IRAQI/CPA-TURKEY TRADE TALKS HELD IN ANKARA, MARCH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 ANKARA 001709 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL ETRD MOPS MARR TU IZ SUBJECT: IRAQI/CPA-TURKEY TRADE TALKS HELD IN ANKARA, MARCH 10-11, PROGRESS ON BTA CONTRACTS, NOT ON SECOND BORDER GATE, GOOD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SETS STAGE FOR FUTURE TALKS REF: A. 03 ANKARA 7444 ¶B. ANKARA 1653 (U) Sensitive but unclassified. -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Iraqi/CPA-Turkey trade talks in Ankara, March 10-11 laid out positions of both sides on a range of bilateral trade issues, including energy, water, bilateral trade agreements and the possibility of opening a second border gate. While talks on most issues were characterized by active participation on both sides, the Turks were unwilling to engage the Iraqis on alternatives to the Turkish proposal for a second border gate between Turkey and Iraq. The Turkish press played the talks as Turkey making multiple trade related requests and the US rejecting all of them. The talks set the stage for the next round, post-June 30, at which the Iraqis will represent themselves without CPA advisors. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) A 16-person Iraqi/CPA delegation, led by Senior Advisor to the MFA Amb. Ron Neumann and Trade Ministry Director General Ahmad al-Mukhtar met with representatives from the Turkish MFA, Undersecretariat for Foreign Trade and Turkish General Staff in Ankara March 10-11. The agenda included second border gate issues, electricity and oil issues, water issues and outstanding contracts under the January 2000 Bilateral Trade Arrangement (BTA). A joint statement reflecting the discussion is at para 24. -------------- - Political Outlook - TAL and Regional Stability -------------- - ¶3. (SBU) The talks began March 10 in a session chaired by Turkish MFA Deputy Undersecretary Kilic. Kilic asked for a briefing on the political outlook in Iraq, and Amb. Neumann gave a short presentation on the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) explaining that it laid the groundwork for a promising future, was the result of very difficult negotiations among the Iraqi Governing Council and between the IGC and the CPA. He noted that the TAL had struck a good balance and that, as one IGC member put it, showed the Iraqis were learning a new habit - compromise (see Ref B for report of Amb. Neumann's meeting with senior MFA officials on the TAL). Iraqi MFA Amb. Taha Shukor al-Abbasi assured the Turks that the signing of the TAL reflected a national consensus and demonstrated the unity of Iraq. He said Iraq was working hard with all means available to normalize relations with its neighbors and needed to find a friendly settlement of differences. Amb. Taha said he had in mind an MOU on good neighborly relations between Turkey and Iraq's MFAs and that Iraq was working on a text. He also noted that the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs had stated in Kuwait that Iraq was willing to sign a non-aggression treaty with all of its neighbors, and was ready to discuss this with the Turkish MFA. Iraqi MFA Amb. Sabah Omran said Turkey should understand Iraq's difficulties as brothers and give Iraq a chance to find compromise solutions. Iraq was depending on Turkish and US support. Kilic noted that Iraq, its government and its future were a regional and an international matter, and that efforts would be required to create regional stability through security. He assured the Iraqis that Turkey saw eye-to-eye with them on the majority of issues. -------------- Iraq-Turkey Economic Relations -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Turning to the general state of the economic relationship, Kilic noted that Turkey had been providing assistance to Iraq since the war, and that Turkey's experience, knowledge and location were all valuable for Iraqi commerce and reconstruction. He pointed to the good international reputation enjoyed by Turkish contractors, who could be particularly important for reconstruction. Turkey also was in a position to, and wanted to help in the telecom sector, in banking and in meeting Iraq's electrical power needs. He suggested that Turkey and Iraq could further develop and expand their business relations. Turkey supported relations between the private sectors of the two countries, he added, noting that the future was not in government-run business. The Turkish Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry TOBB) was highly developed. Its recent visit to Iraq was a good beginning and should be repeated by both sides. Trade fairs were also important. Turkey wanted to see an increase in trade with Iraq. Kilic suggested the possibility of re-establishing the border trade mechanism that had been advantageous in the past. Turkish MFA Coordinator for Iraq Reconstruction Amb. Okcun added that Turkey would organize a trade fair for Iraq in Gaziantep in April. TOBB wanted to visit northern and southern Iraq soon, and wants to hold trade fairs in various parts of Iraq. Kilic said Turkey would welcome the restoration of oil flow in the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline. ¶5. (SBU) Amb. Neumann replied that Iraq and CPA agreed that increasing prosperity would increase stability and make more room for reform. Private sector was clearly