Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
04AMMAN3148
2004-04-22 15:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

KING'S DECISION TO POSTPONE D.C. VISIT LOWERS

Tags:  PREL ASEC KISL KPAL IS JO 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003148 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2014
TAGS: PREL ASEC KISL KPAL IS JO
SUBJECT: KING'S DECISION TO POSTPONE D.C. VISIT LOWERS
JORDAN'S TEMPERATURE

REF: A. AMMAN 2882

B. AMMAN 2957

C. AMMAN 3075

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b and d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 003148 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2014 TAGS: PREL ASEC KISL KPAL IS JO SUBJECT: KING'S DECISION TO POSTPONE D.C. VISIT LOWERS JORDAN'S TEMPERATURE REF: A. AMMAN 2882 ¶B. AMMAN 2957 ¶C. AMMAN 3075 Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Activists have continued to express the anger and sympathy felt in Jordan after the Rantissi assassination and President Bush,s assurances to Sharon. The GOJ has aligned itself with public opinion, denouncing the Israelis' "heinous crime" in the killing and postponing an Abdullah-Bush meeting whose timing had become politically inconvenient. Both steps have helped contain political emotions, although Friday prayers are likely to occasion more rhetoric. Anti-Israeli sentiment has taken on anti-U.S. flavors. For example, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) called on the Jordanian government to cut contact with the U.S. for its "aggressive" regional policies, and the press union has called for a boycott of American Embassy activities and contact (this has had no practical impact). In the background, U.S. military action in Iraq, particularly Fallujah, continues to provoke outrage and fear of "imperialist" designs. In this atmosphere, the King's postponement of a meeting with President Bush has blunted criticism of the King's policies, but there is skepticism that he can deliver the sort of assurances Jordanians would seek in a rescheduled meeting. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Political activists continued to exploit the anti-Israeli and anti-U.S. mood generated by recent events, principally the Yassin and Rantissi assassinations and recent U.S. assurances to Israel touching on final status issues (refs a and b). The widespread public perception is of a U.S. "green light" for the targeted killings and of a U.S. move to foreclose the possibility of a viable Palestinian state. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and IAF have taken the lead in organizing street protests, and rallies are expected to follow Friday prayers on April 23 throughout Jordan. Security officials told us an MB-sponsored demonstration on April 18 attracted nearly 7,000 participants, including members of Parliament and political activists. The Professional Associations organized a rally at its headquarters in Amman that evening as well. Other large protests occurred in Irbid, Zarqa and university campuses throughout Jordan. These and other demonstrations in Amman-area Palestinian refugee camps were largely peaceful.
;On April 17 a rally at the Baq,a camp got a little out of hand. Angry crowds, mostly of young men, pushed out onto the main Amman-Irbid highway, burning tires and throwing stones. ¶3. (C) Its instincts for self-preservation activated, the government aligned itself firmly with public opinion. The King denounced the Israelis for their "heinous crimes" against Rantissi. Prime Minister Faisal al-Fayez, who had returned early from the U.S. "in light of regional events," on April 20 paid condolences to Rantissi's extended family (including three brothers) as well as at the IAF,s headquarters. The government had plucked one of Rantissi's brothers out of a no man,s land camp at the Iraqi border (where he and 400 other Palestinians from Iraq have languished for the past year) and brought him to Amman to receive condolences. But in a very Jordanian twist, it was made clear he would have to return to no man,s land after his seven-day celebrity turn, to the upset of UNHCR. The government drew another fine line in its commentary on Israeli threats against HAMAS, Damascus-based Khalid Mish'al, who was expelled from Jordan in 1999. The government spokeswoman condemned Israel for issuing death sentences outside the rule of law, but dialed back a cabinet colleague,s statement by insisting that Mish,al,s return to Jordan is not up for debate: "HAMAS is a Palestinian movement on Palestinian soil," she maintained. ¶4. (U) Heavy public criticism of U.S. support for Israel and its occupation of Iraq has been a staple of opposition rhetoric, but anti-U.S. sentiment has increased to a degree of anger we have not seen recently. After Rantissi's death, the IAF publicized a "fatwa" calling on Jordanians to battle physically the American Administration and to stop all forms of cooperation with the U.S., including official visits, because of objectionable American policy. The Jordan Press Association, along with other professional associations and several political parties, called for a unified Arab stand against Israel's "terrorism" at the upcoming Arab summit and for a nationwide boycott of U.S. products to protest U.S. support of Israel. Journalists were also called upon to refrain from contacts with the American Embassy, although with no discernible impact. ¶5. (C) The King,s U.S. trip coincided with this agitated political atmosphere. There was a perception afoot that the King was either complicit in Israeli actions and U.S. statements or at a minimum having his interests ignored. Public jitters still are high over the uncovered al-Qaeda plot and unsubstantiated statements that the plot entailed a massive chemical agent attack, a threat seen by some as a by-product of Jordan,s pro-U.S. stand. In the background, U.S. military action in Iraq, particularly Fallujah, continues to provoke outrage and fear of "imperialist" designs. ¶6. (C) The postponement of the Abdullah-Bush meeting, therefore, came as something of a relief to Amman,s political circles. A locally generated government press statement, apparently uncoordinated with the traveling party and citing the need for clarification in the U.S. position on final status issues before a summit meeting, achieved its desired effect domestically. Editorials and commentaries lauded the King's "wise" and "bold" decision to postpone the meeting (ref c). Embassy contacts stressed that the decision helped lower the political temperature, which had reached boiling point. Jordan's Higher Coordination Committee of Opposition Parties -- a distinctly uncoordinated gathering of 14 tiny, fragmented, secular opposition parties -- issued a statement of praise for a stand it found to be "in harmony with the inclinations of the Jordanian people" and hoping the next step would be the closure of the Israeli embassy. Another government critic, former Prime Minister Taher al-Masri, told an interviewer that the postponement was the right step pending receipt of a U.S. letter of assurances, similar to that given to Israel, on final status issues. Secretary Powell,s April 20 comments, addressing Jordanian SIPDIS concerns on the peace process, received favorable coverage and contributed to a lessening in political tension. Nonetheless, anti-U.S. sentiment remains strong, as ordinary Jordanians seem convinced that U.S. and Israeli policy are now one and the same and that the rules of the game have been changed to Arab disadvantage. Also, Jordanian public opinion is increasingly equating U.S. military action in Iraq with Israeli practices. There was a particularly angry reaction to what was portrayed locally by the media as a "massacre" in Fallujah. ¶7. (C) Comment: The recent train of events and resulting public uproar in Jordan gave the government few options but to try to absorb the public mood. However, the government made clear it has not abandoned policies which are pillars of national security, including keeping HAMAS out of Jordan, promoting implementation of the roadmap and a two-state solution, and defending the peace treaty with Israel as something that is out of bounds for political debate. Postponement of the Abdullah-Bush meeting blunted domestic criticism of the King's policies, but only temporarily. Judgments are being held in suspense, but there is skepticism that the King can receive from the U.S. the sort of peace process assurances which, in local eyes, would justify a visit to Washington in the current overheated atmosphere. Visit Embassy Amman's classified web site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman or access the site through the State Department's SIPRNET home page. HALE

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