FALCON-50 AIR CREW ON JET'S IRAQI OWNERSHIP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 AMMAN 001214

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR ZARATE AND LINARDI
CPA FOR TRENT
CPA FOR CASTLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2009
TAGS: EAIR ETTC IZ JO
SUBJECT: FALCON-50 AIR CREW ON JET'S IRAQI OWNERSHIP

REF: BERN 83

Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a series of meetings, crew members of a
Jordan-based Falcon-50 executive jet described their version
of the history and current condition of thE aircraft and its
substantial links to the government of Iraq (Reftel). They
turned over to the Embassy documents relating to activities
of the Falcon-50 prior to regime change in Iraq, and gave
their impressions of steps that should be taken if and when
the aircraft is released to the government of Iraq. These
steps include the refurbishment of the aircraft (which would
likely cost US$100,000),the re-certification of two Iraqi
pilots of the aircraft, and the re-issuance of previously
expired Jordanian passports to these two Iraqi pilots. END
SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Between February 9-12, Econoff conducted a series of
meetings with Capt. Adel Ahmad and Capt. Mu,ayyed Kamil
Al-Jarrah, former pilots of a Falcon-50 executive jet serial
number 061, and with Ahmed Sultan, engineer of that Falcon-50
airplane (hereafter &0618). All of these men are
long-standing employees of Iraqi Airways. Sultan was
assigned to work on the airplane in 1981, prior to its
delivery to Iraq in 1982. In this capacity, he has been in
contact with both Dassault and with Jet Aviation since 061
was delivered. Al-Jarrah was assigned in 1982 to fly 061,
but did not operate the aircraft until a couple of years
later, and Ahmad was assigned to this job in 1998, though he
did not begin operating the aircraft until 2000.

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The History of 061
--------------


3. (SBU) Ahmed Sultan, who has been employed by Iraqi Airways
since 1977, had the most knowledge of 061 of the three. He
was assigned to serve as mechanic for 061 in the summer of
1981, when the aircraft was under negotiations for purchase.
061 was one of a batch of five Falcon-50 executive jets whose
purchase was negotiated simultaneously by the Iraqi Ministry
of Communications (which included transportation in its
portfolio). While the Ministry (hereafter &IMOC8) was to
receive the five aircraft, Sultan said the Iraqi Air Force
had funded their purchase.


4. (SBU) Sultan was sent by the IMOC in November 1981 to a
one-month maintenance course conducted by Dassault, for which
the IMOC paid Dassault. Other students funded by the IMOC
who were receiving Dassault training on Falcon-50 maintenance
at that time included Mu,ayyed Ibrahim Muslah, who was in
training to work on 061 as well, and four members of the
Iraqi air force, who were in training to work on the other
four Falcon-50 jets in the batch. In January 1982, Capt.
Rizal (possibly Rezal),a Swiss pilot, flew Sultan (along
with the rest of 061,s prospective crew) on 061 from France
to Switzerland, in order for the crew to receive Swiss
licenses to operate 061, which was already registered in
Switzerland by the Iraqi front company Logarcheo. The
government of Iraq had previously taken the decision to
register the aircraft in Switzerland in order to make it
easier for 061 to receive flight clearances to Europe. Capt.
Rizal then delivered 061 to Baghdad on January 15, 1982.


5. (SBU) The Swiss aircraft operating company Jet Aviation
served as operator for 061 from the time of its delivery. In
this capacity, Jet Aviation had full responsibility for
keeping 061 maintained and in compliance with applicable
safety standards and licensing, filing of flight clearance
requests, payment of overflight and landing/airport fees, and
all other operational facilitation necessary to keep 061 in
the air. With the exception of a 6-month period 1985-6
during which Unijet acted as operator, Jet Aviation continued
to operate 061 until it was recently deregistered by
Switzerland. Jet Aviation also acted as primary maintenance
provider for 061 from the time of its delivery until 2000. At
that time, the Ministry decided to contract with Dassault as
primary maintenance provider, in order to lower costs.


6. (SBU) 061 was the first of the batch of five aircraft to
be delivered, according to the predetermined arrangement
between the Ministry and Dassault. The second of the batch,
serial number 071, was delivered to Baghdad in late
March/early April 1982, and was later given as a gift to the
government of Djibouti, which has since sold that airplane.
The remaining aircraft, serial numbers 101, 120, and 122,
were delivered in sequence until all had been received, by
the middle of 1983.


