JORDANIAN FM DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS, RELATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 000832

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2014
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS IZ JO KTER
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FM DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS, RELATIONS
WITH ISRAEL AND SYRIA, AND OTHER ISSUES WITH NEA DAS
SATTERFIELD


Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for Reasons 1.5 (b),(d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Jordanian FM Marwan Muasher told visiting NEA DAS
Satterfield on February 1 that he was pushing for an Arab
League resolution to help bolster the peace process,
including a provision that would specifically condemn suicide
bombings. He said it remained unclear whether the Arab
League summit would take place as scheduled in Tunis.
Muasher spoke January 30 with Syrian Foreign Minister Shara
on strengthening Syrian-Jordanian relations and discussed
King Abdullah's upcoming trip to Syria. The King is wary of
undertaking travel to Syria beyond a planned opening of the
Unity Dam on the border without a pledge for a return visit
by Syrian President Asad to Amman. Muasher was very
concerned about Jordan's relations with Israel and complained
that the Israelis had given Hizbollah a far better prisoner
release deal than they were willing to give Jordan. Given
this disparity of treatment, Muasher said he would not
receive Israeli FM Shalom until an agreement was reached that
included release of the four long-time prisoners convicted of
murder. Muasher assured Satterfield that Jordan's recent
filing with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against
the Israeli security wall was strictly legal in its approach
and did not stray into final-status issues. He pledged to
continue negotiations with the U.S. over an Article 98
agreement. End Summary.

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ISRAEL-PALESTINIAN UPDATE
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2. (C) NEA DAS David Satterfield and the Ambassador met
February 1 with Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan Muasher.
Satterfield briefed Muasher on his recent conversations with
both Palestinians and Israelis during his visit to the region
and said that both sides, driven in large part by domestic
pressures and reasons, are seriously talking about taking
steps needed for sustainable progress. Muasher remarked that
he had recently talked with Abu Mazen, who told him that the
time may now be right to strike a deal with Arafat whereby
Arafat would be granted freedom of movement within the West
Bank/Gaza in exchange for meeting all the stringent
conditions that we have asked for. Muasher did not comment
on the merits of this suggestion, but said he was merely
passing it along for U.S. consideration. (Separately, Abu
Mazen had lamented that Arafat "would never change.")

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SOMETHING POSITIVE FOR THE ARAB LEAGUE?
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3. (C) Asked about plans for Arab League summit action on
the peace process, Muasher said that he spoke with Amre
Moussa and other Arab leaders at Davos about this subject.
Muasher opined that Arab states need to play a constructive
role and that, if a summit is held, he was going to push for
an Arab League resolution consisting of four parts, which he
had already drafted. First, a condemnation of the killing of
civilians by both sides, with a specific denouncement of
suicide bombings. According to Muasher, this would help
provide "Arab cover" for the Palestinians to take action
against the organizers of suicide operations. Second, a
statement supporting efforts to reach a comprehensive and
permanent hudna, to be followed by "significant steps" to
restart peace negotiations. Third, a call on Israel to state
its acceptance of the roadmap without conditions. Fourth, a
reaffirmation of the Arab League's peace initiative from the
Beirut summit.


4. (C) Muasher acknowledged that he was unsure if he could
persuade Arab League members to support such a resolution.
He had already spoken to Saudi FM Saud about his plan, but
got only a lukewarm reaction. While Saud wasn't opposed to
the idea, he instead was focused on legalistic actions, such
as "registering" the language of the Beirut initiative with
the UN, a move which Muasher and Satterfield agreed was
irrelevant given numerous UNSC endorsements of the Beirut
document. Muasher intended to pursue his resolution idea
with Saud and others at the February 14 meeting of
"neighboring states (to Iraq)" in Kuwait.


5. (C) Concerning the status of the Arab League summit in
Tunis, Muasher commented that Tunis was now uncertain if it
wanted to host it. He said that the Tunisians were afraid
that the summit might be seen as a failure, which would
reflect badly on President Ben Ali during an election year.
The Tunisians were also concerned about possible security
threats. The summit could be moved to the League's
headquarters in Cairo, but Egyptian President Mubarak told
King Abdullah that he was not keen on this since he was not
planning to go to Tunis, but would be forced to attend the
summit if it were held in Egypt.

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JORDAN-SYRIA RELATIONS: MOVING AHEAD?
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6. (C) During the January 25 visit of Syrian Prime Minister
Otri to Amman for the signing of a regional gas project,
Muasher said, both he and Prime Minister Faisal Al-Fayez
urged Otri for better communication and coordination between
their two governments to help overcome current "barbs" in
Jordanian-Syrian relations. Five days later, Syrian FM Shara
gave Muasher a "very friendly" call to say that President
Bashar Asad had been briefed on these remarks, and that Asad
wants to coordinate more closely with Jordan on issues of
common concern. Shara added that Asad was looking forward to
King Abdullah's upcoming visit to Syria to inaugurate the
Wahda (Unity) dam.


7. (C) According to Muasher, the Syrians are proposing that
King Abdullah continue on to Damascus after the ceremony at
the dam. King Abdullah, however, is wary of going to
Damascus without a commitment by the Syrians that Asad will
make a return visit to Jordan. The King has made several
trips to Syria without any reciprocal travel by Syria's chief
of state and he feels that it is only fair for Asad to now
visit him. While Muasher said he believes recent signs that
Asad clearly wants to further open up his country, he is
skeptical whether Asad can pull the old guard and the Syrian
bureaucracy in line with him.

