RULING AK PARTY'S BIG WIN IN LOCAL ELECTIONS: HOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001847

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2005
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS TU
SUBJECT: RULING AK PARTY'S BIG WIN IN LOCAL ELECTIONS: HOW
WILL TURKEY ABSORB IT?


REF: ANKARA 1842


(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch; reasons: 1.4 (b,d).



1. () Summary: Ruling AK Party's (AKP) strong but not
overwhelming win in March 28 elections appears to open the
way for PM Erdogan to continue to press ahead with an agenda
of change and reform. At the same time, the win leaves core
elements of the Turkish State -- already deeply distrustful
of what AKP's reforms mean for the established "secular"
order -- angry and searching quietly but very determinedly
for alternatives to AKP. End summary.



2. (U) With 87% of votes counted, we would highlight the
following results:


--Given that these were local elections, the best proxy for a
national vote is that for provincial councils, with AKP at
42.1%, left-of-center main opposition CHP at 17.9%,
rightist-nationalist MHP at 10.4%, and center-right DYP at
10.1%. AKP had long expected to garner around 50%; a
detailed analysis of key districts and precincts over the
next few weeks will reveal why AKP finished at 42% (still
seven points ahead of its 2002 general election results).


--AKP appears to have won 56 of 81 provincial capital mayoral
races, including Istanbul and Ankara; AKP has taken three
bastions of CHP -- Antalya (CHP leader Baykal's home
province),Hatay, and Gaziantep (outgoing mayor Dogan was
really his own party) -- and four provincial capitals in the
southeast formerly held by mainly Kurdish DEHAP and its
predecessors.


--AKP won Istanbul greater municipality with a total
currently at 44.7%, CHP at 29.4%; an analysis of district and
precinct results will help indicate why AKP failed to reach
50% plus, which provincial party leader Muezzinoglu and
others had long indicated was their target.


--AKP thrashed the opposition in Ankara (which has
traditionally shown a strong "secularist", left-of-center
vote) with a dominating 54.7% to leftist SHP's 21% and CHP's
12.6%.


--CHP appears to have won only 10 provincial capitals, most
prominently Turkey's third city Izmir, where incumbent mayor
Piristina convincingly beat AKP; CHP held on in Mersin (Icel)
despite a strong push from the alliance of leftist SHP and
mainly Kurdish DEHAP and a concerted public relations
campaign by AKP; CHP also won strongly in Sisli district of
Istanbul, where incumbent mayor Sarigul reached an
exceptionally strong 67%.



3. (C) Significant trends:


--AKP increased its share of the vote in every region
compared to its 2002 results, while CHP fell in every region;
MHP and DYP, which failed to pass the 10% national threshold
for parliamentary representation in 2002 each managed to
raise its total to just over 10%.


--What had long been a right-of-center/left-of-center split
of 60%-65% to 35%-40% in Turkey shifted to 80%
right-of-center to 20% left-of-center; contacts such as those
at the Advanced Strategy Center expect the center of Turkish
politics to reflect a more conservative outlook (this shift
also helps explain Istanbul-Sisli CHP mayor Sarigul's
domineering win: he emphasized the importance of mosques and
religion (i.e., Islam) in his campaign).


--As we predicted in reftel, AKP supporters voted for Tayyip
Erdogan -- as well as for AKP's reputation of delivering
services and for the prospect that the ruling party would
provide resources for cities in AKP's hands -- rather than
for a group of AKP mayoral candidates who, by our direct
observation and that of a wide range of contacts, were in the
great majority colorless.


--Those supporting AKP also signalled they continue to accept
Erdogan's caution that Turkey will not see the economic and
social benefits of AKP in power for up to three years.


--CHP held on in much of its traditional strongholds of the
Aegean and eastern Thrace, but came close to losing its
traditional bastion of Edirne and lost Tekirdag (main
producer of the Turkish national alcoholic drink raki),
Aydin, and Denizli, where it had long had a strong presence,
to AKP.


--The Black Sea region, the butt of most regional jokes in
Turkey, proved its reputation of contrariness; despite being
known as a conservative region, seven of the 10 provinces
from Sinop to Ardahan went to CHP, leftist DSP, or MHP.



4. (C) Key questions ahead:
--How quickly or forcefully will Erdogan push ahead with a
legislative and constitutional-amendment agenda which the
Turkish State establishment has already tried to rebuff? A
raft of proposed constitutional amendments and, among others,
draft laws to decentralize public administration and devolve
significant authority to local levels and to reform the High
Education Council (YOK) are particularly neuralgic to core
elements of the State, which see them as a direct and
material challenge to the Kemalist order.


--How thoroughly can Erdogan carry out the (long overdue)
cabinet shuffle he has said will follow the elections? In
other words, is he now powerful enough to change the delicate
coalition balances within AKP?


--How well can Erdogan control the 81 provincial party
organizations, the great majority of which have a more closed
(Milli Gorus) character than he wishes to project for the
party (reftel)? In this regard, how well will AKP mayors in
56 provincial capitals establish a modus vivendi with, and
avoid antagonizing, local army commanders, i.e., on the
subject of Islamist headscarves at official functions?


--Where will the democratic, civilian alternative to AKP come
from? CHP is in a dead-end as long as the professional
naysayer Baykal insists on clinging to the chairmanship; with
Gaziantep's national figure Celal Dogan defeated, CHP's only
hope is to promote someone who has reached out to a more
conservative center, i.e., possibly Sisli mayor Sarigul. CHP
misfit Kemal Dervis is a non-starter outside the elitist
districts of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. DYP and its
chairman Agar are rescued from oblivion, although much of
DYP's vote had to do with the attractiveness of local
candidates and not with Agar. Moreover, Agar has a dirty
past (Susurluk scandal and connection to extrajudicial
killings aimed at the PKK) and will have to clean the party
of the corrupt hangers-on from the era of former PM Ciller if
he is to have any traction. AKP captured Osmaniye, the home
province of MHP chairman Bahceli, whose fastidiousness has
made him in any event a less than ideal leader in the minds
of many MHP supporters. Moreover, MHP lacks a coherent,
broadly attractive program.
EDELMAN