IRAQI SUNNIS VISIT AMMAN, SEEK TO ENGAGE U.S. IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000728

SIPDIS

CPA BAGHDAD FOR DIR OPO RON SCHLICHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2013
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM KISL ECON IZ JO
SUBJECT: IRAQI SUNNIS VISIT AMMAN, SEEK TO ENGAGE U.S. IN
IRAQ

REF: CPA HQ 05130261830Z JAN 04

Classified By: CDA DAVID M. Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) A group of Sunni Iraqis representing the Iraqi Peace
Party told PolCouns January 22 that they want to cooperate
with the CPA and Coalition Forces in Iraq, but are put off by
tough security measures there. The group said that anti-U.S.
violence in the Sunni triangle does not represent support for
Saddam Hussein, but the fear of average Sunnis that their
interests are not being taken into consideration. It is
also, they argued, the result of high unemployment among
working age Sunnis who previously had held government and
military jobs. The group made an unexplained plea for good
treatment and resettlement in the U.S. of MEK members in
Iraq. While we cannot vouch for their bona fides, the
members of group seemed genuine in their desire for direct
contact with CPA. END SUMMARY

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SEARCHING FOR A SYMPATHETIC EAR
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2. (C) PolCouns met January 21 and 22 with a group of Iraqi
Sunnis representing the Iraqi Peace Party (Hizb as-Salam).
The party's Secretary General and group leader, Sheikh Saleh
Abu Khumrah, explained that the group had decided to travel
to Amman to talk to USG representatives because they believe
they could not get a fair hearing from Americans in Iraq,
particularly because they do not want to undergo the
"demeaning" security procedures required to visit Coalition
officials.

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SUNNIS POORLY REPRESENTED ON IGC
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3. (C) Abu Khumrah asserted that anti-coalition violence in
the Sunni triangle is not due to residual support for Saddam
Hussein: the vast majority of Sunnis realize that the era of
Saddam and the Baath party are over forever. Rather, the
violence is a reaction of the Sunni population to Iraq's
humiliating military defeat, continuing harsh Coalition
security practices (including arrests and raids on homes),
and the strong feeling that Sunnis are not properly
represented on the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC). The Sunnis
on the IGC, he said, have no constituency within the Sunni
triangle, and do not speak for most Iraqi Sunnis. This gives
Iraqi Sunnis the feeling that, in the wake of a military
defeat, the U.S. is imposing a political leadership on them.
The group urged the CPA to consult more closely with them and
other organized Sunni groups in the run-up to the June 30
handover of power to ensure that Sunnis feel better
represented in the new transitional Iraqi government. Abu
Khumrah also asked for monetary assistance for his party,
which he promised would work to further Sunni relations with
the Coalition. He also suggested that he and other Sunni
tribal and political leaders should travel to the United
States (at U.S. expense) to start building bridges, and to be
able to explain the U.S. to their constituents.

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SECURITY PRACTICES MAKING ENEMIES
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4. (C) All in the group complained that Coalition security
practices were strengthening ill-will toward the U.S. among
Sunnis. U.S. soldiers, they asserted, do not respect Iraqis
or their traditions, saying that an American soldier should
not be permitted to search an Iraqi police chief -- it causes
the police chief to lose face, the respect of his community,
and therefore, effectiveness. They also complained that lack
of local knowledge caused many indiscriminate arrests. One
sheikh cited an example from Kirkuk where one son of a family
had attacked Coalition forces, but Coalition forces -- unable
to convince the family to identify and turn over the guilty
individual -- had arrested all five of the family's sons. If
the Coalition had worked with local tribal leaders, the
sheikh asserted, they could have worked out surrender of the
guilty son, saving the others from arrest. As it is, all
sons remain in prison, and the U.S. forces have won the scorn
of an entire clan. There are currently "more than 30,000
Sunnis" in Coalition custody, the group claimed, and each one
has "a family that will react against the U.S." because of
the arrest of its family member; "these arrests breed only
hatred." PolCouns outlined the Coalition's new conditional
release program for some detainees and asked the group to
check with local Coalition officials about the program when
they returned to Iraq.

5. (C) Several of the members also said that, while they
desire dialogue with the U.S. and Coalition, they expect
dialogue to lead to concrete changes in Coalition practices.
Several members of the group said that they had spoken with
local U.S. military commanders, but their complaints and
suggestions had not been translated into any change in
practice on the ground. Abu Khumrah said that he understands
that Coalition forces come under attack daily, but argued
that Coalition security practices increase resentment and
will make stability in the Sunni triangle harder to achieve.

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UNEMPLOYMENT, LACK OF SERVICES GROWING PROBLEMS
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6. (C) Abu Khumrah stressed that another issue that is
growing in importance is unemployment. Many Sunnis from
prominent families who previously worked for the government
or military were now unemployed. (Two of those present
identified themselves as unemployed former Iraqi army
officers). Under the old regime, many Sunnis from "good
families" joined the military or Baath party to cement their
family or tribe's position of prominence. The Coalition
needs to reach out to such Sunnis, provide them with
dignified employment, and bring them into the new system. In
addition, Abu Khumrah said, economic activity in Sunni areas
has not yet started to pick up, and government services --
including electricity, water, and sewerage -- are sporadic,
when available at all. The Coalition needs to work to remedy
these issues as quickly as possible, the group argued, to
show Sunnis that they have gained something from the
departure of Saddam. "Thus far, nothing you promised us has
come to pass," accused Sheikh Abdullah al-Jabouri from
Kirkuk. "Painting schools is not enough."

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A PITCH FOR THE MEK?
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7. (C) Midway in the conversation, Abu Khumrah made a pitch
for lenient treatment for the members and family of the
Mujaheddin-e-Khalk (MEK),the Iranian opposition/terrorist
group that had large numbers of supporters and militants
based in Iraq under Saddam. Abu Khumrah said that the goals
of the MEK closely track those of the USG in Iran, and that
the U.S. should work to convince the ICG not to expel them
from Iraq or, alternatively, to accept them into the U.S.
Abu Khumrah backed off a bit after PolCouns explained the
terrorist history of the MEK and its legal designation by the
U.S. as a foreign terrorist organization.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) We cannot vouch for the bone fides or motivations of
this group or the Iraqi Peace Party. We note, however, that
this group's complaints and suggestions were remarkably
similar to ref conversation between OPO Director Schlicher
and the head of the Council of Sunni Communities in Iraq
(ref). The members of this group appeared to us to be
sincere in their desire to work with the U.S., but also want
to be reassured that the Coalition will act on at least some
of their recommendations.


9. (U) CPA Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/

or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET
home page.
HALE