GERMAN POLICE LIAISON'S TAKE ON TERROR FINANCE AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002467

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR EB/ESC/TFS (GGLASS),S/CT (TNAVRATIL),
EUR/SE, IO/PHO (APEREZ),INL (ANNE CUMMINGS);
TREASURY FOR RNEWCOMB AND JZARATE;
NSC FOR GPETERS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2014
TAGS: EFIN PREL PTER SNAR TU
SUBJECT: GERMAN POLICE LIAISON'S TAKE ON TERROR FINANCE AND
NARCOTICS IN TURKEY

(U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION ROBERT S. DEUTSCH
FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) & (d).



1. (C) Summary. According to Heinrich Reiser, the German
Police Liaison to Turkey, Turkey's Financial Intelligence
Unit, MASAK, is not effective. Reiser considers the Turkish
National Police (TNP) a much more effective partner in
fighting terrorism financing and narcotics. End Summary.



2. (U) On 22 April Econoff met with Reiser, who has acted
as Liaison for the past three years. His duties encompass
operations, reporting, and technical training and assistance.
Reiser noted that, with Turks comprising 5% of the population
of Germany, Germany police have long maintained close
relations with their Turkish counterparts. He is interested
mainly in narcotics, TIP, organized crime, and terrorism. In
a wide-ranging conversation, Reiser provided insights drawn
from his years of experience working with TNP.



3. (C) According to Reiser, Turkey exports to Europe
(mostly Germany) 4-7 tons (comment: presumably, metric tons)
of heroin per month, of a value to the exporters of $5,000
per kilo. Reiser asserted that up to 5% of this amount goes
to finance terrorism.



4. (C) While Turkey's narcotics personnel are
operationally effective, Reiser does not consider them to be
good at gathering and utilizing intelligence, and does not
believe that they can put together a complicated case. Cases
are based mostly on informers, and little effort is put into
reaching higher-ups, in part because of limitations of
Turkish law. German training is directed at developing this
intelligence capability.



5. (C) Reiser does not believe the PKK to be the primary
terrorist threat any more. Of the 50 terrorist organizations
that Reiser said are operating in Turkey, he considers DHKP/C
to be the most dangerous. (He surmises that DHKP/C is
responsible for the April 21 bombing in Istanbul.)



6. (C) Reiser does not believe that much money is
laundered through the banking system. Rather, he thinks it is
brought into the country in cash (border control is, he says,
non-existent) or as goods -- primarily, automobiles and
machinery.



7. (C) Reiser called MASAK, the Turkish financial crimes
investigation agency, a "paper tiger" and "hopeless." Reiser
says it was established only at the insistence of the E.U.
and that GOT has no intention of taking effective action to
prevent money laundering. Note: Reiser's views, while
strongly worded, are not much different from those expressed
more diplomatically by a number of post contacts. End note.



8. (U) Reiser works extensively with four TNP departments
reporting to a Deputy Director General. The departments are
International Relations; Interpol; Intelligence; and KOM.
Intelligence handles terrorism (including terrorist
financing) and organized crime intelligence gathering.
Intelligence hands off to other TNP departments for arrests,
and works with State Security Court prosecutors in developing
cases. KOM, the Headquarters for Combating Drugs and
Organized Crime, has operational responsibility for organized
crime, narcotics, cyber crime, and includes a financial
police unit (Mali Sube). Reiser considers Istihbarat and Mali
Sube to be very good units.



9. (U) The EC has 12 twinning projects with TNP, of which
Germany is responsible for 4: (i) Organized crime, which
started last week; (ii) money laundering (with Istihbarat and
KOM),to start by year end; (iii) migration/TIP, to start by
year end; and (iv) forensics (including terrorism and cyber
crime),to start by year end.



10. (C) Echoing comments made by UK's resident customs
inspector, Reiser says that mid-level TNP people do not
require additional training; rather, efforts should be
directed towards supervisors, so that they can appreciate the
issues and the work that their subordinates are doing. He
also emphasized that providing training (particularly,
overseas training) to supervisors is very valuable in
developing relationships and that without personal
relationships little substantive assistance can be expected
from Turkish officials.
EDELMAN