) In short, a natural politician, Erdogan has a common

touch and an ability to communicate his empathy for the

plight and aspirations of the common citizen. He projects

the image of the Tribune of Anatolia, ready to take on

corruption and privilege and to defend conservative

traditions. As a result his AK Party won a two-thirds

parliamentary majority in Nov. 2002 national elections.

Owing to AK's image as the party of change at the national

level, good record in providing services at the municipal

level, and lack of viable political alternatives, AK could

gain around 50% of the vote in March 28 nationwide local

elections. Party insiders project that such a result would

give AK control of 65% or more of the 3,200 municipalities in

Turkey, including probably Istanbul and Ankara and perhaps

even Izmir, where AK has not done well to date, plus most of

the other large cities. Every step by the Turkish

Establishment to try to diminish him -- whether by blocking

legislation or attacking his motives -- cements his

popularity in Turkey's urban sprawls and across the Anatolian

heartland. While opposition to him remains bitter in various

loci of the State apparatus, Erdogan currently faces no

credible political opponent or party.





7. (C) Moreover, Erdogan knows his government has gained

credit well beyond AK supporters, as well as in the EU, for

political reforms which, if fully implemented, will

substantially strengthen democracy in Turkey. His

government's inability to pass legislation or regulations

favored by AK supporters -- land registry reform, Supreme

Education Board (YOK) reform, Koran course reform -- has not

eroded support. Indeed, even right-of-center Turks who

remain wary of AK readily tell us the Establishment's

opposition to such reforms is counterproductive. Even if one

can attribute Turkey's lowest inflation and interest rates in

30 years to luck, Central Bank skill, and global emerging

market trends rather than to the AK government's actions,

Erdogan has reaped the political benefit.





8. (C) Taking a high-profile approach in pursuing Turkey's EU

candidacy through direct campaigning in EU capitals, Erdogan

has relished being feted by EU leaders for the past year. He

will have had positive visits by EU Commission President

Prodi and German FonMin Fischer before his Washington trip

and looks forward to the February visit by German Chancellor

Schroeder. He sees himself at this point as one of (if not

the) most important leaders of the Muslim world.

ERDOGAN'S VIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.

--------------





9. (C) Erdogan recognizes that U.S. support can be important

for Turkey's economy and EU aspirations. He sees his task as

managing Turks's ambivalence toward us; at the same time he

wants to avoid being labeled pro-American. From the low

point in bilateral relations in March 2003 he has taken

several supportive steps, while being careful not to be too

closely associated with us since opening Turkish airspace for

the Iraq war. Erdogan agreed to a ground line of

communication for Coalition forces in Iraq. He pushed

through authorization for a Turkish deployment in support of

the Coalition. He agreed to U.S. troop rotation through

Incirlik airbase. In line with long-standing U.S. desires,

he took a bold step in Nov. 2002 to try to move Turkey away

from its no-solution stance on Cyprus and may be prepared now

to do more. He seems to be more open than any previous Prime

Minister to a re-opening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's

Halki seminary.





10. (C) On the other hand he has made public his discomfort

with what most fellow Turks also see as American complicity

in creation of a de facto independent Kurdistan in northern

Iraq and lack of concrete U.S. action against the

PKK/KADEK/KHK. He has not controlled anti-American

suspicions among the AK parliamentary group or within the

Cabinet (DefMin Gonul told us recently on the margins of a

symposium in Istanbul that in closed meetings FonMin Gul

continues to praise the Parliament's March 1, 2003 turndown

of U.S. deployment and to advocate a more Arab/Islamic

foreign policy orientation as a counter to relations with the

U.S.). Nevertheless, Erdogan and Ministers like Gonul and

Justice Minister Cicek see U.S. support for his government as

essential to his survival, and he wants a successful visit.









THE DEEPER CHALLENGES FOR ERDOGAN

--------------





11. (C) Erdogan, AK, and his government face half a dozen

serious domestic challenges which, if he does not manage them

well, will begin to put a severe strain on his ability to

govern by late 2004 and on his and our ability to maintain

dynamic, deep U.S.-Turkish cooperation:





--Erdogan's character: Erdogan has traits which render him

seriously vulnerable to miscalculating the political dynamic,

especially in foreign affairs, and vulnerable to attacks by

those who would disrupt his equilibrium. First, overbearing

pride. Second, unbridled ambition stemming from the belief

God has anointed him to lead Turkey (Mustafa Bilginer, a

close confidant of Erdogan and his wife Emine from 1997-2003,

has analyzed this trait in a draft book on Erdogan's

character; Erdogan used Koranic allusion in his speech to the

AK Congress in Oct. 2003 to make the point about his

God-appointed mission). Third, an authoritarian loner streak

which prevents growth of a circle of strong and skillful

advisors, a broad flow of fresh information to him, or

development of effective communications among the party

headquarters, government, and parliamentary group. This

streak also makes him exceptionally thin-skinned. Fourth, an

overweening desire to stay in power which, despite his macho

image, renders him fearful and prone to temporizing even at

moments which call for swift and resolute decisions. Fifth,

a distrust of women which manifests itself not only in

occasional harsh public comments but also in his

unwillingness to give women any meaningful decision-making

authority in AK.





