PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN LEADERS CRITIQUE THE KING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 006736 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2014 TAGS: KPAL PGOV JO SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN LEADERS CRITIQUE THE KING REF: A. AMMAN 5109 ¶B. AMMAN 6160 ¶C. AMMAN 5789 Classified By: CDA: David Hale, Reason 1.4(b) (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Prominent Palestinian critics of the regime -- malcontents who nonetheless voice views held more widely -- recently shared with us their analysis of King Abdullah,s standing. They attacked his political reforms as lacking in substance, and therefore uninspiring to the public and a discredit to both the regime and its principal champion, the U.S. Corruption as well was cited as a source of discontent. While Abdullah,s authority has, if anything, been enhanced by his weathering of recent regional crises, these analysts fear the long-term consequences of failure to develop institutions, including the parliament and cabinet, that give a hearing to authentic political voices other than the monarch,s. One such consequence may be an inability to absorb in any predictable, stable fashion the "moment of truth" when Jordanian-Palestinians are confronted with the reality of a settlement on the West Bank that makes no accommodation for their return and causes them to reassess their political stature in Jordan. End summary. ¶2. (C) Two prominent Palestinian-Jordanian figures, on the outs with King Abdullah, gave free voice to their criticism of the Jordanian regime,s current direction in recent, separate meetings with the Charge. Former Prime Minister Taher al-Masri and King Hussein,s former political advisor Adnan Abu Odeh made similar points: --King Abdullah and the "tribally oriented" Prime Minister Faisal al-Fayez were deliberately reinforcing messages of political exclusion and discrimination against Palestinian Jordanians (ref A). --Jordan,s themes of democratization and enhanced political participation lacked substance. Gerrymandered districts favored rural and tribal constituencies, producing members of parliament who were either tribal elders dependent on palace stipends or retired security officers who relied on pensions or their relations with the security apparatus for sustenance. With the exception of the Islamic Action Front, parliament had few figures prepared to challenge the government. Parliament acted as a rubber stamp for the cabinet, balking only at a few of the King,s social reforms, such as a woman,s right to divorce (ref B),which are ironically too liberal for the King,s men to swallow. --The Fayez cabinet was notably lacking in political strength as well as administrative competence. The Prime Minister was described as amiable but obtuse, unable to command national political respect or to coordinate the work of his highly competitive ministers. --Corruption had reached unprecedented levels in Jordan, in terms of volume and blatancy (ref c). It was the topic of discussion not just in elite West Amman, but in every tent in Jordan. Coupled with extremes in living standards between rich and poor, discontent regarding corruption was tainting the King,s image. Because of the close association between Jordan,s regime and the U.S., Masri said the U.S. was viewed as complicit. --Abdullah,s failure to generate political evolution toward a more genuinely representative and credible parliamentary system posed no immediate risks. The Palestinian middle classes were economically content, and the grassroots continued to invest themselves emotionally, if irrationally, in developments in the West Bank. However, a "moment of truth" was inevitable, when the option of return to the West Bank will be permanently removed. Jordan's Palestinians -- 35 percent registered refugees -- have not emotionally reconciled themselves to that likelihood, and the "moment of truth" could be unsettling for Jordan. East and West Bankers alike will have to reassess their stands. Palestinian complacency at being effectively kept out of the political process in Jordan may end. Abu Odeh claimed that it was in preparation for that day that King Hussein first launched his political liberalization strategy; however, his need to find a malleable parliament amenable to peace with Israel distorted the effort. Abu Odeh and Masri both said they had advised Abdullah to resume that effort, to soften the shock of Palestinians, "moment of truth." --Islamic trends were gaining strength, but these two secular leaders denied that those trends could lay claim to represent Palestinian opinion. Abu Odeh dismissed them as focused primarily on social issues, in an effort to defeat the influence of a Western lifestyle. Masri saw a more sinister threat. While mainstream Islamic trends posed no danger to the foundations of the regime now, the lack of alternative channels of dissent enabled the Islamists to continue to gain a strength that may later haunt the Hashemites. ¶3. (C) Comment: Masri and Abu Odeh, having been effectively sidelined, are nursing monumental grudges against the King and his advisors. However, their views encapsulate criticism heard elsewhere from political elites who are disenchanted with a regime that pays lip service to democratization but, in reality, ensures through the intelligence directorate and key regime advisors that the process of political reform remains devoid of real substance. Critics conveniently ignore the fact that Jordanian political factions -- who have gained a healthy skepticism over the years about monarchical intentions to open Jordan,s political system -- themselves have failed to rise to the challenge of the King,s top-down reforms, by testing his redlines on press freedoms and political activism. Instead, his proposals for electoral and party reform are met largely with apathy. ¶4. (C) Comment continued: Despite these problems, the pillars of the regime -- the tribes, the intelligence service, and the military -- remain staunchly supportive of the King and have enabled him to weather recent regional crises with his authority, if anything, enhanced. In fact, part of the King's dilemma is that these reliable allies loathe democratization and the Palestinians who are perceived as the primary beneficiaries of political liberalization (and rock-ribbed East Bankers are no more prepared for the "moment of truth" than Palestinian refugees). Nor is there evidence that elements of discontent have either effective leadership or sufficient motivation to attempt to challenge the regime,s control. But the King,s domestic political reform rhetoric is losing credibility. The U.S. image as a champion of reform in the Middle East -- a subject met with some skepticism in Jordan to begin with -- suffers as well. And over time, failure to establish a more malleable, representative foundation for Jordan,s political system will complicate the King,s ability to maneuver Jordan through crises to come, such as the political fate of the Palestinian community after a settlement on the West Bank. HALE