TURKISH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: THE VIEW FROM THE WEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001833

SIPDIS


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS: THE VIEW FROM THE WEST


REF: ANKARA 1436


(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter.
Reason: 1.4 (b,d).



1. (C) Summary: The ruling AKP's chances of winning
municipalities in the Aegean region is hampered by the
party's uninspiring candidates. Rather than build support
through intense door-to-door campaigning, AKP is relying on
the popularity of P.M. Erdogan and the AKP "brand" to attract
voters. A feckless opposition appears unable to mount much
of a challenge outside of Izmir, historically a bastion of
the center-left. End Summary.



2. (U) Poloff recently traveled to Izmir, Manisa, and Aydin
provinces in Turkey's Aegean region, which is generally more
affluent and closer in mentality to the West than the rest of
Anatolia, and met with a variety of political and
professional contacts to discuss March 28 municipal elections.


--------------
Izmir: Too Close To Call
--------------



3. (C) Our contacts in Izmir largely echoed what we have
heard recently in Ankara, namely that the race in the Aegean
city, historically a bastion of the center-left, could be
close. Osman Gencer, chief editor of the regional daily Yeni
Asir, asserted that both the ruling AKP and main opposition,
center-left CHP are running a tight race. Citing business
and other journalist sources, Gencer said that on any given
day either party could be ahead in public opinion polls.
Niyazi Memur, a senior provincial AKP official, told poloff
that although AKP has its work cut out for it, the party has
a "good chance" of pulling off a victory. Memur noted that
AKP will do well in Izmir's poorer districts, which are
overwhelmingly populated by internal migrants mainly from
Turkey's Kurdish Southeast. Memur claimed that incumbent
mayor and CHP candidate Ahmet Piristina has neglected basic
infrastructure in those districts -- a charge we heard from
many local businessmen -- providing AKP fertile ground for
grassroots politicking.



4. (C) Not surprisingly, CHP Izmir provincial chairman
Alaattin Yuksel confidently proclaimed Piristina will win the
mayoralty again on March 28. Yuksel cited his party's own
polling, which showed CHP ahead -- 40 percent to AKP's 32
percent. However, betraying fear that AKP is catching up to
CHP, Yuksel prepared the ground for a possible CHP failure by
making the same claims to poloff that CHP chairman Deniz
Baykal made to Ambassador earlier this month (reftel): 1) the
media is overwhelmingly biased toward AKP; 2) the party in
power has an advantage in municipal elections; and 3) it is
too early in the GOT's tenure for the Turkish public to judge
AKP's performance, which Yuksel claimed has been poor across
the board. Adding to the feeling of doubt, local CHP
official Ulku Caner coyly asked poloff whether there would be
any military intervention against the GOT if CHP loses Izmir
-- a symbol of Kemalist rectitude -- as if fishing for any
sign of USG displeasure with AKP.


--------------
Opportunity Lost?
--------------



5. (C) One factor that is likely to work against AKP in the
region is the lack of color in its candidates. In
left-leaning Izmir, where AKP's success could hinge on its
candidate's individual appeal and dynamism, the party chose
previously unknown Taha Aksoy, described by supporters as an
"honest businessman" and by detractors as a "nobody." The
speeches we heard Aksoy make in Izmir were unimpressive.
Compounding the problem Aksoy's bland personality presents is
that AKP will have difficulties introducing Aksoy, because
the party waited until virtually the last minute to announce
his candidacy. Indeed, Niyazi Memur conceded that AKP's
biggest challenge is getting Aksoy's face and name out to
people in time for March 28.



6. (C) For months our contacts on the political right in
Ankara claimed that AKP had wanted to choose former DYP and
ANAP M.P. Isilay Saygin as its mayoral candidate in Izmir. A
life-long conservative politician -- she began her career in
the Izmir suburb of Buca at the age of 25 and never married,
saying she did not have time -- Saygin established a strong
reputation for service and a common touch. Our Ankara
contacts believed Saygin represented the kind of mainstream,
energetic candidate AKP needed to unseat CHP in Izmir.

7. (C) Asked about Saygin's candidacy, Memur defensively
claimed that Saygin never followed proper application
procedures. He contended that, in any case, Saygin did not
have strong ties to the AKP Izmir office or AKP's grassroots
in the city. Saygin, he said, had hoped that AKP
headquarters in Ankara would weigh in on her behalf, but that
never happened.



