PRESIDENT ASSAD'S VISIT TO TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 000226 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2014 TAGS: PREL PTER SY TU IS SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ASSAD'S VISIT TO TURKEY (U) Classified by Ambassador Edelman, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Assad's January 6-9 visit to Turkey was the first by any Syrian President. Assad met one-on-one with PM Erdogan and President Sezer, and also met FM Gul, TGS Chief Ozkok, Parliament Speaker Arinc, and main opposition CHP leader Baykal. Turkish contacts say GOT raised terrorism, WMD and Syrian-Israeli relations, without any notable response from Assad. The two sides signed agreements on double taxation, mutual foreign investment incentives, and tourism. The visit, another step forward in bilateral relations, is a piece in FonMin Gul's desire for a foreign policy more oriented toward the Islamic world. End Summary. Iraq ¶2. (C) According to MFA Middle East DG Tahsim Burcuoglu, Assad expressed concern (Burcuoglu described him as "panicked") about the current situation in Iraq, including worries about a separate Kurdish state in the north. Assad claimed Syria is trying to control border crossings into Iraq, but mainly expressed hope for early elections and a swift end to U.S. occupation. Terrorism ¶3. (C) Turkish interlocutors assert to us that they pressed Assad and his delegation on three terrorism-related issues: suspects in the November Istanbul bombings believed to be at large in Syria; Syrian support for anti-Israel terrorist groups; and terrorist infiltration to Iraq from Syria. According to DG Burcuoglu, Assad expressed a willingness to work with Turkey on the Istanbul bombing suspects but requested more information from the Turks first. The Turks also asked Assad to stop supporting Hezbollah, HAMAS, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. According to Burcuoglu, Assad merely repeated "the usual things" and claimed Syria is trying to control its Iraqi border to prevent terrorist infiltration. Israeli DCM Nahshon told us the Turks say they still await the Syrian response. WMD ¶4. (C) Burcuoglu told us Assad raised WMD on his own, saying he does not want to see any WMD in the region. Assad worried that, at the UK's behest, the EU will re-open the WMD article of Syria's EU partnership agreement. Ali Sarikaya, an aide to PM foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoglu, claimed to us that Assad denied Syria has WMD but affirmed its "right" to possess them "in light of Israeli WMD." Syria's Relations with Israel ¶5. (C) The Assad visit also allowed Turkey to portray itself as a peace mediator between Israel and Syria. Israeli DCM Nahshon said he had spent the month before the visit working with GOT officials on issues to raise with Assad, and PM Erdogan personally debriefed the Israeli Ambassador on the visit January 8. Spinning the visit as "extremely constructive", Nahshon said the Turks claimed Israeli issues were at the top of the agenda. In addition to urging Syria to stop supporting anti-Israel terrorist groups, Erdogan and Sezer reportedly raised the issue of accounting for missing and dead Israeli citizens in Syria and Lebanon; Assad was noncommittal. According to Burcuoglu, Assad said he could not make concessions on the Golan Heights but is ready to discuss other issues. On January 12, Israeli President Katsav invited Assad to visit Jerusalem; Nahshon said this gambit is "of course" related to Assad's Turkey visit. According to media reports, the Syrians quickly rejected the offer. Economic Issues ¶6. (C) The GOT and the Syrians also signed agreements on double taxation, foreign investment incentives, and tourism. According to Burcuoglu, the agreements had been in the works since 2002. Language that referred to the long-disputed area of Hatay (called Alexandretta by the Syrians) hung up the agreements until the last minute. However, just before the visit, the Syrians accepted the Turkish language. In Istanbul, Assad also paid a visit to the Istanbul Stock Exchange and despite looking slightly bewildered (according to Burcuoglu, the visit was Mrs. Assad's idea),promised to create one in Damascus. ¶7. (C) Comment: At Assad's request, his meetings with Erdogan and Sezer were one-on-one, according to Burcuoglu, so that Assad could get away from his "entourage." According to Burcuoglu and Israeli DCM Nahshon, the GOT perceived Assad as "sincere" and believes he has had a "change of mentality." Islamist-oriented contacts who are close to FonMin Gul, for instance journalist Fehmi Koru, have insisted to us that the visit was immensely positive and that Assad is an agent of democratic change. The Turkish press fawned over Assad in a manner rarely seen. However, the results of the visit appear modest at best. Bilaterally, the visit is another step in relations that have steadily improved since 1998, when the two nations almost went to war over Syria's harboring of PKK leader Ocalan. Assad appears to have bowed to reality on the Hatay/Alexandretta dispute, ameliorating a bilateral irritant. However, the visit seems to have contributed little to regional issues. Although the Turks are fond of seeing themselves as regional brokers and apparently worked closely with the Israelis on the visit, they seem to have gotten little movement out of Assad. End Comment. ¶8. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. EDELMAN