TURKEY AND PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN: SETTING THE RECORD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002901 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2014 TAGS: MOPS PREL TU AF SUBJECT: TURKEY AND PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN: SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT REF: A) ANKARA 920 B) ANKARA 1005 C) ANKARA 1162 D) ANKARA 1318 E) STATE 50477 F) ANKARA 1711 G) ANKARA 2293 H) ANKARA 2822 (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman. Reasons: 1.5 (B and D). -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Turkish press is reporting that Washington is debating whether to respond positively to Turkey's proposal to establish a PRT in Takhar province if the Turks refuse to go west or south. We provide a chronology of Turkey's PRT-related consultations and considerations leading up to their most recent proposal to establish a PRT in Takhar. Turkey has been receiving conflicting messages which have resulted in frustration in Ankara and contributed to their strong stand on Takhar. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) The Turkish press reported May 20 that Washington is considering how to respond to Turkey's latest proposal to establish a PRT in Takhar province. The article suggested there is a debate between USG officials who advocate rejecting the GOT's proposal and encourage the GOT to establish a PRT in the west or south, and those who would endorse the Turkish proposal if the Turks could not be persuaded to go elsewhere. We understand from e-mail traffic that this story may be true. To help policymakers understand where the Turks are on their PRT proposal, and how they got there, we lay out the following chronology of the issue. While we recognize this list is not exhaustive and may not include discussions with Turkish officials that have taken place outside of Ankara, it reflects our understanding of the GOT's evolving position on PRTs and Turkey's willingness to be flexible within reason. -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) TURKISH PRT PROPOSAL: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS -------------- -------------- --Early February 2004: Turkish Minister of Defense Gonul advises SECDEF and other Allies that Turkey is considering establishing a PRT in northern Afghanistan (ref a). --February 18: MFA advises that MFA/TGS have agreed to establish a PRT and will seek PM Erdogan's backing soon. If the PM is supportive, the GOT will approach the USG to discuss location and seek our official reaction (ref a). --February 20: MFA/TGS agree to establish a PRT in northern Afghanistan; request official reaction from Washington. Their proposal includes a core presence in Faryab province, and a willingness to consider including Jawzjian and Badghis provinces. If the reaction from the US is positive, Turkey intends to approach UK officials, who reportedly had indicated in the past that the UK would be willing to have Turkey cover some of the regions currently covered by the UK-led PRT bases in Mazar (ref b). --February 27: MFA officials note Ankara is still waiting for a reaction from the USG to Turkey's proposal (ref b). Meanwhile, the Turks begin to receive discouraging messages about their proposal from others, including D/SACEUR, who discourages them from establishing a PRT in the north. With no reaction from Washington to their proposal, the Turks ask if the USG and/or NATO share D/SACEUR's views. --Early March: Fearful that PRT discussions were progressing at NATO and SHAPE without consideration of their proposal and still no response from Washington, the Turks inform the UK of their desire to establish a PRT in Maimana. On March 4, HMG informs Ankara that the UK intends to establish a PRT there, UK troops were already on the ground there, and that Norway has expressed a willingness to contribute (ref c). At the same time, D/SACEUR asks the Turks to consider establishing a PRT in Feyzabad -- a request TGS rejects. However, the MFA informs us that Turkey would be willing to consider establishing a PRT in Takhar province that would also cover Badakhstan (ref c). --March 9: Some three weeks after receiving the GOT's PRT proposal, we (on instructions from Washington -- ref d) ask the GOT to "maintain a flexible position" on PRT location to help NATO and Turkey achieve maximum benefit. The MFA agrees to work with SHAPE and the PRT ESC in Kabul to identify an acceptable area, noting that the Turkish MNR had been instructed to work with SHAPE. --March 9: The MFA informs us that the Turkish MNR at SHAPE had sent D/SACEUR a letter proposing three possible alternative locations for a Turkish-led PRT: a) Faryab province only b) Faryab province and Jowzjan, and c) Faryab and Badgis provinces. The MFA said that Turkey wanted to be as flexible as possible, but