SCENESETTER FOR THE MARCH 2004 VISIT OF GENERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ANKARA 001507 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2014 TAGS: PREL MOPS TU IZ SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE MARCH 2004 VISIT OF GENERAL MEHMET ILKER BASBUG, DEPUTY CHIEF, TURKISH GENERAL STAFF REF: A. A) ANKARA 1230 ¶B. B) ANKARA 1259 ¶C. C) ANKARA 1360 (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: General Basbug comes to Washington at a time when the US-TU relationship is generally on the mend. It has been one year since the 1 March vote and 5 months since the 7 October vote and the "soft landing". Once again, generally, the US-TU relationship is approached from a multi-faceted perspective, not just a one issue relationship-Iraq. TGS thinks important issues for the visit will be GME, Med Dialogue and enhanced NATO engagement in the region, the Global Posture Review, Iraq, TAL, and Afghanistan. At the same time, General Basbug will come looking for specific answers on when the U.S. will take direct action against the PKK/Kongra-Gel and expecting to be able to lay out in detail TGS concerns about the implications of the Transitional Administrative Law in Iraq for northern Iraq. He is scheduled to travel to Louisiana, Florida, and Washington, DC. Meetings are scheduled with U/Ss Feith, D Armitage and NSA Deputy Hadley (with a drop-in from Dr. Rice). End Summary. -------------- Greater Middle East Initiative (GME) -------------- ¶2. (C) Turkey wants to know what GME means in the region and what the US is looking for from Turkey in the way of support/assistance; how do we intend to work this with countries of the region and NATO. Recently in Turkey, GME has been the subject of considerable press commentary, mostly negative and reflecting chronic suspicions about U.S. motives and paranoia that the U.S.'s real aim is to turn GME against Turkey and remove the Kemalist State structure. Few Turks understand GME's methods or aims. This issue will likely be raised in most of the DCHOD's meetings. ¶3. (C) While recognizing that Turkey's democratization and economic reforms have a way to go, Turks are proud of their achievements, especially over the last two years, and many are willing to play a regional role. Several GOT officials have encouraged us to consult closely with Ankara on GME, believing that Turks' long association with the region can be useful in refining the initiative. Turkey has for decades 
seen itself and been seen as an east-west bridge, although Turks have not examined closely the implications of what it means to be a bridge or how one fulfills one's alliance obligations while being a bridge. Turkey's experiences in integrating itself into NATO and the EU are consistent with core GME objectives. Moreover, Ankara might welcome opportunities to share its experiences with others in the region -- experiences in making laws more democratic, training military and police to respect civilian rule and human rights, opening up markets. Turks may be able to deliver some messages about the nee d for Middle East societies to face up to their problems more easily than the U.S., although Turkey's unique history, including memories of the Ottoman Empire means it is not a "model". ¶4. (C) Therefore, in helping the Turks to fashion their regional GME role, we must be aware of the Turks' historical baggage in the region and the problematical question of Islam in Turkey, and we must avoid a perception of Turkey as the U.S.'s regional gendarme. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Edelman and Basbug discussed GME March 9, and the Ambassador has provided the general with speeches and statements by the President and others on the initiative. Further, the Turkish General Staff J-5 posed a range of questions concerning the Greater Middle East Initiative (see ref A for more details.) The following are a sampling of the questions: -- Which countries are included in the GME? And why. -- What if any relationship is there between GME and the Global Force Posture Review? (TGS suspects that they are related: perhaps the reason that the US has so many forces in the region -- and wants to move more of them to the east as part of the posture review -- is to be able to have the capability to use mil force to further the objectives of the GME.) -- What if any expectations does the US have for Turkey as far as the GME is concerned? -- Beyond policy pronouncements, is there programmatic content to the GME? -- Will the GME continue to be a high priority if President Bush loses in November? -------------- CYPRUS -------------- ¶6. (C) We expect several interlocutors to raise this with Basbug in Washington. TGS only cautiously agreed to the government's wish to move Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash and the Turkish Cypriots back to the bargaining table and it appears TGS insisted on only a narrow field of maneuver on the part of the government. TGS is being careful not to comment in public on the course of Cyprus negotiations. However, TGS remains concerned lest a settlement (1) draw a line between the two communities which TGS considers militarily indefensible; (2) lead to a reduction of Turkish troops below 6,000; and (3) impose what TGS considers onerous reporting requirements for troop movements. Basbug's interlocutors should emphasize (1) the credit redounding