CABINET SHAKE-UP EXPECTED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 007336

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2014
TAGS: PGOV JO
SUBJECT: CABINET SHAKE-UP EXPECTED

REF: A. AMMAN 6213

B. AMMAN 6545

Classified By: CDA DAVID Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: PM Fayez has told the press a cabinet
shuffle will occur soon, probably by early October. For
different reasons, he and ministers heavily involved in
Jordan's economic and social reform successes appear safe for
now, but a degree of royal disfavor with Fayez remains
evident. End Summary.

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WILL FAYEZ STAY OR WILL HE GO?
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2. (C) With no immediate crisis to focus their minds,
Amman's political observers are engaged in widespread
speculation about the future of the Fayez Cabinet. The Prime
Minister fueled the rumor mill when he told an influential
local daily on August 28 that he expected a shuffle to take
place after October 1 -- when he is due to respond to the
King's demand for a status report on the government's
progress in its first year (ref a). This has naturally
further disgruntled his entire cabinet, whose members have
been made instant lame ducks just as the King is trying to
energize them into post-summer activism.


3. (C) With Jordan's political system still highly
dependent on the motivations and actions of one man, the
guessing game on the cabinet and PM,s future is fueled
primarily by supposed insights into the thinking of King
Abdullah. The King's mid-July letter expressing
dissatisfaction with the performance of Fayez, whose
principal strength is his perceived closeness to the King,
provided unusual open evidence of rifts within ruling
circles. Privately, GID Chief/National Security Advisor
Sa'ad Kheir and Court Minister al-Rifai say frankly that
Fayez has all too sadly met their low expectations.
(Ironically, it is Kheir's security apparatus that receives a
significant share of the blame from reform activists for the
government's failure thus far to move forward on its
political development agenda.) With the scent of blood in
the air, aspiring prime ministers in the
cabinet -- Deputy PM Halaiqa and Planning Minister Awadallah
-- make no secret of their own ambitions.

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GOVERNMENT'S INEPTITUDE WEAKENS KING
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4. (C) The starting point of reports of change is the
patchy performance of the Fayez government. Criticism of
Fayez focuses on managerial ineptness, a certain obtuseness
on policy details, and political abilities that do not
stretch beyond a quest for personal popularity through
regional travel and humanitarian handouts from the PM's slush
fund. His efforts to woo parliament have yielded minimal
results, and the King appears to have cut short the summer's
extraordinary parliamentary session out of frustration that
it was not smartly adopting into permanent legislation over
200 temporary laws that form the foundation of his
socio-economic vision for Jordan. To keep the ball rolling
on his broad reform agenda, it is the King (not the PM) who
is seen on a daily basis briefing interested parties,
cajoling his senior team, and demanding performance from the
civil service. Awadallah expressed to Charge his concern
that this approach ties the King too closely to the ups and
downs of progress, by removing the traditional shield the
cabinet and PM have provided to the palace, and insulation of
the King from criticism on day-to-day performance.
Meanwhile, with a parliament that proved disappointing to
almost every faction in Jordan, the political field has once
again been left open to the professional associations,
stacked with hardy survivors of the 1960s and 1970s when they
and the Muslim Brotherhood alone were permitted political
room. They traffic in mindless rhetoric of
anti-normalization, anti-semitism, and knee-jerk anti-U.S.
policy, in which all of Jordan's ills are laid on foreigners'
doorsteps. Victims of the recent flare-up in this campaign
included a leading parliamentary reform spirit, Raed Qaqish,
who received little support from a government supposedly
committed to quieting anti-normalization forces.