7. (SBU) 061 continued to be based in Baghdad from its
delivery in 1982. During that time, it was used to fly
official missions on behalf of the government of Iraq. In
late 1990, it was flown to Amman. (Before the beginning of
the Gulf War, the three remaining, Iraqi-registered,
Falcon-50s were flown to Iran, where the crew of 061 believes
the aircraft remain.) 061 was not flown at all until late
1993-early 1994, at which time Tariq Aziz decided that the
Iraqi government should begin to use the airplane again. The
Foreign Ministry at that time designated three pilots
(including Al-Jarrah) to fly 061, and 061 was sent to Basel
for an overhaul, performed by Dassault. After this time, 061
was used on a periodic basis to fly Foreign Ministry
officials on official missions. In 1998, ownership of the
airplane was transferred by the government of Iraq to
Aviatrans, a corporation that had been established in that
year.


8. (SBU) In the same year, Capt. Ahmad, a pilot at Iraqi
Airways since 1976 who had primarily flown 727s, 737s, and
747s for the regular airline, was assigned by the Ministry to

061. In February 1999, Ahmad participated in a two-week
training course offered by Flight Safety in Paris in order to
become certified to fly 061. The training course was paid
for by Jet Aviation. Ahmad began operating the aircraft in
late December 1999, and continued to operate it until March

2003. He stated that 061 had made the below flights (taken
from 061,s flight log book beginning in 2000, which Sultan
was finally able to produce) in order to transport members of
the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, whom he was extremely unwilling
to identify by name.

2000
April 9 Amman-Tunis
April 11 Tunis-Amman
April 24 Amman-Geneva
May 21 Amman-Damascus
May 21 Damascus-San,a
May 24 San,a-Damascus
May 24 Damascus-Amman
July 25 Amman-Moscow
July 29 Moscow-Amman
November 1 Amman-Tripoli
November 2 Tripoli-Tunis
November 3 Tunis-San,a
November 4 San,a-Aden
November 4 Aden-Cairo
November 5 Cairo-Sharm al-Sheikh
November 5 Sharm al-Sheikh-Cairo
November 5 Cairo-Amman
November 24 Amman-Damascus
November 25 Damascus-Moscow
November 25 Moscow-Amman
November 27 Amman-Delhi
December 1 Delhi-Damascus
December 1 Damascus-Amman
December 13 Amman-Karachi
December 14 Karachi-Kuala Lumpur
December 16 Kuala Lumpur-Hanoi
December 19 Hanoi-Karachi
December 20 Karachi-Amman

2002
January 14 Amman-Bahrain
January 16 Bahrain-Damascus
January 16 Damascus-Amman
January 22 Amman-Damascus
January 23 Damascus-Moscow
January 24 Moscow-Amman
January 30 Amman-Moscow
January 31 Moscow-Damascus
January 31 Damascus-Amman
February 4 Amman-Tunis
February 6 Tunis-Amman
February 11 Amman-Damascus
February 11 Damascus-Istanbul
February 13 Istanbul-Damascus
February 13 Damascus-Amman
March 15 Amman-Damascus
March 16 Damascus-Tripoli
March 17 Tripoli-Tunis
March 18 Tunis-Algiers
March 19 Algiers-Rabat
March 20 Rabat-Marrakech
March 20 Marrakech-Rabat
March 21 Rabat-Damascus
March 22 Damascus-Amman
May 12 Amman-Damascus
May 12 Damascus-Ankara
May 14 Ankara-Istanbul
May 15 Istanbul-Damascus
May 15 Damascus-Amman
June 24 Amman-Khartoum
June 27 Khartoum-Damascus
June 28 Damascus-Amman
July 2 Amman-Damascus
July 3 Damascus-Khartoum
July 3 Khartoum-Johannesburg
July 9 Johannesburg-Khartoum
July 9 Khartoum-Damascus
July 10 Damascus-Amman
July 18 Amman-Damascus
July 19 Damascus-Algiers
July 21 Algiers-Brussels
July 23 Brussels-Damascus
July 24 Damascus-Amman
August 2 Amman-Damascus
August 3 Damascus-Delhi
August 8 Delhi-Damascus
August 8 Damascus-Amman
August 24 Amman-Damascus
August 25 Damascus-Delhi
August 25 Delhi-Shanghai
August 27 Shanghai-Beijing
August 29 Beijing-Delhi
August 29 Delhi-Damascus
August 29 Damascus-Amman
September 5 Amman-Damascus
September 6 Damascus-Algiers
September 7 Algiers-Tripoli
September 8 Tripoli-Tunis
September 11 Tunis-Damascus
September 11 Damascus-Amman


9. (SBU) The operational gaps shown in the above list of
official flights generally reflected times at which 061 was
undergoing maintenance or the pilots were training ) usually
in France or Switzerland. The especially long gap throughout
2001 was due to a change of Swiss regulations, which required
the use of a new flight management system (FMS) and suspended
the license for 061 until such time as that FMS had been
acquired. Dassault was not ready to acquire the new FMS
until the latter half of 2001, and the installation,
training, and testing occupied almost six months.