--Rival centers of power: Cabinet Ministers, Erdogan advisors

and a raft of M.P.s constantly tell us of the tensions

between Erdogan and Gul, with the latter appearing repeatedly

to try to undercut Erdogan. Parliamentary Speaker Bulent

Arinc, who has a strong following among more Islamist AK

M.P.s, has also caused problems for Erdogan on controversial

questions like pushing the right to wear headscarves at State

functions. Although Arinc has kept a low profile for the

past seven months, he remains a locus of troublemaking,

especially on questions involving the U.S. (e.g., troop

rotation through Incirlik).





--Lack of technocratic depth: While some AK appointees appear

to be capable of learning on the job, others are incompetent

or seem to be pursuing private or lodge (cemaat) interests.

AK is far from bringing the bureaucracy under control or

making it work efficiently. We hear constant anecdotal

evidence, not only from those on the secularist left who have

deep prejudices against AK but also from contacts on the

right, that AK appointees, at the national and provincial

levels, are incompetent or narrow-minded Islamists. AK

officials -- from Cabinet Ministers to local-level party

activists across the country -- admit to us that the party's

choice of competent and broadly acceptable candidates for the

March local elections will be exceptionally difficult and the

election of controversial or inept AK candidates would

complicate AK's ability to govern both at the local and

national level.





--Weakness of public relations and the image of hidden

agendas: Erdogan lacks advisors who are able to pre-empt or

handle the news cycle; none of his advisors has good working

relations with the Turkish military. His government has

failed continually to consult broadly and openly or to

prepare public opinion for legislative initiatives,

long-overdue reforms, or foreign policy steps (e.g., pre-war

U.S. troop deployment or troop rotation). As a result AK

creates the impression, exploited by the Establishment, that

it harbors an anti-republican, deep Islamist agenda or is

selling out the country, leading to Establishment

(dis)information campaigns which cause the government to

retreat.





--Corruption: AK rode to power on the common citizen's

revulsion against corruption. Charges that Erdogan amassed

his fortune through kickbacks as mayor of Istanbul have never

been proven but we now hear more and more from insiders that

close advisors such as private secretary Hikmet Bulduk,

Mucahit Arslan, and Cuneyd Zapsu are engaging in wholesale

influence peddling. Aksam Ankara bureau chief Nuray Basaran

told us Zapsu admitted to her Jan. 13 that Erdogan and he

benefited "directly" from the award of the Tupras (state

petroleum refinery) privatization to a consortium including a

Russian partner. Erdogan's direct acquisition of a

significant interest in a food distribution company has

become a public controversy.





--Islamist complexes and prejudices: Some appointments, such

as Prime Ministry Undersecretary Dincer (who stands by his

1995 article calling into question the relevance of the

Republic),Education Ministry Undersecretary Birinci (who in

the past called himself an "ummetci", i.e., a follower of a

greater Islamic order and an opponent of the Republic),and

head of State-run Turkish Radio and Television Demiroz (who

once paid homage to Afghan fundamentalist Hekmatyar),have

made the core of the State Establishment -- Armed Forces,

Presidency, and Judiciary -- profoundly uneasy. Erdogan's

refusal to condemn these positions, the question of the level

of influence of Islamic brotherhoods and groups (including

the followers of Fethullah Gulen) on the government, and the

presence of Turkish Hizbullah supporters in AK Party

provincial structures in the Southeast have also raised deep

concerns among many long-standing Embassy contacts who

themselves are pious. Erdogan himself recognizes the

pernicious effect of a "closed brotherhood mentality"

(cemaatcilik) in political affairs, as reflected in his Jan.

10 speech to a symposium in Istanbul, but how well he can

control the phenomenon remains a very open question.





COMMENT

--------------





12. (C) As Erdogan rides the twin desires for reform in

Turkey and for wider prosperity, he challenges those who have

traditionally reserved power and wealth for themselves at

least to yield pride of place to a different elite. While

his ultimate direction and success remain to be seen, at this

time Erdogan is the only partner capable of advancing toward

the U.S. vision of a successful, democratic Turkey integrated

into Europe.

EDELMAN