GEORGIAN FM JAPARIDZE'S FIRST VISIT TO TURKEY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001036 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2014 TAGS: ECIN ECON EPET GG PGOV PREL RS TU SUBJECT: GEORGIAN FM JAPARIDZE'S FIRST VISIT TO TURKEY REF: A. TBLISI 0342 ¶B. TBLISI 0311 ¶C. 2003 ANKARA 6198 ¶D. TBLISI 391 (U) Classified by Ambassador Eric Edelman, E.O. 12858, reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Georgian FM Japaridze reportedly gave Turkish FM Gul a positive readout of President Saakashvili's recent Moscow trip but said Saakashvili had emphasized that Georgia will remain oriented toward the West, will insist on Russian withdrawal from bases in Georgia, and will not agree to Russian demands that no foreign forces be deployed in Georgian territory. Japaridze averred that relations between Ajaran leader Abashidze and Saakashvili have improved; Gul claimed Turkey has worked to tamp down Ajaran separatism. Gul pushed for increased contact between Abkhazia and Turkey's Abkhaz community and for opening Abkhazia to Turkish business. The two FMs also discussed controls at the Georgian-Turkish border, possible increased Turkish assistance to Georgia's Interior Ministry, and energy pipelines. In wake of the visit, the Georgian Embassy in Ankara continues to have strong reservations about Turkey's views regarding Russia's role in Georgia. End Summary. Japaridze Meets with PM Erdogan, FM Gul ¶2. (C) Georgian FM Tedo Japaridze visited Ankara for the first time Feb. 17-18, meeting with PM Erdogan and FM Gul (President Sezer was out of the country). In a Feb. 18 telephone readout for the Ambassador, whom Japaridze had known well as Georgian Ambassador in Washington, Japaridze emphasized how pleased he was with the visit. ¶3. (C) In a subsequent briefing for us, Georgian DCM Tabatadze claimed the Turks were "keen" to meet with the GOG prior to Gul's February 23-25 visit to Moscow. According to Tabatadze, Japaridze's one-hour meeting with FM Gul focused on regional affairs and security. Japaridze's meeting with Erdogan was shorter and focused on economic issues. Tabatadze confirmed that Japaridze left pleased with his visit and sees Gul as a good interlocutor. However, both Tabatadze and, he said, Georgian Ambassador to Turkey Lebanidze found Gul poorly briefed on Caucasian affairs. Georgian-Russian Relations ¶4. (C) Tabatadze said Japaridze gave Gul a positive spin on President Saakashvili's February 11-14 visit to Moscow; the Georgians' aim was to re-start Georgian-Russian relations with a clean slate. However, Japaridze asserted to Gul that Saakashvili told Putin two things are non-negotiable: Georgia's pro-Western orientation and the need for Russian withdrawal from bases in Georgia. At the same time Georgia is prepared to guarantee Russian security through joint patrols along the entire length of the Russia-Georgia border (ref A). ¶5. (C) Gul reportedly expressed interest in the progress of the Georgia-Russia Framework Agreement (ref B). Japaridze reportedly answered that Georgia will never agree to Russian demands that the GOG guarantee no deployment of foreign forces on Georgian territory, but asked Gul to reassure the Russians during his upcoming trip that Turkey does not intend to establish bases in Georgia. Abkhazia ¶6. (C) Gul reportedly suggested that increased "people-to-people" contacts between Abkhazia and Turkey's ethnic Abkhaz community could help reduce Russian influence in Abkhazia and reduce tensions between Abkhazia and Tblisi. (Comment: This suggestion appears to run counter to one Turkish MFA assessment about Turkey's Abkhaz community: in September, the MFA Caucasus Department Head said that some members of Turkey's Abkhaz community, with help from the Russian Embassy in Ankara, were smuggling arms and materiel into Abkhazia from Turkey (ref C). End comment.) ¶7. (C) In reporting Gul's strong request to Japaridze that Tblisi formally open Abkhazia to Turkish business, DCM Tabatadze claimed some Turkish companies are already doing business there. Gul reportedly asserted to Japaridze that the CIS embargo of Abkhazia is not working: Russian companies are doing business there and some Russian officials have visited. More Turkish business in Abkhazia, Gul argued, will reduce Russian influence. Downplaying the idea that Turkish access will promote Abkhazian separatism, Gul predicted most Turkish businesspeople would not be from Turkey's Abkhaz community. According to Tabatadze, FM Japaridze told Gul he will consider this proposal. Ajara ¶8. (C) Japaridze asserted to Gul there is now a "good understanding" between Ajaran leader Abashidze and President Saakashvili (ref D). DCM Tabatadze added that he expects Abashidze to visit Saakashvili in Tblisi within the next several days. Gul reportedly welcomed the news, telling Japaridze that the Turkish Consul General in Batumi has been pressing Abashidze to "play by the rules" and avoid separatism. Japaridze "highly appreciated" Gul's message. Border Controls ¶9. (C) Gul reportedly pressed Japaridze to relax the visa regime for Turkish truckers entering Georgia. Japaridze promised to consider this. However, later in the meeting, Japaridze noted Russian pressure to tighten visa controls on Turks entering Georgia: the Russians point to cases of Turkish fighters killed in Chechnya who bore passports with Georgian entry visas. Gul reportedly also complained about corruption at the border; Japaridze replied that the new government is determined to fight corruption. ¶10. (C) The two FMs also discussed the possibility of opening a third border crossing between Georgia and Turkey. Tabatadze noted that one possible location is near a now-closed Russian base, and might help replace the economic activity lost when the base closed. Turkish Assistance to Georgian Ministry of Interior ¶11. (C) Tabatadze said Gul also proposed expanded Turkish assistance to Georgia's Ministry of Interior, including grants, officer training and Turkish advisors. The Turks proposed helping the GOG reconfigure Ministry of Interior security forces to look more like Turkey's jandarma, which is in charge of security outside Turkey's urban areas. Japaridze said he would consider it. Pipelines ¶12. (C) Both FMs agreed on the importance of BTC in fostering regional security and prosperity, and agreed that any delay in construction is in neither Georgia's nor Turkey's interest. Japaridze raised the possibility of a pipeline from Novorossiysk to parallel BTC in Turkey and reduce the amount of Russian oil shipped through the Bosphorus. According to Tabatadze, the Turkish side expressed interest, but wanted to know the Russians' reaction; the Georgians replied that Putin has formed a group to study the proposal. ¶13. (C) Comment: DCM Tabatadze said the visit left him with the clear impression that Turkey wants to expand its role in Georgia. At the same time Tabatadze, who has been a reliable interlocutor for the past two years, reiterated his concern that, despite training programs and other assistance, Turkey is searching for ways to work with Russia on the Georgia question rather than concentrating on helping Georgia extract itself from Russia's shadow. As just one example, he cited Japaridze's interlocutors as consistently emphasizing Russia's role in the region, arguing that Turkey, the U.S. and Georgia should find ways to make Russian involvement constructive. End Comment. EDELMAN