5. (C) With Fayez, weaknesses seen as the real source of
the cabinet,s problems, his removal would be the logical
solution. However, Fayez came into office so clearly
identified as the King,s man, that his sacking would be a
painful admission of failure by Abdullah. More
fundamentally, the King has limited options for a successor.
Royal Court Minister al-Rifai is having a strong run of
success advising the King, who seems to have unqualified
admiration for this able, smooth, and often wise scion of a
family which has produced two prime ministers already.
Samir,s day as PM seems inevitable, but he still is
unseasoned, with no record in management or public speaking.
If selected now, he could suffer the same fate as Fayez, whom
he replaced at the palace. Other candidates carry unwanted
baggage. The choice of a Palestinian, such as Deputy PM
Halaiqa or Planning Minister Awadallah, could generate
domestic headaches the King probably wants to avoid, although
Halaiqa has a commendable combination of political,
managerial, and economic talents. Awadallah, in his star
reform performance, has alienated parliament and other
sectors by breaking from traditional patronage practices on
which these groups thrive. So, most senior government,
palace and security contacts predict to Charge and Embassy
officers that Fayez will stay, despite his flaws.

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WITH CABINET REORGANIZATION CERTAIN, HOW FAR WILL IT GO?
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6. (C) Regardless of whether Fayez stays or goes, it is a
foregone conclusion that there will be a reshuffle of some
kind. With parliament due to return in early November, it is
time for the palace and government to retrench. Two
ministerial offsites are planned, a favored device of this
King to strategize, issue commands, and mobilize his
reformist allies. According to such insiders as Awadallah,
several ministries are likely to be restructured. For
example, some doubled-up ministries such as Tourism and
Environment will be split again to relieve overburdened
ministers. Complete duds such as Political Reform and
Parliamentary Affairs Minister Daoudiyah will go, as well as
Health's Darwazeh. IT minister Zu'bi, a strong reformist
ally of the King, seems determined to leave for personal
reasons, perhaps to be replaced by the miscast and
accident-prone spokesperson, Asma Khader, or Jordan's
ambassador to Washington, Karim Kawar. Others rumored to be
on the chopping block are Labor Minister Amjad Majali and
Municipal Affairs Minister Amal Farhan. Rumors persist that
Muasher recently fell out of favor over his attempts to
"clarify" the King's recent critical comments about the PA
leadership (ref b),but no one in authority has endorsed that
speculation with us.

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OTHER CHANGES UNDERWAY: PRINCE FAISAL IN NEW POSITION
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7. (C) Against this backdrop, other significant changes in
King Abdullah's ruling circle are quietly underway. Prince
Faisal is to be shifted from command of the Air Force into a
still-evolving position, coordinator for Air Force projects
or perhaps a second vice-chairman of the Armed Forces. The
precise source of the King's discontent with Faisal is
unclear, but a recent spate of jet accidents under Faisal's
watch may have played
into the King's decision. Faisal's likely replacement is Air
Force director of operations, Abd al-Halleem Mahfzah.
However, it may only be temporary, as many observers believe
he is not one to "knock heads" and bring into line many
strong personalities moving in many directions. Mahfzah is
otherwise able and has spoken to Charge of his absolute
commitment to strong relations with Israeli counterparts.
JAF Vice Chair Nsairat has already been cashiered, promoted
and retired, and said to have vague promises of a position
outside the military. The motivations for his removal appear
to be complex, by-products of his rivalry with the chairman
and perhaps of the need to make room for Faisal at GHQ, seen
as not big enough for two Air Force chieftains.

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THE KING'S DILEMMA
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8. (C) The impending changes have preoccupied Ammanites,
who seem more concerned with the personalities involved than
with the substance of the issues at hand, including Fayez's
anticipated status report on his government's accomplishment
in the first year. It highlights once again the dilemma
facing a reform-minded King who is, in many ways, ahead of
his people on these issues. Pulled forward by his own vision
(and those of a few select advisors around him),he is
restrained by elements of society that either feel threatened
by reform, don't understand it, or simply prefer traditions
that have served them and their families well (with Fayez
fitting the last category). As one journalist recently
noted: "The King is more liberal than the prime minister, who
is more liberal than the parliament, which is more liberal
than the people." The King remains partly constrained by the
dilemma that it is the leadership of his own loyalist base --
personified by Fayez and much of parliament, and representing
the tribal and rural conservatives of the East Bank -- which
is failing to meet his high standards. Therefore, he may be
treading warily as he amends his cabinet, strengthening its
reformist wings but retaining Fayez for his symbolic value,
if for little else.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/ or access the site
through the State Department's SIPRNET home page.
HALE