ISLAM AND POLITICS IN JORDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 007752 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2014 TAGS: PGOV PREL KISL PTER JO SUBJECT: ISLAM AND POLITICS IN JORDAN REF: A. AMMAN 6213 ¶B. AMMAN 7619 ¶C. AMMAN 6215 ¶D. AMMAN 5109 ¶E. AMMAN 2764 ¶F. AMMAN 3380 Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) There has been a steady and unmistakable increase in the influence of Islam in Jordanian society over the last two decades. The younger generation, in particular, has embraced its Islamic roots. Surprisingly, participation in the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF),has not significantly risen as Jordanians no longer feel the need to join these groups to confirm their religious identity. The IAF leadership, still effectively controlled by elder-generation East Bankers, remains more pragmatic than its rank and file (mostly Palestinian) members. However, its anti-U.S. rhetoric is on the rise and its public statements on Iraq and other issues have, at times, approached the boundaries of the GOJ's tolerance. The IAF's opportunistic alliance in parliament with social conservatives and populist mavericks have paralyzed passage of key elements of the King's reform agenda; PM Fayez's tenure may hinge on success in breaking that logjam when Parliament reconvenes in mid-November. While Islamic extremists remain a small percentage of Jordan's population, their numbers may be on the rise, are loosely organized, and increasingly difficult to counter. End Summary. -------------- LOOKING TOWARD HEAVEN -------------- ¶2. (C) As almost anyone in Jordan will tell you, Islam has had a growing influence on Jordanian society over the last two decades. Whether exhibited by the wearing of headscarves by women, or by attendance at prayers in the country's mosques, Jordan (including relatively cosmopolitan Amman) is at least outwardly a more religiously devout place than in the recent past. During the 1970s, for example, headscarves were by far less common than miniskirts at the University of Jordan, whereas today a large majority of females on campus choose to cover their hair. According to societal observers, going to mosque regularly no longer raises eyebrows, and more Jordanians than ever are performing daily prayers in public. ¶3. (C) The resurgence of Islam has not bypassed younger Jordanians. Dr. Fares Braizat, Director of Polling at the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS),told PolOff that a recent CSS poll showed that young adult Jordanians between 18 and 24 years in age (excluding Christians) are, in general, more conservative and devout in their religious views than their parents. He further noted an increase in the number of Jordanians who identified themselves as Muslims first, and as Jordanians second. Braizat and other sociologists theorize that Islam may have filled a void created by the decline of Arab nationalism and the collapse of socialist and communist ideology. Another theory is that Jordanians may have more tightly embraced Islam as a way to confront a perceived onslaught of Western social and cultural values. -------------- MB, IAF MEMBERSHIP STALLS -------------- ¶4. (C) Despite growing religious devotion, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political offshoot, the Islamic Action Front (IAF),have not seen a noticeable increase in its active membership. Dr. Ibrahim Gharaibeh, former MB member and social researcher who closely follows the Islamic movement, explained to PolOff that as Jordanian society has grown more religious in character, devout Muslims no longer feel a need to join the MB to publicly confirm their faith. "Twenty years ago almost everyone who went to mosque every day was in the Muslim Brotherhood," said Gharaibeh, "but today most regular worshipers are not." MB tactics aimed at boosting membership, such as the funding of mass wedding ceremonies for poor Jordanians, have not had a noticeable impact. ¶5. (C) The IAF, the largest and best organized political party in Jordan, is sometimes portrayed in a radical light. Yet local observers almost uniformly characterize its leaders, particularly the 14-member Executive Bureau, as ultimately pragmatic and loyal to the Hashemite family. Despite frequent public clashes on policy issues, when push comes to shove, the IAF's desire to maintain its favored status with the regime has shown it is willing to cave under GOJ pressure, even at the expense of its own credibility. Senator Mohammad Al-Azaydeh, who left the IAF in 1997 but retains ties with the party, told PolOff there was a "gap" between the IAF leadership (primarily East Bankers) and some of the rank and file (predominantly of Palestinian origin), who favor a more confrontational approach. However, he believes that the Executive Bureau was fully capable of keeping its members "under control." -------------- GROWING CONCERN ABOUT EXTREMISM IN JORDAN -------------- ¶6. (C) While the MB and IAF may be able to keep their members in line, and the GOJ maintains a close hold on their activities, there is growing concern about religious extremism in Jordan, particularly among non-affiliated, poor, and disaffected youth. The Zarqawi-directed bomb plot last April involving local Jordanian extremists was a wake up call to many ordinary Jordanians about the growing danger of radical Islam. Gharaibeh contended that, despite the increased interest in Islam, only a very small fraction of Jordanian Muslims were extremist in their views. Yet he conceded that the absolute number of Jordanians espousing Islamic extremism was most likely growing in number, prompting the King's recent directives to challenge these messages (ref A). Elaborating on the recent confrontation between the GOJ and Islamists over unlicensed mosque preachers (ref B),a local daily recently pointed out that Jordanians are tuning out official sermons, which they know are vetted by the regime, and increasingly tuning in other sources of religious guidance. These include radical Islamist messages (of the Salafist and Takfiri bent) that are circulated more informally