to Turkey broadly (not just the government) from its initiative to re-open negotiations; (2) the crucial importance to Turkey's success overall (well beyond the question of a start date for EU accession negotiations) of a settlement in Cyprus; and (3) the importance of Tu rkey's maintaining its constructive, common sense, cool-handed line in the negotiations, i.e., to avoid being provoked by the Greek Cypriots into abandoning the negotiations. -------------- EU Accession -------------- ¶7. (C) Turkey's current focus on EU accession has been a ready vehicle for the internal changes Turkey needs to be successful. Turkey's focus on getting a date to begin EU accession talks has translated into an effective impetus for reform. Although the Copenhagen Criteria are a de facto external discipline, there is widespread sentiment that these are things Turkey needs to do for its own good. ¶8. (C) Turkey's success is not a given. The Turks have done well in passing laws, but now need to implement them. Everyday life across Turkey yields examples where the basic elements of individual rights and rule of law are not respected. Turkey's EU supporters stress that complacency now will jeopardize Turkey's chances of getting a date in December. Even if Turkey does begin accession talks, the road to accession will be arduous and could take 10 years. Faced with a long haul, the current political focus and burst of energy for reforms could fail. ¶9. (C) The Turkish economy has improved significantly over the past year, greatly reducing fears of renewed financial crisis and generating hope for sustained, low-inflation growth. However, this improvement has generated complacency among government leaders, who fail to understand that the economy's huge debt and structural weaknesses leave it vulnerable. Unless Turkey implements reforms systematically, it will miss the opportunity to move toward sustainable prosperity and away from the boom-and-bust cycles that have haunted it. -------------- Istanbul Summit -------------- ¶10. (C) The President is scheduled for a bilateral visit in late June as well as the NATO Summit June 27-29. NRF has been recommended as a good option to augment civilian security forces. As Turkey would provide the preponderance of the ground troops, TU would be in the forefront. Turkey has not presented any requests to the US for additional security assistance for the summit, although there has been some discussion at NATO about AWACS support.. ¶11. (C) The image of the Summit's occurring in Istanbul provides an opportunity to showcase Turkey and its role in both the institutions of Europe and the GME initiative. Turkey's geographic and historc role as a bridge between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East will provide an appropriate backdrop to the Summit's emphasis on GME, Med Dialogue, expanding PfP opportunities with the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey's active support for these initiatives would further underscore the important role Turkey plays in NATO and its neighboring regions. -------------- IRAQ -------------- ¶12. (C) PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL: Turkey is anxious for action to be taken against the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL. Many in TGS feel Turkey has provided the US with a range of information for use in combating the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL and have seen little in return. Many in TGS see the need for a well-thought-out comprehensive plan to eliminate the PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL. They also realize this is a long-term and laborious effort. However, they also see the need to take immediate tangible action. ¶13. (S) Further, TGS feels they are waiting for several deliverables or responses from the US, some of which, Basbug may ask about. The following are a sample of the issues: (For further details see ref B) -- briefing by CENTCOM on anti-PKK/KADEK/KHK CONOPS planning; (Basbug expected from VCJCS comment in December that U.S. actions might commence in that time period. He will probably raise the issue of his perception of the delay.) -- action against the PKK/KADEK/KHK in northern Iraq, including closing down its front organization offices such as those of the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party; (note: per CPA talks in Ankara on 10 Mar, a law was passed o/a 7 Mar placing all border operations under the authority of the Iraqi Central Government. This should decrease the opportunity for KDP influence in the north.) -- placing officials representing the Baghdad authority on the Iraqi side of the Habur-Ibrahim Khalil crossing under Baghdad's sole authority, rather solely those representing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) or the KDP; -- accepting Turkish offers of training for Iraqi civil servants and others in Turkey; -- a response to TGS D/CHOD Basbug's question about how else Turkey could contribute to efforts in Iraq; ¶14. (C) Intelligence Fusion Cell (IFC): The EUCOM J2 initiated IFC, which is intended to facilitate the exchange of intelligence information and fused analyses between the US and Turkey in order to provide actionable intelligence to CJTF-7 against PKK/KADEK/KONGRA-GEL, is active. Currently, there are two JAC Molesworth personnel at the IFC in Ankara. Several exchanges have already occurred. TGS