the way to go. The Iraqi/CPA general approach to contracts was that all interested parties should apply, and that the competition would be open. The best work for the best price was the policy and the law. Iraqi Ministry of Trade official Muhanad Saleem noted that it would be very important to have a Turkish trade fair in Baghdad. Turkey should be at the Baghdad International Trade Fair later in 2004. He noted that most halls at the fair grounds were badly damaged and needed renovation. Kilic said that the first concrete outcome of the talks was that both sides were interested in trade fairs, and that Turkey would look seriously into being at the Baghdad fair in November. -------------- Second Border Gate/Habur -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Kilic noted that issues related to the border crossing at Habur/Ibrahim Khalil had at times been a problem. Capacity was an issue and there would be an increasing need for more vehicles to cross. This led to discussion of opening a second crossing. He said Turkey had been encouraged by the position Iraq took on the issue in December (Ref A). He said there was an immediate need to look at a second gate. Turkey had studied the recent note on the issue from the Iraqi MFA. This was a technical issue and the MFA's diplomatic note had been general. To go forward there needed to be an overall understanding. There was no question that a second gate was needed, but the Turkish idea was diversification of the route. The Iraqi suggestion for a second gate near Habur that connected to the existing road network did not serve that purpose at all, he said. The existing route, Kilic continued, is congested and crosses mountains (Note: the Iraqi proposed route avoids the mountains and congestion on the Iraqi route is not a problem. End note). Turkey wants to bypass the difficult terrain and connect with the "mainstream" Iraqi road network. If Turkey could not reach "Iraq" via its proposed route, it would consider doing so via Syria. Iraq's objection that the Turkish route is parallel to the oil pipeline follows from the fact that the pipeline goes along the easiest route, as Turkey wants the roads to do. Turkey was not convinced that proximity of the road would jeopardize the pipeline's security. In fact, Kilic said, it might enhance it. If security were the main obstacle, the road could be moved parallel but further from the pipeline. Kilic conceded that the Turkish proposal, including a new bridge across the Tigris and 80 km of new road, would cost more than the Iraqi counterproposal of connecting to the existing roads, but cost need not concern Iraq. It would be paid for by an international consortium and would not be dependent on Iraqi financing. He concluded by saying Turkey did not see the Iraqi counterproposal as preferable or viable. It would, he said, be much better to diversify the road network. ¶7. (SBU) In the most strident presentation of the day, Turkish MFA Econ Deputy Director General Shakir Fakili suggested that because in February, on average 3040 trucks/day had crossed Habur and in March the figure was a record 3930, that Habur's saturation point had been reached. Almost USD 1 billion in trade had crossed Habur in 2003, including Ground Lines of Communication supplies. The main problem was that Iraqi officials at Ibrahim Khalil were charging arbitrary fees and fines, forcing Turkish truckers to buy gas at 12 cents/liter vice 1 cent/liter for Iraqis, and forcing them to buy the gas from specific stations identified by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). He also complained that radioactive scrap metal had been allowed to be sent to Turkey. The KDP, he asserted, was using the gate for political ends. They had confiscated books, flags and maps. These were, he stated, examples of the KDP's narrow-minded sectarian policy. ¶8. (SBU) Amb. Neumann noted that both sides agreed there needed to be a new crossing and expansion of the cross-border traffic for trade. Route selection was always difficult and required serious discussion between experts. He pointed out that the existing route is not/not now congested, and that specialists could work to fix traffic flow issues. The Iraqi/CPA side had not seen a detailed list of costs for the Turkish proposal. There was currently a huge list of unfunded projects in Iraq. If this were to be funded internationally, he said, finding the funds would be a big issue. If Turkey was offering to pay the full price, that would change the matter. Cost analyses were needed and estimates needed to be agreed upon. He noted the major issue for Turkey seemed not to be where the crossing was located, but where the route in Iraq ran, "an interesting topic for bilateral discussions." Neumann noted that Turkey had made the important commitment to work for 1850 trucks/day in each direction in December, that the Iraqi/CPA side understood that was a big undertaking, that Turkey had made good progress, and that Iraq and CPA were grateful. He hoped Turkey could continue to work to reach the target. Neumann pointed out that the TAL makes customs fees the exclusive purview of the federal government, but that the law was only three days old and would take some time to get to full implementation. CPA Lawyer Robert Maguire explained that for Iraq to be in compliance with WTO regulations Iraq needed to operate one uniform customs