AFGHAN COORDINATOR TAYLOR'S VISIT TO ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001711 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2029 TAGS: AF MARR PREL TU SUBJECT: AFGHAN COORDINATOR TAYLOR'S VISIT TO ANKARA REF: A)ANKARA 1382 B)STATE 50477 C)ANKARA 1318 D)ANKARA 1162 E) ANKARA 1005 (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Afghan Coordinator Taylor held wide-ranging and candid consultations with MFA and TGS officials in Ankara on March 12. Turkish officials stressed the theme of "Afghanistan for Afghans" throughout the talks, arguing their commitment to stabilization and reconstruction efforts there are not motivated by a desire to support one ethnic group over another. They reiterated their interest in establishing a PRT in northern Afghanistan and are waiting for SHAPE to respond formally to their proposal. MFA officials exhibited varying degrees of flexibility on location and reluctantly accepted the importance of having SHAPE and the Afghan government coordinate in the overall PRT decision-making process. The Turks also reiterated their interest in increasing their contributions to ANA and police training, but hinted that such steps would likely be predicated on establishing a PRT. The Turks likewise intend to move ahead (independent of the PRT decision) with plans to deepen their involvement in education, medical and agriculture reconstruction projects in the north, while making clear that a PRT would greatly facilitate such efforts. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Afghanistan Coordinator Ambassador Taylor and JCS/J5 South Asia Branch Chief Col Schrader, accompanied by Embassy officials, held wide-ranging consultations with MFA and TGS officials March 12 in Ankara. MFA Deputy U/S for Bilateral Affairs Ali Tuygan led the Turkish delegation that included senior MFA officials from South Asian and NATO Affairs, as well as an officer from the Turkish General Staff (TGS). The delegation also met separately with TGS Deputy J3 for Operations Major General Bekir Kalyoncu and other TGS officers. -------------- AFGHANISTAN FOR AFGHANS -------------- -------------- ELECTIONS -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador Taylor said the US, the UN and the Afghan government were focused on the elections. Timing was key. Noting that the Afghanistan constitution calls for presidential and parliamentary elections to occur simultaneously, he said the US believed it was important to make every effort to try to convene both elections by June ¶2004. Taylor reported that the UN got a late start on election preparations. Much would depend on the UN,s ability to increase registration throughout the country. Admitting that the cost caused some sticker shock for international donors, Taylor said the registration process will cost USD 90 million and simultaneous elections will cost USD 46 million. He stressed the need for the international community to provide adequate resources for voter registration/election day voting, and the necessary security forces to ensure that Afghans are able to vote free of intimidation. President Karzai is also committed to convening the elections in June and wants to avoid any delay. ¶4. (C) Tuygan opened the meeting by thanking Ambassador Taylor for coming to Ankara to hold formal discussions with GOT officials on Afghanistan. He reaffirmed Turkey,s commitment to reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, and stressed the theme of &Afghanistan for Afghans8 throughout the talks. As Afghanistan works through an important period, the international community must work to ensure movement toward a more balanced representation of all ethnic groups to avoid past patterns of one group dominating another. Ensuring a sense of fairness and justice will be important to pave the way for a smooth transfer of power. ¶5. (C) Deputy U/S Tuygan said that he agreed in principle that it was important to stick to a specific date. But if the registration process does not reach an adequate level within a reasonable amount of time, it would not be a good idea to go ahead with elections. He added that if elections must be postponed, it should be for as little time as possible. In the event that presidential and parliamentary elections need to be split, they should be as close together as possible. In the end, the Afghans must decided for themselves. -------------- PRTS -------------- ¶6. (C) Both Deputy U/S Tuygan and MG Kalyoncu noted that earlier in the week Turkey had submitted three options for establishing a PRT in northern Afghanistan to SHAPE (ref A). Tuygan noted that Turkey,s initial proposal to establish a PRT was made in response to the fact that the existing UK PRT did not cover all of the northern region, and the premise that the UK would welcome it. For security, cultural, and linguistic reasons, a Turkish-led PRT in the north represented the best chance of success for Turkey. DDG for NATO Affairs Ceylan stressed that there were important logistical and operational reasons why Turkey believed it was important to establish a PRT in the north. ¶7. (C) Ceylan said it was important for NATO and the Allies to follow established NATO procedures during its operations in Afghanistan. He noted that SHAPE,s Stage 1 and Stage 2 priorities for the deployment of PRTs had created confusion among the Allies, including Turkey. He added that Turkey had also received some mixed signals from the US since putting forth its proposal on February 20 (ref B). Turkey,s proposal had been included in the list of requirements generated by SHAPE at the March 11 Force Generation Conference. The GOT believed that the three options put forth by Turkey provided SHAPE with a considerable degree of flexibility to consider, and added that Turkey was currently waiting for a formal response from SHAPE. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Taylor welcomed the Turkish proposal to establish a PRT in Afghanistan. While recognizing the importance of integrating individual countries, proposals into SHAPE,s operational planning requirements, Taylor stressed the importance of the Afghan national government ) through the PRT executive committee in Kabul ) in guiding the location of PRTs. From the outset, President Karzai has played a leading role in determining the location of PRTs ) including US-led ones. It is important for SHAPE to continue to discuss the location of PRTs with Afghan authorities. ¶9. (C) Ambassador Taylor added that he had just come from London, where he had discussed the issue of PRTs with the British and the Italians. Both welcomed Turkey,s offer as another expression of the Alliance's willingness to succeed in Afghanistan. He noted that the areas within northern Afghanistan identified by SHAPE as Stage 1 appeared to be covered by the existing and soon-to-be-formed UK PRTs. The UK already led an existing PRT, and