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JORDAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS: HITTING A SNAG
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8. (C) Muasher said he was very worried that
Jordanian-Israeli relations could "spin out of control." In
concluding a prisoners release deal with Hizbollah, he opined
that the Israelis did everything that they said they could
not do for Jordan. Muasher stated that there were 24
Jordanians being held in Israel for "security-related"
offenses, including the four long-time prisoners convicted of
murder prior to the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. He explained
that Jordanian officials had met with each of the detainees
and that seventeen of them wanted to return to Jordan,
including "the four," while six did not. Although Israel was
prepared to release even more Jordanian prisoners, Muasher
said that these others were "criminals" and that the GOJ
frankly did not care whether they were freed. Prior to
Israel's deal with Hizbollah, Jordan had come very close to a
prisoner release agreement with Israel except for the issue
of "the four," which Muasher was prepared at that point to
defer until later. However, the Israeli swap with Hizbollah
transformed the prisoner issue for Jordan.


9. (C) According to Muasher, while Jordan had wanted Israeli
FM Shalom to visit Amman as scheduled in January, the
announcement of the deal with Hizbollah two days before the
visit "put us in an impossible situation." That same day,
the Israeli ambassador to Jordan called Muasher and asked
about a meeting between Shalom and King Abdullah. Muasher
said that this had never been promised and that, in his
opinion, it was not necessary. The Israeli ambassador stated
that Shalom would not come to Amman if he could not see the
King. Later, Shalom called Muasher and asked why he was not
welcome in Jordan. Muasher responded that he was very
welcome, to which Shalom said he would "look like a fool" if
he didn't meet with the King. Muasher then asked Shalom how
he thought the King would look if he met with the Israeli FM
after public disclosure of Israel's agreement with Hizbollah
and no similar release of Jordanians.


10. (C) Muasher emphasized that Israel must now come up with
a prisoner release deal for Jordan that includes "the four."
If such an agreement is reached, Shalom's visit to Amman can
be rescheduled and the King will receive him. Otherwise,
after talking things over with King Abdullah, Muasher said
that both he and the King would refuse to meet with Shalom.
While Jordan wants to improve its dialogue with Israel,
Muasher stated that this was not possible in the current
environment and that Israel was clearly taking Jordan for
granted.
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THE BARRIER
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11. (C) The Israeli security wall is a "vital issue" to
Jordan, Muasher stated, as it affected Jordan's own security.
He assured Satterfield and the Ambassador that Jordan's
filing with the ICJ (a copy of which he offered to provide)
was "very legal" in its approach and focused on the fact that
the wall was being built in "occupied territory," as opposed
to "disputed territory." As such, Israel had a legal
obligation to preserve the territory's status/integrity and
must reverse the wall's construction. Israel's argument that
the wall was an act of self-defense, said Muasher, was only
valid if the wall was built on Israel's own territory.


12. (C) Muasher also stated that the filing did not go into
other issues and that Jordan would wait to examine all the
briefs before deciding whether it would participate in oral
debate before the court. Satterfield took note that Jordan's
filing had stuck to legal questions, rather than final status
matters, but reiterated that the U.S. had a difference of
opinion with Jordan on the ICJ case.

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ARTICLE 98 AND ARAB REFORM
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13. (C) Muasher said that the GOJ had closely examined the
most recent U.S. proposal for an Article 98 agreement. While
this proposal reflected the real progress achieved by
negotiations, it still did not resolve Jordan's concerns
regarding the possible transfer of population. Jordan's
latest proposal had "put us in trouble with the ICC," said
Muasher. The GOJ was now waiting on the U.S. response and
ready to reconvene talks in March. Satterfield responded
that the U.S. was carefully examining the Jordanian proposal.
He assured Muasher that any disagreements on the Article 98
issue would not harm U.S.-Jordan relations.


14. (C) Muasher was satisfied with preparations for the
meeting in Egypt on Arab reform to build upon earlier
discussions in Aqaba. According to Muasher, Gamal Mubarak's
office was doing a good job following-up with NGOs, including
women's groups, and the invitations it had issued indicated
that the meeting would cover all the issues that Jordan hoped
it would address (i.e., political and economic reform items).

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OIL AND IRAQ
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15. (C) Both Kuwait and the UAE, Muasher complained, had
failed to provide any money to Jordan this year to help
Jordan purchase oil. He worried that the two Gulf countries
might not even deliver funds for the last three months of
2003 as agreed. The Saudis had kept silent about their
intentions since King Abdullah's visit, but Muasher was not
optimistic.

16. (C) Turning to Iraq, Muasher said that Jordan was
opposed to the idea of federalism and that he would discuss
this issue with Iraqi Foreign Minister Zebari during the
upcoming "neighboring states" meeting in Kuwait. Satterfield
said that the coalition believed it would be able to meet the
concerns of Shi'a leader Ayatollah Sistani and the U.S. would
not change its timeline for the creation of a transitional
government this summer. Satterfield also welcomed a UN role
in the transition process.

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COMMENT
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17. (C) Muasher was relaxed and cordial during the
approximately 80 minute meeting at his home. His statements
on the prisoner release issue with Israel in the wake of the
Hizbollah deal are of particular concern. They represent a
hardening of Jordan's previous stance.


18. (U) NEA DAS Satterfield did not have an opportunity to
clear this cable.
Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page.
GNEHM