VARIED JORDANIAN REACTION TO TELEVISED TERRORIST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003288 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2014 TAGS: PTER ASEC KISL JO SUBJECT: VARIED JORDANIAN REACTION TO TELEVISED TERRORIST CONFESSIONS REF: A. AMMAN 2555 ¶B. AMMAN 2594 ¶C. AMMAN 3128 ¶D. FBIS GMP20040426000216 Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Jordanian emotions were all over the map in reaction to the televised confessions of suspected al-Qaeda/Zarqawi affiliates who planned to unleash massive truck bombs against GOJ targets and the U.S. Embassy in Amman. The GOJ's motivations in airing the confessions appear to have been to a) persuade the public that the terrorist threat is real and affects average people, and therefore should be resisted by all Jordanians b) clarify a confusing picture made by a series of public statements on the ongoing investigation, c) dispel a widely discussed conspiracy theory that the authorities themselves had concocted the story of the plot to distract people from controversial tax hikes, d) boost public confidence in the GID, and e) spotlight the Syrian background of many of the plotters. To reinforce the impact of the dramatic JTV broadcast, print media have clearly been told to toe a line of factual reporting and silencing of any commentary. Reactions include expressions of shock and hatred towards al-Qaeda, relief and congratulations to the King and GID, but also lingering doubts about whether the cell was really capable of pulling off the murder of 80,000 people with chemicals, about the overly slick confessions, and about the impact of the publicity on Jordan,s tourist and service sector. Relief that the plot was disrupted is mingled with fear at the prospect of facing a long-term terrorist threat. End Summary. ¶2. (C) After three weeks of contradictory, confusing and partial government accounts about the unfolding investigation of an al-Qaeda/Zarqawi truck bomb plot, on April 26 state television broadcast a primetime special, publicized in morning papers, and flanked by ten minutes of national songs and images. It dramatically publicized taped confessions by the accused plotters, video footage of their arrest and of seized bomb-making substances and chemicals, and an animated version of how the plotters intended to carry off a bombing at GID. Significantly, it included statements by prominent, independent clerics denouncing such behavior as un-Islamic. Woven into the accounts were clear subtexts. One was repeated reference to the Syrian background to the story, including the Syrian nationality of some of the plotters and their use of Syria as a partial staging ground. Another subtext involved filmed statements by innocent Jordanians who had interacted with the plotters, commenting on their anti-social behavior. Throughout the production, the efficiency and bravery of GID and public security personnel were made evident. ¶3. (C) This broadcast had the desired dramatic impact. Reports of the most elaborate and potentially deadly terrorist plot to date in Jordan, coming against the backdrop of recent attacks in Saudi Arabia, have focused ordinary Jordanians on their personal safety, and generated some shock that Jordanian nationals were involved. There was an outpouring of expressions of solidarity with King, country, and GID, as notables sought to align themselves with the regime, and curry favor by doing so. After weeks of rallies showing anger toward Israel, the U.S., and developments in Iraq (issues which tended to place the Jordanian government in opposition to public opinion),Amman will experience a "Loyalty to Jordan" march on April 29 to protest terrorism. The broadcast turned the tables on opposition elements, which have been compelled to join in this exercise. The Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement rejecting terrorism and condemning the plotters' attempt to kill Jordanians and sow instability. The Islamic Action Front, which initially accused the GOJ of concocting the reports of the plot to distract attention from price hikes, has changed its tune, but only slightly. A spokesman said it was wrong to have planned to attack Arabs and Muslims; the plotters should have pointed their "guns at the enemy occupying (Muslim) lands in Palestine and Iraq." He also noted the importance of waiting for the judicial process to judge the accused. ¶4. (C) Doubts remain. We have heard some question whether this group could have carried off the sort of massive casualties the government has said. Others questioned the slickness of the confessions. Plot leader Jayoussi,s account was delivered in a relaxed, conversational manner, and a young, uneducated Syrian plotter spoke in polished classical Arabic, leading a human rights activist trained in cross-examination tactics to conclude the whole thing was staged in an effort to impress the U.S. that Jordan is an important ally against terrorism. Others found Jayoussi's manner compelling but disconcerting: "how could he sit there so calmly and talk about killing thousands of people?!" a Jordanian university student exclaimed to Poloff. An FSN commented that the confessions were suspiciously neat, but her mother had believed every word, exclaiming something to the effect of: "Hang the bastards!" Still others remain unconvinced. One 30-something Jordanian woman who spends considerable time in the U.S. told CAO the whole thing is preposterous: "Jordan is a safe place... we don't have people like that here." The GOJ's airing of the views of Islamic cleric Ali al-Halabi won praise, in part because he is known for his independent thinking and for speaking his mind. ¶5. (C) Comment: The GOJ had a number of likely motives in releasing this dramatic program. For starters, it had to correct a confusing record of public statements about the ongoing investigation and explain why exceptional security measures had been taken (and remain in place) in Amman. It also appears to have been aimed at enlisting public opinion behind its anti-terror policies, and association with the U.S., by showing that average Jordanians, not just diplomats and intelligence officers, would have been victims. By sensitizing Jordanians to the gravity of the threat, some observers also see an effort to heighten Jordanians, alertness to suspicious activity (the plotters had conducted themselves relatively openly, renting property and buying material). The Jordanian Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff told the DATT that an additional objective was to highlight the Syrian dimension, in terms of the nationality of some plotters and use of Syria as a launching pad for part of the operation. Despite the doubts, this strategy seems to have convinced Jordanians that the plot actually existed. But it also leaves behind unease about the risk of the next terrorist plot. Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. GNEHM