regime. On the matter of the seized books, Amb. Neumann urged everyone to show restraint and support for the spirit of Iraqi nationalism as the best guarantee of each Iraqi's rights. ¶9. (SBU) Amb. Taha noted that the Iraqi position factored in not just the pipeline, but plans for a railroad station and line in the area. He noted that a crossing could be opened east of Habur at Kani Masi quickly and have technical experts look at the situation at the other proposed crossings near Habur to resolve the differences there. Kilic suggested that a working group take up the issue separately and see how far they could get with it. In the working group, the Turkish side refused to discuss the Iraqi proposed route or crossing site. -------------- Energy -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Kilic opened the energy discussion noting that Turkey was prepared to increase the electricity it sold to Iraq and to assist with oil pipeline repairs. Turkish MFA Econ Dept Head Akif Ayhan reported that Turkey had sent a BOTAS delegation to Iraq to share experience and discuss upgrading the SCADA system. BOTAS was ready to continue its cooperation and to send another delegation to Iraq. Turkey was prepared to provide up to 1,000 MGW of electricity, but the transmission lines and border connections needed upgrading which required financing. If the financing could be found, he said, this could be done. The BOTAS rep said BOTAS needed to know what technical equipment was needed in Iraq for the pipeline and needed information on the level of SCADA investment. CPA Oil Ministry Advisor Gary Holcomb gave a detailed presentation on the steps CPA and Iraq were taking to protect and refurbish the oil infrastructure, demonstrating, as Amb. Neumann pointed out, considerable commitment from the Iraqi/CPA side. Kilic said the presentation was reassuring and helpful. ¶11. (SBU) Kilic raised an issue of two Turkish companies that had signed production sharing agreements with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) for oilfields in northern Iraq. Kilic said the PUK had confirmed the agreements after liberation, that construction of rigs was underway and that surveys of the fields were complete. He said Turkey expected the PUK would ensure CPA/IGC endorsement of the agreements. Okcun added that Turks had discussed this with PUK leader and IGC member Jalal Talabani two weeks earlier, and that Talabani had said he would raise it with CPA. Amb. Neumann replied that one important element in the TAL was that Iraq's natural resources would be controlled by the national authorities. CPA and Iraq hoped Turkey would regard this as positive. Anything that was agreed outside of the national framework would need a new review. He added that international law limited the legal rights of CPA to make commitments for Iraq on the future control of its resources. Holcomb added that he was aware of a number of other proposals in Iraq for the same oil fields with other Turkish companies and companies from other countries. It had always been CPA policy to tell parties that such agreements must be taken up with the legitimate Iraqi government. He encouraged all parties interested and involved to meet with Ministry of Oil representatives so that once a legitimate government was in place, negotiations could begin. In a separate meeting the following day, Mukhtar asked that Turkey await Iraq's formulation of a national energy policy before pressing the claims of the Turkish companies under their Production Sharing Agreement contracts. ¶12. (SBU) Iraqi Ministry of Oil Director General Radhwan al-Saadi said that his Ministry had heard rumors about these contracts but had never been informed about them formally or informally. Such contracts, he said, could not be taken lightly. He said he did not know why Turkish companies negotiated these agreements. They had to have known that they needed national authority. The Ministry was now looking at economic models, taxation issues, royalty issues, modes and duration of contracts for national policy decisions. Without a national policy on such matters, it was too early to discuss production sharing. If there were to be a decision to open oil fields to outside competition, it would be free and open. Kilic took note of this. In a private conversation on March 11, Kilic acknowledged to Amb. Neumann the contradiction in Turkey's policy of insisting that Iraq's natural resources be under national government authority yet pressing for the honoring of production sharing agreements signed with the PUK. He assured Neumann that he was under instruction to emphasize that Turkey was not rejecting the authority if the Transitional Iraqi Authority or of the TAL. ¶13. (SBU) Kilic then had the BOTAS rep describe an integrated Iraq-Turkey natural gas project that he said had been underway since 1996 with a twenty-year perspective to deliver gas to Europe. There were also some pending payment issues. Returning to oil issues, he noted that the UN had transferred all authority to CPA for Oil-for-Food issues. Some crude had been sent without payment being received. There were also pending compensation issues. Turkey had applied for USD 1.2 billion, but the UN only accepted USD 170 million and only paid USD 45 million. Director General al-Saadi replied that the gas fields project was a large one with an international consortium, but the