S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002881

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2014
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS US JO
SUBJECT: MUASHER SEEKS CLARIFICATION ON POINTS FROM
PRESIDENT'S EXCHANGE WITH SHARON ON GAZA

REF: STATE 84066

Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.5 (b) (d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (S) Foreign Minister Muasher told the Charge April 15
that the President's April 14 statement with Israeli PM
Sharon on the Gaza disengagement plan in essence closes off
negotiations on return of refugees, kills the Arab peace
initiative, attempts to change the status of the West Bank
and Gaza from occupied to disputed territory, and prejudges
the boundaries of a future Palestinian state. Muasher asked
for public clarification from the U.S. on these points.
Muasher was upset that the President's exchange with Sharon
did not take into account the key points Jordanians made
during recent consultations with the U.S., particularly on
the need for only "minor" adjustments to the 1967 cease-fire
line as a future border. END SUMMARY

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CHARGE: GAZA DISENGAGEMENT AN OPPORTUNITY
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2. (S) Charge and PolCouns delivered to Foreign Minister
Marwan Muasher April 15 ref points on Israel's Gaza
disengagement plan and the exchange of letters between the
President and PM Sharon. Charge emphasized that an Israeli
withdrawal from Gaza and some West Bank settlements
represents a strategic opportunity to leverage progress
toward the President's vision of a two-state solution via the
roadmap. The President also had made clear that final status
issues were for the parties to negotiate, but that certain
realities would have to be taken into account.

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MUASHER: "IT'S TERRIBLE"
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3. (S) Muasher said he had read the exchange of letters
between the President and Sharon very carefully, and was
still upset. "You say that you are not prejudging the
outcome (of final status negotiations), but you are," he
declared. Muasher said that it would be impossible for him
or other moderate Arabs to defend this policy either with the
Arab street or in the Arab Summit meeting. Jordan, he said,
had issued a mild statement -- "neither positive nor
negative" -- only because the King is due in Washington next
week. The exchange of letters, he argued, closes off
negot

iations on refugees, rejects the Arab Beirut Summit
initiative, asserts that the West Bank and Gaza are "disputed
territories," and prejudges the borders of a future
Palestinian state.

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NEED CLARIFICATION
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4. (S) Addressing the specifics of the letters, Muasher
said that the U.S. reference to the 1949 armistice lines --
rather than the 1967 cease-fire line -- endorsed the Israeli
assertion that the West Bank and Gaza are "disputed" not
"occupied" territories. He asked that the U.S. publicly
clarify this point. Jordan received in 1991, Muasher stated,
a letter from then-Secretary of State James Baker stating
that the USG considered the West Bank and Gaza to be occupied
territories, and that the U.S. would not prejudge the outcome
of final status negotiations. "Is this now obsolete? Do
American commitments have time limits?"


5. (S) Muasher said the sentence in the President's letter
pledging the U.S. to "do its utmost to prevent any attempt by
anyone to impose any other plan" kills the Beirut Summit
initiative. Muasher said that, before the April 14 White
House statements, there had been agreement to hold an Arab
League Summit in Tunis May 8-9, "but I'm not sure there will
be a Summit now." The Charge responded that the sentence in
the President's letter referred not to the Arab initiative,
which is completely consistent with the roadmap, but to any
attempt to impose a plan other than the President's two-state
solution. Muasher said that, if the sentence is not meant to
discourage the Arab initiative, the U.S. needed to make an
explicit public statement to that effect to counter
misperception.


6. (S) Muasher argued that the U.S. also needs to define
exactly what territorial concessions it anticipates in the
West Bank. "We need to know that you will not accept a
Palestinian state on 50 percent of the West Bank." Such a
rump state would be untenable, and would kill any possibility
of a viable two-state solution. He said he feared that
Sharon had just won a diplomatic coup, achieving with the
President's assurances two statements he had made to King
Abdullah at their last meeting in Israel: "no to the Arab
initiative, and no to the roadmap."
COMMENT

7. (S) Muasher was agitated by the substance of the
exchange of letters and seemed to be overreaching --
especially with his fear that the letters eclipsed the Arab
initiative. He was also upset that Jordanian efforts had not
led to more significant textual changes -- particularly the
insertion of the words "limited" or "minor" in references to
deviations from the 1967 line. Despite Muasher's initial
negative reaction, he and King Abdullah can be expected to
try to put the best spin possible from their perspective on
the President's exchange with Sharon during the King's U.S.
trip next week.

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HALE