intended to establish a forward operating base in Mazar and a second PRT in Faryab province in the northwest. He added that the Italians had offered to take over the US-led PRT in Herat and to establish a forward operating base in the province as well that would provide a supporting function to PRTs in the region. Taylor said that the Italians had expressed an interest in working with the Turks in that region. Taylor said that based on his understanding of the current situations, there appeared to be an opportunity to find an acceptable solution ) for SHAPE, the Afghan central government and Turkey ) that involved a Turkish-led PRT in Badghis, based on the fact that Badghis appeared on the Turkish list. Tuygan replied &let's wait and see how SHAPE responds to our proposal.8 Kalyoncu was more direct: &if one of our three proposals is not accepted by SHAPE, we will not do anything.8 (Comment: This comment likely reflects that the Turkish military is a reluctant participant in Turkey's PRT proposal.) -------------- -------------- TURKEY: COMMITTED TO NOT SUPPORTING ONE GROUP OVER ANOTHER -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Tuygan stated that Turkey,s interest in establishing a PRT in the north was not to support a single group (i.e. Dostum). We want to be 100 percent sure, he emphasized, that there is no question about our objectives. The Turkish military demonstrated in exemplary fashion in the past, both in the Balkans and more recently in Afghanistan as leader of ISAF II, that it is capable of acting in an even-handed and neutral manner. Tuygan noted that Turkish soldiers helped repair not only mosques but also churches in the Balkans. MG Kayloncu argued that Turkish soldiers are trained to be neutral before they deploy abroad and have behaved accordingly. He noted that when disputes erupted between different groups in the Balkans and there was a need for arbitration or mediation by a third party, the parties often times turned to the Turkish battalion commander. ¶11. (C) Specifically turning to Dostum, Tuygan said that Turkey has been advising Dostum for some time that × have changed in Afghanistan,8 and that he needs to make the transition from a regional player and act like a political leader of a party. He argued that by establishing a PRT in the north, Turkey could take advantage of its ties and influence with the parties there to bring about positive developments. He said that Turkey believes that Dostum has made some progress in this area given the circumstances. Tuygan argued that last fall there was considerable pressure on Dostum to expedite the DDR process at the very time when there was increase in Taliban activity in the south and a move to the north. Too radical a push for change in the north at such a time would have led to incredible instability there. While Turkey is committed to continuing to tell Dostum to comply with the DDR process, Tuygan argued that a sense of justice is needed and it will be equally important that it be done on a fair, equal basis across the country. ¶12. (C) Taylor acknowledged that similar language, cultural affinity and familiarity with the local population could all be positive factors in helping Turkey succeed in the north. However, these factors cut both ways. In Afghanistan, where a number of ethnic rivalries are at play, perceptions )- especially among the Afghans ) are important. If Turkey was in the north and a dispute between ethnic groups was to break out, there might be a perception that Turkey would side with one group over another. -------------- DONOR'S CONFERENCE IN BERLIN -------------- ¶13. (C) Ambassador Taylor said the upcoming Afghan donors conference in Berlin at the end of the month was a defining moment for the Afghans and the international community. Noting that the Secretary and other important world leaders were committed to attend, Taylor urged MFA officials to encourage FM Gul to attend the conference. (Note: After the morning session at the MFA, Ambassador Taylor met FM Gul before the latter spoke to the press, and encouraged him to attend the conference. Gul was non-committal. MFA officials had told us the previous night that there may be an extraordinary NSC meeting on Cyprus around the same time as the conference and therefore Gul may not be able to attend. End note.) ¶14. (C) Ambassador Taylor added there were a number of important objectives. First, it would be an important time for the international community to pledge much-needed resources for the immediate term (i.e. upcoming fiscal year) in Afghanistan. Second, it would serve to press the Afghan government to make important political decisions, including when to convene elections. Third, the Afghans and the international community needed to step up their commitments in security sector reform. ¶15. (C) Taylor said that Afghan Finance Minister Ghani will present a study showing that Afghanistan will need USD 28 billion in the coming 7 years. Taylor and Tuygan agreed that this figure should not be our goal in Berlin. The measure of success, they agreed, was donor pledges to cover the GOA's budget needs for the coming fiscal year. ¶16. (C) JCS Col Schrader outlined US plans for the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA),provided the Turkish delegation with papers identifying the needs of the ANA, and asked GOT officials to consider offering mobile training or embedded training teams. Amb. Taylor added that police training was another area in need of assistance, noting that the regional training centers (RTCs) established by the US and others at PRTs were making major contributions to overall police training efforts in Afghanistan. Deputy U/S Tuygan noted that Turkey remained interested in contributing to the ANA training efforts in principle, but hinted that the Turkish military might be constrained by budgetary limits, given the large number of active training programs elsewhere (i.e. Georgia, Albania, Azerbaijan). MG Kalyoncu merely noted the requirement. ¶17. (C) MFA officials provided Ambassador Taylor with a detailed briefing of Turkey,s assistance projects. Turkey has exceeded its original pledge of USD 5 million and has committed an additional USD 5 million over the next three years. Turkey,s program will continue to emphasize projects in education, health and agriculture. Turkey has built and restored a number of clinics and is looking for some help to manage the hospitals. Taylor encouraged Turkish officials to contact USAID officials in Kabul. He also suggested that a USAID official could be assigned to the Turkish PRT, which would help both sides coordinate assistance efforts. Tuygan noted that Turkey was currently providing training to 15 Afghan diplomats in Ankara ) the fourth group of 15 over the past year and a half. ¶18. (U) Ambassador Taylor has cleared this message. ¶19. (U) Kabul minimize considered. EDELMAN