10. (C) NOTE: A second period, from Oct. 10, 2002 until March
14, 2003, lacks any activity records at all. This may call
into doubt the authenticity of the log book, as that period
saw considerable diplomatic activity by the government of
Iraq. It is possible that during this period of time, the
government of Jordan may have clamped down on GOI use of
Jordanian facilities, including their airports, and Iraqis
may therefore used assets based elsewhere to aid their
travel. If the log book is not authentic, however, the crew
probably would have needed professional help to create a
forgery of such quality. END NOTE.


11. (SBU) According to the log and to their own accounts,
Ahmad and Al-Jarrah spent the first part of 2003 training on
061 in Switzerland. At the beginning of the war, their
funding dried up, and they flew 061 back to Marka Airport,
where they parked it and left, taking the key and the flight
log book, which they still retain. 061 has remained on the
tarmac at Marka airport since that time.

--------------
Moving Forward
--------------


12. (SBU) Sultan, who has continued to monitor the condition
of 061 since March 2003, believes that the airplane is in
perfect condition except for the engines, two of which belong
to Dassault and all of which will need to be overhauled or
replaced due to lack of use. Dassault is currently holding
two of 061,s original engines (#1 and #3),which Dassault
had refurbished prior to March 2003. He estimates the cost
of engine replacement and of rent and fees for degradation of
Dassault,s engine at US$60,000. In addition to this amount,
there are outstanding balances associated with the aircraft
at Dassault ($30,000) and at Jet Aviation ($10,000).
Demurrage/parking charges for the airplane, according to
Jordan CAA Director-General Hanna Najjar, will be approx.
$23,940. On the other hand, Sultan is confident that if the
money is found for the long-term repairs and other charges,
he and his men will be able to get 061 in working order at
least temporarily, so that it can be safely flown to France
to have its engines replaced.


13. (SBU) Al-Jarrah and Ahmad, who currently are without work
and likely not being paid above subsistence by Iraqi Airways,
want to fly 061 again. They have three concerns, however.
First, their certification to fly the Falcon-50 has expired.
Second, they worry that 061 has somehow been exposed to
radiological material. They base this fear on the fact that
two of the three pilots who were assigned to 061 in 1993-4
have died of cancer. Al-Jarrah, the third of these pilots,
appears to suffer from a muscular disorder of some type.
Iraqi Airways contacted the Jordanian Royal Scientific
Society (RSS) to carry out radiation testing on 061 in
December 2003, and the head of the Iraqi Airways office in
Amman claims that the RSS gave 061 a clean bill of health.


14. (C) The third concern of the pilots regarded the
expiration of the Jordanian passports that they had held ever
since they were assigned to the Falcon-50. Ahmad,s initial
passport and Al-Jarrah,s most recent renewal had both been
issued, with five years' validity, in fall 1998. As the
passports expired last fall, both men were very anxious that
new Jordanian passports be issued them, because "the people
we dealt with used to know us as Jordanians." NOTE: It is not
clear to us on what basis the Jordanian passports were
initially issued. END NOTE.

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Comment
--------------


15. (C) Assuming that the account of the crew of the 061 is
basically truthful, the Government of Iraq is clearly the
beneficial owner of 061. While the account would not
constitute proof in a legal sense of actual ownership of the
aircraft, the evidentiary standard imposed by the government
of Liechtenstein in the case appears to be rather lower.
Post also stands ready to provide upon request, to all other
interested parties within the U.S. government, a variety of
documents turned over to post by Iraqi Airways. These
include photocopies of the flight log, a certificate of Swiss
registry for 061, a sample invoice sent from Jet Aviation to
Iraqi Airways for operating services provided by Jet
Aviation, and signed statements from Ahmad and from Sultan
attesting to the veracity of information (spelled out in the
statements) provided by them on the history of 061 and of its
links to the GOI.


17. (C) It should be noted that the credibility of this
source remains at issue. The crew members were by their own
admission working for the Iraqi regime prior to regime
change, though they claim that they were not Ba,athists.
However, they may have substantial reason to distort the
truth of the history of 061 in order to protect themselves.
If this extended to sanitizing the log book of 061, as seems
possible, they would have likely needed outside assistance to
do so. While the preceding account of the history of 061 may
serve as the necessary evidence to arrange the transfer of an
asset that everyone agrees is Iraqi, it should not be
regarded as necessarily accurate in its particulars.
GNEHM