PM ALLAWI'S AMMAN MEETINGS WITH IRAQI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009672 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2014 TAGS: IZ JO PINR PREL SUBJECT: PM ALLAWI'S AMMAN MEETINGS WITH IRAQI OPPOSITIONISTS REF: A. BAGHDAD 2003 ¶B. AMMAN 9485 ¶C. AMMAN 9411 Classified By: CHRISTOPHER HENZEL, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B & D) ¶1. (S) On December 1 and 2 Iraqi PM Allawi and DPM Barham Saleh held meetings in Amman with Iraqi Sunni figures, most from Al-Anbar province, ranging from IIG-allied brothers Amer and Sheikh Majid ali Suleimein Dulaim, to prominent Sunni Arab rejectionists. The latter category included the normally Syria-based Muadher Khorbit, believed by USG sources to have played a role in supporting the Iraq insurgency. According to our sources Khorbit met at least three times with Allawi, twice in small group meetings with other oppositionist figures, and once privately. Khorbit subsequently claimed to several of our contacts that Allawi invited him to endorse and join the democratic political process and return to Iraq "with Allawi on his plane." Khorbit is still in Amman and, according to our Iraqi contacts, is considering Allawi's alleged offer. Khorbit (who reportedly stalked out of one small group meeting when Majid ali Suleiman showed up) is among those expected to meet again with Allawi when he returns to Amman on December 8 or ¶9. Small-Group Meetings -------------- ¶2. (S) Other Iraqi Sunni Arab figures who met with Allawi and Saleh in a series of small group meetings include Sheik Tarik al Abdullah, a wealthy businessman and the de facto leader of a Fallujah-area tribe; Mahsen Naif al-Faisal, a Shammar tribal leader; Abdul Jabar Kubaisi, a prominent lawyer from Fallujah and reported business associate of Allawi's brother; and Abdul Hamid al-Muhmadi, a senior Saddam-era intelligence official also from Fallujah (reportedly a Director in the Iranian section). Sheikh al-Abdullah, who has known Allawi for several years, said that in their meeting Allawi spoke about an Iranian/Islamist threat and the need for Iraqi nationalists and secularists to unite. They also discussed the need to provide humanitarian assistance to Fallujah IDPs and return people to their homes. Al-Abdullah said that the Sunni interlocutors strongly pressed for an election delay and criticized the dissolution of the Iraqi army, and asked that at least part of it be stood up again. Al-Abdullah claimed that Allawi agreed that an election delay is desirable, but said he lacks leverage by himself to force a delay. Al-Abdullah said that Allawi agreed that disbanding the army was a mistake, stressing that he personally had no role in this decision. ¶3. (S) According to al-Abdullah, the upshot of the meeting was that Allawi is enthusiastically in favor of organized Sunni nationalist participation in the political and governing process. Al-Abdullah said that Allawi made a favorable personal impression on the group, who agreed that it is time for Sunni Arabs to identify leaders and begin active participation in the electoral and governing process. Al-Abdullah said that the group stressed to a sympathetic Allawi that they need more time to bring Sunni Arabs on board. Al-Abdullah thought the meeting was helpful and productive, with Allawi taking on their points. Apparent Progress with Al-Anbaris... -------------- ¶4. (S) Allawi's series of meetings culminated on December 2 in a private encounter with Beirut-based Dr. Hameed al-Gaaod, de facto leader of al Anbar's al-Gaaod clan, and his brother Jalal. Also present were Barham Saleh, the Iraqi Minister of Defense (an old friend of the al-Gaaod's),and an unnamed British member of Allawi's staff. The al-Gaaod's subsequently told emboff that they were impressed by both Allawi and Saleh and asserted that the discussion has created the possibility for "historic developments" for Iraq. They said that Allawi stressed that he and the Kurdish parties share Sunni Arab concern about the potential threat to Iraq posed by what they described as an Islamist/Iranian alliance. ¶5. (S) The al-Gaaods reported that Allawi claimed IRAN has given $300 million to Adnan Chalabi and others to organize and buy votes, and is purchasing voter registration forms from Iraqis for $100 each. Saleh said that the Kurdish parties know that a sovereign independent Kurdish state is an impossibility and are therefore allying with Allawi to promote a secular and modern state. Jalal al-Gaaod quoted DPM Saleh as adding "if I thought a Kurdish state was possible, I wouldn't be here". Allawi speaking for his allies and Saleh speaking for the Kurdish parties told the al-Gaaods that Iraq needs Sunni Arab nationalists to enter the political process, and be their allies in thwarting the extremist threat and in governing generally. As a sign of sincerity, Allawi asked that the al-Gaaods consult with other al-Anbar leaders and give him a list of three candidates from which Allawi would choose a new al-Anbar governor, as well as a list of "credible and respected people" to serve on the Al-Anbar Governing Council. ¶6. (S) The al-Gaaods claimed (and Allawi aide Izzaat Shabinder separately seconded to us) that Allawi is prepared to support an election delay if a critical mass of Sunni leaders make a "clear break" with rejectionists in favor of full participation by Sunnis in the election process. Shabinder underlined that only then would it be possible for the IIG to accept the argument that some extra time is needed "to prepare the ground" for broad Sunni participation. While the al-Gaaods claimed Allawi said the USG still needs to be won over to this concept, they were convinced that he will exert all his influence in favor of an election delay if this condition is met. The al-Gaaods tentatively committed to work with Allawi in organizing a notional large group meeting of Al-Anbar notables in Dubai, where they will meet Allawi "face-to-face" and hopefully hammer out an agreement of cooperation and political alliance. Allawi aide Shabinder accompanied Hakeem back to Beirut on December 3. (Note: We are closely monitoring this process and will provide further updates. End Note). ...But Mosul Figure Avoids Allawi -------------- ¶7. (S) One prominent Sunni who refused to meet with Allawi was Mosul-based Sheikh Dari Mashaan al-Faisal, leader of Iraq's Shammar tribe and a reported rival of Mahsen Naif al-Faisal. Sheik Dari, brother-in-law of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and a distant relative of Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawer, told emboff on December 1 that, while he personally advocates Sunni Arab political participation in the elections, the "Sunni street" currently perceives the election as a calculated step toward Shi'a/Iranian domination of Iraq. He stressed that while the concept of democratic elections is overwhelmingly supported by Sunnis, participation in elections "stacked" against Sunni interests is not. He estimated that at least a third of influential Sunni figures currently support an organized boycott if the January 31 elections go forward, with most of the others sitting on the fence. Dari downplayed Allawi's efforts to meet with oppositionists in Amman, and said that he personally could not be seen meeting with Allawi at this point - not least because the "Sunni street" blames the IIG, "not the Americans," for the Fallujah attack. HENZEL