noted that logistics and capabilities would guide the GOT's final decision. The MFA added that if SHAPE were to come up with an alternative location for a Turkish-led PRT, the GOT would be willing to consider it -- assuming its location was somewhere in the north of Kabul. --March 12: Senior MFA and TGS officials reiterate to visiting Afghan Coordinator Amb. Taylor that Turkey is interested in establishing a PRT in Afghanistan and is waiting for D/SACEUR to respond formally to the GOT's latest proposal. MFA officials exhibit flexibility on location and accept the importance of having SHAPE and the Afghan government coordinate in the overall PRT decision making process (ref e). --April 9-16: GOT sends an inter-agency recon team to Afghanistan to meet with Afghan, US, ISAF and officials from other countries to finalize their decision-making process on PRTs. Prior to the visit, the GOT was considering two provinces -- Takhar and Baghlan. During their meetings in and outside of Kabul, the Turks receive conflicting messages from various actors on the ground regarding desired location of a Turkish-led PRT: Afghan MOI Jalali reportedly was positive on either Takhar or Baghlan; LTG Barno and others encouraged the Turks to consider Baghlan, while some ISAF officials said that the Dutch intended to establish a PRT there and encouraged the Turks to look West or South. The ESC reportedly does not decide on the Turkish proposal. --April 22: MFA informs us that, based on the results of the recon visit to Afghanistan, MFA/TGS would recommend to PM Erdogan that Turkey establish a PRT in Takhar (ref f). --May 4: FM Gul informs NATO SYG that Turkey's priority is to establish a PRT in Takhar. Turkey's mission in Kabul is instructed to inform the ESC during its May 10 meeting of Turkey's position. --May 14: The MFA advises us that PM Erdogan has approved the Takhar proposal and agreed to provide funding. The MFA instructs its missions in Brussels, Kabul and Washington to inform appropriate authorities. The MFA specifically requests Washington's support. --Mid-May: The PRT ESC issues a map identifying 10 priority locations for PRTs in Afghanistan, including two locations in northern Afghanistan. Takhar is not one of them, but Baghlan is. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶4. (C) Since mid-March, the Turks have gone along with our recommendation to work directly with SHAPE and the ESC PRT to identify an exact location for a PRT. Recognizing the sensitivities surrounding their relationship with Dostum, Ankara abandoned its initial proposal (core presence in Faryab, willingness to consider including Jawzjian, Badghis provinces) and suggested alternative locations they understood to be consistent with the priorities outlined by NATO and Afghan authorities. The Turks remain frustrated by what they perceive to be mixed and confusing messages coming from Brussels and Kabul, and wonder why the USG -- their main Ally and the leading advocate of a greater international role in Afghanistan --- was silent on the issue of PRTs for so long. ¶5. (C) The Turks are sticking to their latest proposal: establish a PRT in Takhar province or nowhere at all. While we suspect Ankara would be willing to consider an alternative location in northern Afghanistan, we do not envision a scenario under which PM Erdogan or TGS CHOD GEN Ozkok would reverse course and agree to establish a PRT in the west or the south. PM Erdogan has already signed off on Takhar and agreed to fund the PRT there; TGS has never supported a Turkish contribution to PRTs, and only reluctantly supported the MFA when it was assured the military contribution would be minimal and the location would be in a familiar part of the country where the chances of success were greater than failure. One element of the consideration is what MFA U/S Ziyal characterized as a historically negative relationship with Afghan Pashtuns (ref h). In the absence of support for a Turkish-led PRT in the northern half of Afghanistan, the Turks may be close to cutting their losses and pull out of the PRT business altogether. ¶6. (C) As Washington prepares for the June NATO Summit in Istanbul and the President's meeting with PM Erdogan in Ankara beforehand, it may be time to ask whether it is more important to have the Turks in the PRT tent or outside it. While a Turkish-led PRT in the north may not significantly bolster NATO's stabilization capabilities in Afghanistan at this stage, it may be preferable to no Turkish contribution at all. From a bilateral standpoint, US support for a Turkish-led PRT will be instrumental in our ability to persuade the Turks to contribute to other stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan (i.e. ANA training, anti-narcotics efforts, reconstruction efforts, troops for Afghan elections, and ISAF). ¶7. (U) Kabul minimize considered. EDELMAN