project deal had not been signed or approved. Regarding UN compensation, he noted this was a UNCC issue and completely out of Iraqi hands, but CPA agreed to look into it. The Iraqi/CPA side also undertook to provide the Turks with information regarding the condition of the Iraqi side of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline and on outstanding fees, and agreed to study the Turkish proposal of technical assistance. ¶14. (SBU) Holcomb and the head of SOMO's Crude Oil Department 3, Salar B. Afrif, met separately with MFA, BOTAS and TPAO (state oil company) representatives to discuss energy issues in more detail. The Turkish side raised a number of issues connected to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. The Turkish side noted that Iraq had not made scheduled payments for the oil pipeline in 2002 and 2003. Afrif indicated that he thought Iraq had made a payment for January 1, 2002 through June 2, 2003. Holcomb promised to help settle the issue, and both sides agreed to exchange information on payments followed by a meeting in Baghdad. BOTAS officials said they were pleased that oil was flowing through the pipeline and asked for more information on the physical conditions to help them better operate the Turkish stretch of the pipeline. For example, BOTAS officials noted that the current flow rate was quite low, which caused vibration problems requiring compensating measures. They also noted that the oil contained high water content (2 percent). ¶15. (SBU) TPAO President Dinc reported that Turkish firms are interested in oil and gas projects in Iraq. He said that the Turkish market was the best option for the eventual export of Iraqi natural gas in the north, and that much of this gas would be used to supply western Europe. TPAO was also very interested in oil-field work and production in northern Iraq. He reported that TPAO has modern equipment and experienced crews, which are ready to quickly begin work in Iraq. He also said TPAO is prepared to offer training to Iraq's oil officials and workers. Holcomb was grateful for the information and expressed surprise that he had not heard of the Turkish offer earlier. He suggested that Turkish resources could be used for oil field work-overs to begin soon. On natural gas, Holcomb explained that Iraq will develop its natural gas sources, but exports were not an immediate priority. Most of this new gas production would be used first for domestic purposes, especially power generation, he explained. -------------- Banking -------------- ¶16. (SBU) Kilic noted that Turkish banks in Iraq would eliminate the courier problems at Habur (including disputes over fees they are charged),and that Ziraat Bank has made a formal application. Amb. Neumann explained that the three banks that were granted licenses made the best offers. A new tendering process was being developed. He noted that Turkish banks could open offices in Iraq now, though without a license they could not open branches. -------------- Transportation -------------- ¶17. (SBU) Kilic reported that the number of road attacks in Iraq on Turkish truckers was high and increasing. He said he would appreciate the Iraqi/CPA side taking note and the coalition enhancing security of Turkish drivers. Amb. Neumann said that route security was critical and that the CPA/Iraqi side took note. There was no higher priority than winning the fight for security. -------------- Tenders in Iraq -------------- ¶18. (SBU) Kilic said Turkey aspired to have Turkish contractors get construction tenders due to their qualifications and experience. He welcomed the decision to give Turkey prime contractor status and said Turkey was also ready for subcontracting. Turkish companies had already signed a large number of contracts. Amb. Neumann said we were trying to be fully transparent in the tender process. If it seemed to Turkey that we were not, he asked the Turks to please let us know. He urged the Turks not to rely on invitations to participate but to actively follow the tenders when they are announced. Okcun said Turkish companies were complaining that they were not getting timely information on tenders. They often had only a few days to put together their project proposals. The CPA/Iraqi side promised to look into this problem and see what they could do to help. -------------- Water -------------- ¶19. (SBU) The Iraqis asked for data on this year's rain and snow fall, and on the quantity of water being released downstream by Turkey so Iraq could do its seasonal planning. Kilic said he supported such an exchange of data. As neighbors, there was no reason not to cooperate, but this should be a two-way street. He asked the Iraqis to share with Turkey Iraqi data on its water supply usage and irrigation data. (Some of this data was exchanged the next day). Kilic then explained that Iraq, Syria and Turkey had been planning to discuss water in a tripartite commission, but much had changed since the last tripartite meeting. Turkey wanted any new steps to re-invigorate cooperation and help find better ways to share the use of water. -------------- Foreign Trade -------------- ¶20. (SBU) In the meetings at the Foreign Trade Undersecretariat, some of the same ground was covered on border fees. The Turks complained that one company in northern Iraq had the export monopoly for scrap metal and that the only way Turks could export it was