8. (C) For her part, Saygin did not dispute Memur's
accusations in a private meeting with poloff and noted that
AKP headquarters actually undermined her candidacy in the
end. She claimed that former ANAP deputies, now AKP
ministers Abdulkadir Aksu, Cemil Cicek, and Erkan Mumcu had
lobbied for her candidacy but that F.M. Abdullah Gul, whom
she termed a "fundamentalist" -- rejected her candidacy
outright. She suspected the influence of Milli Gorus, which
Memur separately later acknowledged with reluctance. He said
cryptically that although Milli Gorus has influence in Izmir,
today's Milli Gorus "is not the same as in the past" -- a
turn of phrase Milli Gorus-linked AKPers often use to suggest
they are not as outwardly "Islamist" as they once were.
Milli Gorus (MG) is the problematic, lodge-like movement of
1996-97 Prime Minister Erbakan. With links to Saudi, and in
the past Iranian, money and with major support from a western
European network principally in Germany and Belgium, MG wraps
itself in Islamism and anti-U.S./anti-Israel rhetoric.
However, MG is as much a money-making machine for Erbakan and
his inner circle as a religious lodge in the more traditional
sense.


--------------
Manisa and Aydin: AKP Winner By Default?
--------------



9. (C) In both Manisa and Aydin, where center-right parties
have historically performed well, AKP may win through no
effort of its own. As in Izmir, AKP has chosen uninspiring
candidates and, based on our conversation with party
officials, will rely heavily on the party's drawing power as
the party of government. In Manisa, where AKP will face a
strong challenge from an incumbent ANAP mayor, who has been
successful and is confident he will win a third term, the
local AKP boss Ramis Siyak could only say that the party's
chances are "good." Despite prodding, he did not mention the
AKP candidate once during our meeting and instead focused on
Tayyip Erdogan's national appeal as the party's most critical
asset. AKP officials in Aydin also did not discuss the
merits of the party's candidate, the incumbent mayor who is
technically still a member of ANAP. In a wide-ranging
discussion with party hacks and local journalists, AKP
provincial chairman Mehmet Erdem asserted that the party will
win because of the government's nationwide popularity.



10. (C) Working to AKP's advantage in both cities is the
weakness of the opposition in the region. Although AKP faces
a stiff challenge in Manisa from the incumbent, other
opposition parties are likely to have little impact on
election day in either city. In Aydin, where DYP has
historically performed well, the AKP candidate and incumbent
mayor was confident that DYP voters would turn to AKP "as the
only center-right party." In Manisa, CHP officials received
us in a room full of T.V. cameras and tape-recording
journalists in an obvious attempt to draw public interest to
the party. In Aydin proper, CHP simply refused to meet with
us, citing the press of business (party chairman Baykal was
due in town the next day). In a meeting in Soke sub-province
of Aydin, CHP officials were resigned to a poor performance
nationally and hinted that the party base is ready for
leadership change.


--------------
Women's Roles Still Circumscribed
--------------



11. (C) The Isilay Saygin episode described above highlights
an important issue for Turkish political life in general and
one that is especially acute in AKP. The dearth of women
candidates for AKP nationally -- some 18 out of over 3,000
possible municipalities -- reflects the persistent problem of
women's socialization and participation in politics. During
our discussions at the local level, AKP officials were at
pains to point out the large and increasing number of women
that they claim to have brought into the party ranks.
Manisa's Siyak, for example, said that he made sure some 50
women -- 38 of whom have no headscarves, he pointedly noted
-- became members of the provincial assembly. However, he
could not explain why women have not occupied more
influential positions in the party organization, simply
noting that "very few women even applied to be candidates."



12. (C) AKP officials in Soke sub-province of Aydin echoed
their counterpart in Manisa. Soke AKP chairman Kemal Ozbek
said only a handful of women had applied for any of the
sub-provincial mayoralties. The AKP supporters in attendance
all acknowledged that there is a problem but none of the men
present had any ideas as to how to address it. One member,
clearly frustrated with a pointed line of questioning, sought
to turn the tables, asking defensively whether women are
involved in American politics. After all the men had spoken,
the lone woman in attendance explained that AKP women face
two challenges: 1) education -- a nationwide problem for
women; and 2) self-confidence, which better education could
enhance. If women feel more confident, she argued, they will
be more inclined to be politically active.


--------------
Comment
--------------



13. (C) AKP may pull out victories in all three provincial
capitals, although its chances of winning Izmir metropolitan
municipality appear doubtful. In any case, our discussions
in the region revealed three noteworthy trends in the party:
1) the paucity of energetic, three-dimensional AKP mayoral
candidates; 2) the concurrent reliance on Erdogan and the
party name to win votes as opposed to building up the
personality of local party candidates; and 3) the absence of
women on AKP ballots and in decision-making positions at the
local level. Septels will show that these themes are not
confined to the Aegean region. The fallout will have an
enormous impact on AKP's ability to respond effectively to
public demands, which will only increase on the party
following its expected widespread victory March 28.
EDELMAN