IRAQ: TGS OPEN TO SUPPORTING OTHER COUNTRIES'

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002589

SIPDIS


DEPT FOR NEA, EUR/SE, PM AND EAP. BAGHDAD ALSO FOR CJTF-7


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/29/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: TGS OPEN TO SUPPORTING OTHER COUNTRIES'
ROTATION OF TROOPS


(U) Classified by Political-Military Affairs Counselor
Timothy A. Betts. Reasons: 1.5 (B and D).



1. (C) Summary: Seoul is exploring the possibility of
deploying its troops to Iraq through Turkey. The Turkish
military is supportive, but has encouraged the Koreans to
seek a political decision from the GOT before planning on
transiting Turkey. If the ROK pursues this route, we expect
the Turks to be helpful although, as we found early last
year, obviously military equipment traveling overland to Iraq
may not be possible. End summary.



2. (C) During a recent meeting on an unrelated issue, Turkish
General Staff (TGS) Agreements Branch Chief Col. Karacoban
told deputy pol-mil counselor that South Korea was interested
in using Turkish bases to deploy its troops to Iraq, assuming
the ROK made a political decision to contribute troops there.
Karacoban said if South Korea decides to deploy troops to
either Irbil or Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq, it "has little
choice but to go through Turkey." He added the Koreans were
"pressing" TGS for detailed information regarding the
availability and capability of specific Turkish bases and
ports. According to preliminary informal discussions, the
South Korean military is interested in using military airlift
to transport its troops from South Korean to northern Iraq
via Turkey, and possibly sealift to transport initial heavy
supplies/equipment to the Turkish port of Iskenderun. The
South Koreans would then transport heavy supplies overland
via Turkey to northern Iraq.



3. (C) Karacoban stressed that TGS had not taken a formal
position on whether to assist South Korea. While he
personally saw no reason not to allow the Koreans to use
Turkish air bases to deploy troops to Iraq, Karacoban said
the decision was not his nor TGS's. "It is up to the
politicians." Karacoban said TGS intends to inform the South
Korean military that it will not discuss further any request
until it had "authorization" from Turkish "political
authorities," and that all further inquiries should be
directed to the Turkish MFA.



4. (C) On a related matter, Karacoban said TGS was
facilitating the rotation of Hungarian troops to Iraq. TGS
and Hungarian military officials were discussing whether to
use Incirlik Air Base or a military base in Ankara to allow
Hungarian troops to RON en route to Iraq. Karacoban
understood that Hungary intended to deploy around 350 troops
to Iraq, 30 at a time. The Hungarians prefer Incirlik, but
TGS intends to steer them toward Ankara due to the greater
availability of quality sleeping accommodations.



5. (C) Deputy pol-mil counselor encouraged TGS to "get the
word out" that Turkey was assisting coalition members other
than the US to contribute to the GWOT and stabilization
efforts in Iraq. Karacoban said TGS was reluctant to make
such efforts public for fear that "others" would criticize
the military for allowing countries to make use of Turkish
soil for "Iraq operations." Deputy pol-mil counselor
responded that TGS and other official Turks, at a minimum,
should share with US and other Allies Turkey's positive
contributions.



6. (C) Comment: It is not surprising that TGS (at least at
the staff officer level) is willing to facilitate the
rotation of others' troops to Iraq. TGS backed the GOT's
December 2003 decision to allow the US military to rotate US
personnel out of Iraq -- a decision the GOT views as
consistent with UNSCR 1483 and the Council of Ministers June
2003 decision to support stabilization and reconstruction
efforts in Iraq. It is less surprising that TGS is not
willing to enter into formal discussions with South Korea
without authorization from Turkish political authorities.
Given TGS's experiences with the discussions with US military
authorities prior to commencement of operations in Iraq
(where it was criticized for getting out in front of the
politicians),TGS is unlikely to authorize other countries'
use of Turkish bases, ports or territory without appropriate
political backing. If South Korean submit a formal request
to use Turkish air bases to rotate their troops to Iraq, we
suspect the GOT (including TGS) will respond positively.
Requests to use Turkish territory to transport troops or
equipment overland to Iraq are another matter. Given the
overwhelming negative political reaction in February 2003 to
the possibility that US forces would pass overland through
Turkey to Iraq, we doubt whether the GOT would allow South
Koreans to move obviously military equipment overland to
Iraq. Sustainment supplies might be permitted to go
overland, but would add to the congestion at Turkey's lone
border crossing to Iraq.



7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.
EDELMAN