TURKEY'S GREYING WOLVES: RIGHTIST-NATIONALIST MHP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002291

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S GREYING WOLVES: RIGHTIST-NATIONALIST MHP


REF: ANKARA 2204


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d).



1. (C) Summary: Leaders of rightist-nationalist MHP are
spinning March 28 municipal election results as a victory.
According to at least one MHP official, however, the party
had expected a better showing. Although MHP leaders profess
a desire to bring the party into the mainstream, party
policies on core issues -- Cyprus, Iraq, and the EU -- have
not changed since the party's electoral defeat in 2002
general election. MHP officials hope to exploit any
perceived missteps by ruling AKP on these issues to build on
momentum they claim they have after March 28. End summary.


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Election Results Good But Not Great
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2. (C) Winning or holding onto four provinces in March 28
municipal elections, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) has
recouped some of the sharp fall in popular support the party
experienced in the 2002 national elections. In recent
meetings, senior MHP officials told us that the party's
10-percent showing in provincial councils -- the best proxy
for a national vote -- has restored some confidence among the
party's grassroots. Faruk Bal, MHP vice chairman for
election affairs, averred to us April 9 that March 28 was a
success and in part demonstrated that the party's base has
gotten over its defeat in 2002. Bal contended that MHP did
well despite receiving almost no positive media coverage in
the run-up to municipal elections.



3. (C) Bal and other MHP officials nevertheless acknowledge
that the party leadership still faces challenges in
recapturing the momentum from 1999 national elections, when
MHP soared to 18%. Both Bal and Murat Sevkatli -- head of
MHP's political academy -- claimed party chairman Devlet
Bahceli is committed to moving MHP more toward the
"mainstream", but neither could explain what that might mean.
In an April 15 conversation with us, Sevkatli admitted that
MHP leaders had hoped for an even better showing on March 28,
given the media's focus on Cyprus, which, as a perceived
national cause, had in the past galvanized MHPers of all
stripes.



4. (C) MHP intellectual and long-time Embassy contact Riza
Muftuoglu, who unlike most of his party colleagues is usually
a free thinker, offered to us April 20 a more even-handed
analysis of the party's performance. Muftuoglu explained
that MHP leaders can spin the results as a "victory" by
noting that the party finished third in votes for provincial
councils and that this is a tacit blessing of the party's
general direction. On the other hand, Muftuoglu argued that
after factoring in the thirty percent of Turks who did not
vote March 28, MHP's showing is much less impressive. "If
these had been national elections, we still would not have
entered Parliament," he asserted.


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Nothing's Changed
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5. (C) Our conversations revealed that MHP has not changed
its basic policies on core foreign policy issues. On Cyprus,
Bal and Sevkatli underscored MHP's strong opposition to a
settlement as envisioned in the Annan Plan. Both asserted
that a settlement will lead to inter-communal violence and
eventually the total take over of the North by Greek
Cypriots. In this regard, Bal even claimed that, "since the
EU won't take Turkey anyway," the EU is purposefully seeking
a solution that will remove the presence of any Muslims
within its borders.



6. (C) Despite MHP's strong objections to a settlement,
neither Bal nor Sevkatli believes that a meaningful number of
ruling AKP M.P.s with MHP resumes will defect and vote
against the Annan Plan should it come to Parliament. Indeed,
Sevkatli admitted that an MHP-led "March to Cyprus," which
will culminate on Cyprus on April 23 with an anti-settlement
speech by Bahceli, is merely meant to cement the party's
base. In this way, the party hopes to give itself political
cover regardless of the outcome. If the referendum is
successful and passes Parliament, the MHP base will not be
able to accuse the party leadership of inaction. Moreover,
Sevkatli asserted that when the inevitable (in the MHP mind)
violence breaks out, MHP will be well positioned to say, "We
told you so."



7. (C) Our three contacts also expressed dismay with USG Iraq
policy, claiming that our cooperation with "those tribes" in
northern Iraq (read Kurds) will lead to disaster for the U.S.
and Turkey. Bal asserted that Kurds "have been stabbing
their allies in the back for centuries." For his part,
Sevkatli claimed that USG Iraq policy has created a de facto
Kurdish state, which will fuel nationalist ambitions of
Turkey's own Kurds. As a result, Sevkatli averred,
anti-American sentiment in Turkey is on the rise. He added
that EU-related reforms -- e.g. allowing Kurdish language
schools -- will unify the fractious Kurdish tribes in
Turkey's Southeast, which will encourage greater demands for
autonomy and lead to the eventual dismemberment of the
Turkish State.


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MHP Prospects
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8. (C) Our contacts tell us that MHP's relative success on
March 28 was due to: 1) the return to the fold of disaffected
MHP voters who had supported the xenophobic Genc Party in
2002; and 2) developments on Cyprus and in Iraq, which they
claimed have stoked nationalist flames over the last several
weeks. In the latter regard, clearly MHP hopes to use
Cyprus, Iraq, and the EU to exploit fears of an AKP sellout
of Turkish interests. Whether or not MHP will be able to
exploit nationalist paranoia to undermine support for AKP and
position itself for the next national election remains an
open question. Muftuoglu, for one, expressed doubt: "Under
Devlet Bahceli, the party won't go anywhere."


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Eyes on the Army
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9. (C) In the context of our Cyprus discussions, both
Sevkatli and Muftuoglu independently offered their analysis
of Chief of the General Staff (TGS) Ozkok's April 13 press
briefing on Cyprus and the military's role in society.
Sevkatli, who had earlier criticized Ozkok for being "soft"
on Cyprus and ruling AKP's domestic policy, assessed Ozkok's
statements as much more in line with "what a TGS chief is
supposed to say." Muftuoglu asserted that the speech was
primarily directed against Ozkok's opponents within TGS but
added that his remarks were also a warning to the GOT.
Expressing his frustration with ruling AKP policy on a host
of issues -- and Ozkok's more moderate approach to the GOT --
Muftuoglu said, "If I were TGS chief, I would have led a coup
already!"


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Comment
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10. (C) MHP has a core eight percent of the vote but has no
new ideas and relies on circumstantial developments on
"national issues" to boost its vote. In any event, we do not
see MHP in its current greying state as capable of playing a
major national role under the leadership of ultra-fastidious
leader Bahceli.
EDELMAN