Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04AMMAN5894
2004-07-14 02:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

UNAMI TO REDUCE STAFF IN AMMAN

Tags:  PREL PHUM IZ JO 
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140225Z Jul 04
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005894 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM IZ JO
SUBJECT: UNAMI TO REDUCE STAFF IN AMMAN

REF: USUN 1592

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b),(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 005894

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PHUM IZ JO
SUBJECT: UNAMI TO REDUCE STAFF IN AMMAN

REF: USUN 1592

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: According to Interim Special Representative
of the Secretary-General for Iraq (A/SRSG) Ross Mountain and
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator
Malloch Brown, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq
(UNAMI) plans to reduce its staff profile in Amman slightly
for reasons of political perception, not security. The new
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Iraq will
go to Baghdad with a small team, and will depend on the Iraqi
Interim Government (IIG) and multi-national forces (MNF) for
"life support". Despite the planned reduction in staff,
Amman will continue to host the bulk of the UN presence until
the security situation improved significantly. These
reductions affect less than a quarter of UNAMI staff and,
therefore, are unlikely to have much impact, positive or
negative, other than to UNAMI efficiency. End Summary.

--------------
UNAMI STAFF REDUCTION IN AMMAN
--------------


2. (C) Malloch Brown, in a July 11 meeting with chiefs of
mission of donor states participating in the International
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI),said UNAMI
planned to reduce its staff profile in Amman, from 274 to
224, for reasons of political perception, not security.
According to Brown, Amman would continue to host the bulk of
the UN presence. Brown said that Amman would remain the
principal center as it was easiest to bring Iraqis to Jordan
and a natural convergence point. However, there was a medium
term political consideration which weighed in favor of some
dispersal in the region.


3. (C) Brown worried that a large, conspicuous UN presence
in Amman might become a source of friction among Iraqis and
others in the region, critical that UN personnel were sitting
around in Jordan and not doing much for Iraq. He said that
to avoid getting too big, the election component would be
placed in Kuwait and the infrastructure development unit in
Cyprus. Though the initial Jordan reaction had been to
express concern that this decision reflected fear about
Jordanian security, Brown said there were no pressing
security concerns in Jordan. He also said this was not a
reaction to Iraqi pressure. The Iraqis preferred that all UN
operations be set up there, but they recognize that Amman is
the most viable place to do business.

-------------- --------------
NEW SRSG, SMALL TEAM TO BAGHDAD; PERMANENT OFFICES IN IRAQ
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Brown said the new SRSG (ref) would go to Baghdad with
a small team of between 15-25 persons. The group would
depend on the IIG and MNF for "life support" while there.


5. (C) According to Brown, if the security situation for UN
personnel improved significantly, UNAMI would be able to set
up permanent offices in Baghdad, Mosul and Irbil over the
remainder of 2004. A Basra facility could open in late
September and Irbil in November. UNAMI was still looking for
a suitable Baghdad site, so it would probably be the end of
the year before an office could be set up. He said that
UNAMI would plan to have 260 international staff in Baghdad,
and 65 each in Mosul and Irbil. As many of these people
would be security personnel, the "substantive" staff would
number 35-50 in Baghdad and 10-15 in Basra and Irbil each.
He stressed that actual deployment of these numbers of
personnel depended upon the threat directed toward them.


6. (C) Comment: These officials evaded questions about the
specific number of personnel that would remain in Amman, but
Charge noticed Ross Mountain had in hand a table reflecting a
UNAMI staffing reduction from 274 to 224. We do not see this
reduction as having any particular political impact, negative
or positive, although it runs counter to a strong trend among
Embassies, NGOs, contractors and others to locate substantive
"back office" operations in Amman pending improved security
in Iraq.


7. (U) Baghdad minimize considered.

Visit EMBASSY Amman's classified website at

http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/

or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET
home page.
HALE

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