J2 described the IFC as the first step in fighting terrorism and will improve the TU-US relationship in the process. Additionally, TGS J2 expressed considerable interest in acquiring U2 imagery via the IFC. U2 overflights have been approved by POTUS; pending DOS demarche to MFA, the flights could commence. ¶15. (C) Transitional Administrative Law (TAL): GOT has reacted harshly to the terms of the TAL. It views the process as undemocratic; the result as a pure ethnic federation dividing Iraq; and the treatment of the Turkomen as belittling. The result, it believes is inconsistent with the presentation to date by the U.S. including in the recent letter from the President to PM Erdogan. Turkey believes it has been frozen out of US Iraq operations and treated in a manner unbecoming an ally. It is not yet clear how far our explanations of the process so far and in perspective have gone to put aside those concerns. (See ref C. for further details.) -------------- Afghanistan -------------- ¶16. (C) Basbug could be mostly in the listening mode here. Afghanistan Coordinator Taylor will meet on March 12 with GOT officials in Ankara. A Turkish offer to provide a PRT in northern Afghanistan has prompted a renewed discussion within the USG as to what additional contributions to reconstruction and stabilization efforts the US should solicit from the GOT to support US and NATO interests in Afghanistan. ¶17. (C) The following are snapshots of where the Turks are on key issues: --PRT: The Turks have proposed establishing a PRT in northern Afghanistan and are in discussions with SHAPE about an alternate location as the one the Turks proposed is already being covered by the UK. The Turks have a strong preference for establishing a PRT in the north -- a preference driven more by a familiarity withthe region and the players (and thus a greater chance of success) than by a desire to somehow influence domestic political developments. From our vantage point, the Turkish position is clear: a PRT in the north or no PRT at all. --OEF: CENTCOM has asked the Turkish General Staff on at least two different occasions during the past year (spring and fall 2003) to contribute troops to Operation Enduring Freedom. In both instances, the Turkish General Staff replied "no." There is no reason to believe that TGS's position has or will change, particularly if Turkey's offer to establish a PRT in the north is not accepted. TGS believes the Turkish military is overstretched globally and is reluctant to do more in Afghanistan. They are also watching closely the discussion of NATO taking on a significant role in Iraq where, being much closer to home, they will want to have forces ready to contribute. The MFA experienced considerable difficulties in persuading TGS to contribute a small number of forces to a TU-led PRT; they assess the chances of persuading the TU military to contribute forces to OEF operations as "next to zero." Finally, the Turkish Parliament is highly unlikely to approve combat forces to OEF (as opposed to troops for PRTs, where the MFA has indicated that further Parliamentary approval would not be needed). --ISAF: The Turks believe they already have done more than their fair share in terms of contributing to ISAF operations (i.e. 267 personnel to ISAF I, leadership of ISAF II from June 2002-February 2003 and a contribution of approximately 1,400 troops, on-going contributions to ISAF III, and an offer of three helicopters) and are not inclined to do more. The Turks rebuffed requests from former NATO SYG Robertson to contribute an 1,000 additional troops to ISAF. Their position remains unchanged. --Afghan National Army (ANA): The Turkish military has expressed an interest in the past in contributing to US-led training efforts. They participated in the early stages of training the ANA and were considering participating in the CENTCOM-led training program in early 2002 before deciding to take over command of ISAF II. We suspect some within the Turkish military may be receptive to proposals to participate in future training. During a recent MFA-TGS meeting on PRTs, TGS reportedly expressed an interest in participating in training the ANA, on the condition that Turkey had a PRT that could serve as a "base" for training efforts. --Police Training: The GOT is inclined to provide police training if Turkey stands up a PRT in the north and if the US provides the facilities (reftel). --Reconstruction: The GOT already has contributed more than $5M to Afghanistan reconstruction efforts and is considering making significant contributions (including establishing schools and agriculture centers) in the north later this year. -------------- Incirlik AFB -------------- ¶18. (C) The Turks are still awaiting a second round of consultations on global force posture. Basbug may have heard rumblings about different potential operational needs or developments. None of these have been taken to the political leadership at this point and it would not be useful to get the TGS significantly out in front in trying to obtain continuous changes to approved operations. The authority for OIF II concludes on April 30, and there has been no sustained engagement with the GOT/TGS on other operational requirements. Turkish interpretations of our general arrangements form a relatively high political bar for establishing different operational requirements at Incirlik. EDELMAN