through leaflets, cassettes, and during discussions in private homes beyond the reach of the security services. Contacts both inside and outside the government worry that the young in particular are increasingly susceptible to radical messages and willing to carry out violent acts in accordance with these teachings. As an example, Jordanian authorities point to four young Jordanian-Palestinians intercepted in July trying to infiltrate Israel as influenced by Takfiri teachings (ref C). -------------- HIJACKING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE? -------------- ¶7. (C) Societal tensions between East Bank Jordanians and those of Palestinian descent have filtered into the IAF hierarchy, Azaydeh said, but the East Bankers still held the upper hand in resolving internal policy disputes. The IAF's political advocacy on Palestinian issues, however, is not lost on (secular) Jordanian-Palestinians. Palestinian contacts tell us that fear of reprisals from the security services (and East Bankers) keep most secular Jordanian-Palestinian activists from advocating publicly on issues important to their community, such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, citizenship rights, or discrimination in Jordanian society. As a result, the IAF has emerged as the main public voice for the cause of Palestinians in Jordan. Earlier this month, for example, it was IAF MPs who met with PM Fayez, the Justice Minister, and the Interior Minister to discuss concerns that the GOJ had plans to withdraw citizenship from Jordanians of Palestinian origin. The emergence of the IAF as a voice for Jordanian-Palestinians is a development does not sit well with many of our Jordanian-Palestinian contacts. They say that because the IAF's new role ensures that "Palestinian" issues remain "oppositionist" issues, not to be taken seriously (ref D). It also feeds the perception of many East Bankers that the Palestinians are the root of Jordan's troubles, feelings that persist since the 1970 civil war. -------------- -------------- CAPITALIZING ON ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT, BLOCKING SOME REFORMS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Beyond the Palestinian issue, the IAF also is trying to broaden its popularity by increasing its focus on economic and foreign policy issues that appeal to the religious and the secular alike, according to post contacts. Its opposition to unpopular tax hikes (ref E) struck a chord with the public and is also tapping into strong anti-U.S. sentiment in Jordan with more denunciations of the American administration. In April of this year, the IAF's Muslim Scholars Committee issued a "fatwa" on the obligation to oppose the U.S. administration for its "aggression against the Palestinian and Iraqi peoples." A similar ruling was announced in May after the Abu Ghraib scandal (ref F),and the party has announced the cessation of any and all forms of cooperation with the U.S. government. More recently, the same committee issued a fatwa declaring that joining the Iraqi military or police was a "sin against God," as was providing food or supplies to American forces in Iraq. It further called for jihad in Iraq and for support for Shiite leader Muqtada Al-Sadr. Jordan's other political parties are in disarray, awaiting a new parties law that theoretically may bolster moderate, secular forces. But for now, the only organized, active, popular alternative to the IAF on a national scale is the network of professional associations, which traditionally filled the void created by long bans on party formation. Unfortunately, association leaders are caught in an Arab nationalist time warp -- making them both anathema to the King and regime and a fairly feeble rival to the Islamists on certain issues. On other matters, such as anti-normalization, the two sides have successfully capitalized on their overlapping memberships to find common cause against the government. ¶9. (C) Despite the IAF's vitriol in denouncing some GOJ positions, many of our Jordanian interlocutors dismissed these statements as "just talk." "They sometimes push at the boundaries with their edicts," said Gharaibeh, "but they know the government will usually leave them alone if they don't go beyond words." The IAF recognizes that some issues may be too sensitive for public debate. Attempts by Islamists to secure backing for the return of expelled HAMAS activists, for example, have been discreet and low-key. In Parliament, they have successfully joined opportunistically with social conservatives and others to block elements of the King's reform agenda -- posing such a significant challenge that the King ended the summer extraordinary session early, in disgust. The longevity of PM Fayez's tenure may well depend on whether he succeeds in breaking this logjam when parliament reconvenes after Ramadan. The King has also made clear publicly that the government must do a better job to ensure that the "correct" message of Islam is spread through the mosques. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) The monarchy's successful taming of the Islamic "opposition" over the years -- while banning alternative secular political voices -- is coming back to haunt the regime. Building frustration about the regional political situation, mounting anti-U.S. sentiment, the seeming disconnect between the regime and the masses, and popular impatience with aspects of the economic reform program, are coalescing to increase the appeal of radical Islamic calls to action. For its part, the GOJ remains confident that it can channel and manage Islamic political sentiment with a combination of cooptation, surveillance, and, when necessary, carefully applied threats of repression. In post's view, the regime's strategy will continue to meet with success in the medium term. Over the longer haul, however, the monarchy will need to deliver the democratic political rights it has promised, if the King's ambitious plans for a prosperous and stable Jordan are to succeed. ¶11. (U) Baghdad minimize considered. Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. HALE