to pay the KDP USD 80/ton. Director General Mukhtar replied that on the border fees, Iraq would do its best to eliminate them, but they were a source of Kurdish revenue and the KDP would not give them up "just like that." The IGC, he said, would solve this matter. It was a political issue. On scrap, there were two rules banning its export: one IGC rule and one CPA rule. A set of regulations would soon be issued to regulate the export. Maguire added that any export of scrap now was a smuggling operation and against the laws of Iraq. The Turks replied that in that case, Turkey would ban the import of scrap into Turkey from Iraq. Mukhtar said he welcomed that. -------------- Resolution of BTA Contracts -------------- ¶21. (SBU) The two sides agreed to a framework for processing the BTA (Bilateral Trade Agreement)-registered and funded contracts that were interrupted by the war. The Iraqi side explained that it was disadvantaged by the widespread looting and destruction of government offices and was dependent on the Turkish side for copies of the contracts and statements of the bank accounts. (The BTA arrangement required 70 percent of the value of the exported crude be credited to Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. in Turkey. The remaining 30 percent was deposited on behalf of SOMO in an unknown bank in Lebanon. The balance on the Turkiye account had at one point risen to USD 578 million, of which USD 302 million had been authorized by SOMO to be paid to Turkish producers for completed shipments, an additional USD 19 million had been paid for partial shipments and a final USD 18.5 million had been paid without Iraqi approval.) The Iraqi side demanded proof that the USD 18.5 million of products had been produced, shipped and accepted by Iraq before the war. Turkish Foreign Trade reps said that under the BTA there was USD 60 million available for use in Iraqi purchases of Turkish goods for export and Turkey wanted Iraq to utilize that fund. Al-Saadi replied that it was Iraq's money. Iraq wanted clear records and to receive all, but only, the goods agreed upon. Then the sides must establish the amount remaining in the account. To resolve the remaining contractual issues, the Turkish producers must revalidate the need for the products with the various Iraqi ministries and state owned enterprises. In cases where the Iraqi side is still interested in receiving the products, the sides agreed they would be promptly shipped. Agreement was reached to ship USD 140 million of railroad locomotives to the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation. Agreement was also reached on shipment of commercial oil drilling products to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. In cases where the Iraqi end-user either no longer existed or no longer needed the specified product, the Iraqi side argued the contracts would be "closed out." The Turkish side said that whether or not they should be terminated was for discussion and decision by the Turkish government and each Iraqi ministry involved. The Iraqi side insisted that funds which were not pledged to existing "registered and funded" contracts must be deposited in the DFI. The Turkish side initially claimed that there were many more contracts (USD 257 million) existing than remaining credit available (USD 237 million) in the account, but also claimed that the entire account should be viewed as a general fund to match against Turkish production contracts. The concluding statement reflects the parties' disagreement on this point. -------------- Border Trade Centers -------------- ¶22. (SBU) The Turks suggested establishing Border Trade Centers for free trade by local residents in areas around the borders to prevent smuggling and legalize local border trade. they said this had worked well at three locations on Turkey's border with Iran. Habur was too busy to handle such an arrangement, but once a location was agreed for the second crossing, this could be done. Mukhtar said if it worked, it could help promote good relations and suggested that one small pilot project be introduced first, once a suitable location is determined. ¶23. (SBU) The Turks noted that they had submitted a draft for a preferential trade arrangement and hoped that Iraq and Turkey could find agreement without violating WTO rules. Mukhtar replied that the draft had been circulated to various Ministries for comment, and many comments had already been provided. This could be discussed at the next round of bilateral talks. If there was agreement, it could be signed sometime after June 30 and would add credibility to Turkey's relations with the new Iraq Government. ¶24. (U) Begin Text of Agreed Statement: The Turkish and Iraqi Delegations met in Ankara on March 9 - 12, 2004 to discuss common concerns. The two neighbors recognized that economic cooperation provides the necessary stability for democracy and reform. They intend to further develop their mutually beneficial trade and investment relations. They discussed the following points: ¶1. The Turkish side raised financial, operational and security issues of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline. The Iraqi side explained in satisfactory detail the significant efforts it has undertaken to provide security for the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline including building ground and air guard forces, a