PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN LEADERS CRITIQUE THE KING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 006736

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2014
TAGS: KPAL PGOV JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN-JORDANIAN LEADERS CRITIQUE THE KING

REF: A. AMMAN 5109


B. AMMAN 6160

C. AMMAN 5789

Classified By: CDA: David Hale, Reason 1.4(b) (d)


1. (C) Summary. Prominent Palestinian critics of the
regime -- malcontents who nonetheless voice views held
more widely -- recently shared with us their analysis
of King Abdullah,s standing. They attacked his
political reforms as lacking in substance, and therefore
uninspiring to the public and a discredit to both the
regime and its principal champion, the U.S. Corruption
as well was cited as a source of discontent. While
Abdullah,s authority has, if anything, been enhanced by
his weathering of recent regional crises, these analysts
fear the long-term consequences of failure to develop
institutions, including the parliament and cabinet, that
give a hearing to authentic political voices other than
the monarch,s. One such consequence may be an inability
to absorb in any predictable, stable fashion the "moment
of truth" when Jordanian-Palestinians are confronted
with the reality of a settlement on the West Bank that
makes no accommodation for their return and causes them
to reassess their political stature in Jordan. End
summary.


2. (C) Two prominent Palestinian-Jordanian figures, on
the outs with King Abdullah, gave free voice to their
criticism of the Jordanian regime,s current direction
in recent, separate meetings with the Charge. Former
Prime Minister Taher al-Masri and King Hussein,s former
political advisor Adnan Abu Odeh made similar points:

--King Abdullah and the "tribally oriented" Prime
Minister Faisal al-Fayez were deliberately reinforcing
messages of political exclusion and discrimination
against Palestinian Jordanians (ref A).

--Jordan,s themes of democratization and enhanced
political participation lacked substance.
Gerrymandered districts favored rural and tribal
constituencies, producing members of parliament who
were either tribal elders dependent on palace stipends
or retired security officers who relied on pensions or
their relations with the security apparatus for
sustenance. With the exception of the Islamic Action
Front, parliament had few figures prepared to
challenge the government. Parliament acted as a
rubber stamp for the cabinet, balking only at a
few of the King,s social reforms, such as a woman,s
right to divorce (ref B),which are ironically too
liberal for the King,s men to swallow.

--The Fayez cabinet was notably lacking in political
strength as well as administrative competence. The
Prime Minister was described as amiable but obtuse,
unable to command national political respect or
to coordinate the work of his highly competitive
ministers.

--Corruption had reached unprecedented levels in
Jordan, in terms of volume and blatancy (ref c).
It was the topic of discussion not just in elite
West Amman, but in every tent in Jordan. Coupled
with extremes in living standards between rich
and poor, discontent regarding corruption was
tainting the King,s image. Because of the close
association between Jordan,s regime and the U.S.,
Masri said the U.S. was viewed as complicit.

--Abdullah,s failure to generate political evolution
toward a more genuinely representative and credible
parliamentary system posed no immediate risks. The
Palestinian middle classes were economically content,
and the grassroots continued to invest themselves
emotionally, if irrationally, in developments in
the West Bank. However, a "moment of truth" was
inevitable, when the option of return to the
West Bank will be permanently removed. Jordan's
Palestinians -- 35 percent registered refugees --
have not emotionally reconciled themselves to that
likelihood, and the "moment of truth" could be
unsettling for Jordan. East and West Bankers alike
will have to reassess their stands. Palestinian
complacency at being effectively kept out of the
political process in Jordan may end. Abu Odeh
claimed that it was in preparation for that day
that King Hussein first launched his political
liberalization strategy; however, his need to
find a malleable parliament amenable to peace
with Israel distorted the effort. Abu Odeh and
Masri both said they had advised Abdullah to
resume that effort, to soften the shock of
Palestinians, "moment of truth."

--Islamic trends were gaining strength, but these
two secular leaders denied that those trends could
lay claim to represent Palestinian opinion. Abu
Odeh dismissed them as focused primarily on social
issues, in an effort to defeat the influence of a
Western lifestyle. Masri saw a more sinister
threat. While mainstream Islamic trends posed no
danger to the foundations of the regime now, the
lack of alternative channels of dissent enabled
the Islamists to continue to gain a strength that
may later haunt the Hashemites.


3. (C) Comment: Masri and Abu Odeh, having been
effectively sidelined, are nursing monumental
grudges against the King and his advisors. However,
their views encapsulate criticism heard elsewhere
from political elites who are disenchanted with a
regime that pays lip service to democratization
but, in reality, ensures through the intelligence
directorate and key regime advisors that the process
of political reform remains devoid of real substance.
Critics conveniently ignore the fact that Jordanian
political factions -- who have gained a healthy
skepticism over the years about monarchical
intentions to open Jordan,s political system --
themselves have failed to rise to the challenge of
the King,s top-down reforms, by testing his
redlines on press freedoms and political activism.
Instead, his proposals for electoral and party
reform are met largely with apathy.


4. (C) Comment continued: Despite these problems,
the pillars of the regime -- the tribes, the
intelligence service, and the military -- remain
staunchly supportive of the King and have enabled
him to weather recent regional crises with his
authority, if anything, enhanced. In fact, part of
the King's dilemma is that these reliable allies
loathe democratization and the Palestinians who are
perceived as the primary beneficiaries of political
liberalization (and rock-ribbed East Bankers are no
more prepared for the "moment of truth" than
Palestinian refugees). Nor is there evidence that
elements of discontent have either effective
leadership or sufficient motivation to attempt to
challenge the regime,s control. But the King,s
domestic political reform rhetoric is losing
credibility. The U.S. image as a champion of
reform in the Middle East -- a subject met with
some skepticism in Jordan to begin with -- suffers
as well. And over time, failure to establish
a more malleable, representative foundation for
Jordan,s political system will complicate the King,s
ability to maneuver Jordan through crises to come,
such as the political fate of the Palestinian
community after a settlement on the West Bank.
HALE