construction program for increased valve shutoffs, and providing hazardous response teams to reduce any economic and environmental damage. The Turkish side said that the Turkish domestic market and transportation of natural gas to Europe via Turkey constitutes the best option for Iraqi natural gas exports. Turkish companies BOTAS and TPAO expressed their willingness to develop five gas fields in Iraq, and TOPRAS expressed its desire to purchase oil from SOMO at the Ceyhan Terminal. ¶2. The two sides recognize that the current border gate at Ibrahim Khalil-Habur is inadequate to support their growing bilateral trade, and that a second border crossing point would benefit both sides. The Turkish side did not accept the Iraqi technical response to the Turkish technical proposal. Further technical studies will be required. ¶3. The Turkish side noted the recent establishment of three border trade centers on the border with another neighbor, and agreed to use the results of this experiment in plans for establishing similar sites on the Turkish-Iraqi border. ¶4. The Turkish side intends to provide seasonal data on snowfall and reservoir levels sufficient for Iraq to develop its water plan for this year. The Turkish side wants to receive relevant data from the Iraqi side regarding their reservoir levels and irrigation projects. Both sides recognize the benefit of discussions about available water resources and how they may be most efficiently used. ¶5. Both sides recognized the need to promptly resolve the Border Trade Arrangement (BTA) of January 14 -16,2000. a. The Iraqi side looks forward to receiving a full comprehensive statement of the deposits and recent withdrawals from the BTA related bank accounts. The Turkish side will also report the remainder of the cash balance described in paragraph 5 of the January 14-16, 2000 minutes, and will disburse this pursuant to proper instructions from the Iraqi side. b. The original procedures for delivery and acceptance of Turkish products to the Iraqi end user is the way to close out the remaining BTA registered and funded contracts. The Iraqi Ministry of Trade will remind the other relevant Iraqi Ministries of the need to observe these procedures with regard to outstanding BTA registered and funded contracts. c. The Iraqi side notes the disbursement of approximately USD 18.5 million to Turkish companies for goods delivered to Iraq where conformity with original procedures needs to be established. The Turkish side is obliged to obtain and provide to the Iraqi side all documents that would justify these disbursements. In the event that insufficient documents exist, the parties will revisit the issue. d. Since the recent conflict constituted circumstances beyond the control of either party and prevented the timely performance of the BTA registered and funded contracts, the Turkish producers will be requested to contact their Iraqi end users and revalidate the Iraqi need for the products. If the Iraqi end user validates this continued need, the contracts will be performed and closed out following the original procedure. Examples of where this should be promptly begun include BTA registered and funded contracts specifically identified to the Turkish side where the end users are the Iraqi Ministry of Transportation's railroad related contracts and Iraqi Ministry of Oil's contracts, as shown in the attached annex (not attached in this cable). e. If the Turkish producer no longer wants to produce the specified product at the contract rate, or the Iraqi end user no longer needs the specified product at the contract rate, in the Iraqi view the contract is terminated. In the Turkish view the contract should be submitted for consideration of termination to the Iraqi ministries concerned and the Turkish side (Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade). f. The fact that an Iraqi end user no longer has a legal existence would normally constitute a force majeure event; the Turkish side may provide full contract documentation to the Iraqi Ministry of Trade and request guidance on whether the product specified in the contract could be accepted by a different Iraqi end user. The Iraqi Ministry of Trade will use its best efforts to locate an alternate end user to permit performance of the BTA registered and funded contract. g. It is the position of the Iraqi side that after performance of the BTA registered and funded contracts, any money remaining in the BTA related bank accounts should be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq. It is the Turkish position that all money in the BTA account should be utilized by the Iraqi side for BTA contracts. ¶6. The Iraqi side has circulated the Turkish draft Preferential Trade Agreement among its ministries for comment; both sides are very interested in discussing a mutually beneficial bilateral trade agreement that is consistent with the principles of the World Trade Organization. Witnessed by: Iraqi Side: Ambassador Sabah J. Omran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Director General Ahmad Al-Mukhtar, Ministry of Trade; Director General Radhwan Al-Saadi, Ministry of Oil; Director General Falah Hasan Habsi, Ministry of Transportation. Turkish Side: Director General Tevfik Mengu, Prime Ministry, Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade. End text of statement. ¶25. (U) CPA has cleared this message. EDELMAN