MOVING AHEAD WITH NIGERIA ON THE EVIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 000393 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E FOR ANNE PENCE EB/IFD/OIA FOR MARSHA KELLEY AND TIM HAUSER INL/C FOR DAVID LUNA AND JOHN BRANDOLINO E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV KCOR ETRD NI SUBJECT: MOVING AHEAD WITH NIGERIA ON THE EVIAN TRANSPARENCY/ANTI-CORRUPTION PILOT PROGRAM REF: A. STATE 33364 ¶B. ABUJA 35 ¶C. STATE 350 ¶D. MAXSTADT-HAUSER TELCON 2/24/04 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, NOT FOR POSTING ON THE INTRANET OR INTERNET. -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Finance Minister Ngozi and Presidential Advisor Ezekwesili have given Post concrete expression of Nigerian government interest in a G-8 transparency/anti-corruption pilot program in January (Ref B),and reaffirmed that in February to Post and also in their meetings with U/S Larson at Davos. Post believes it is necessary to move forward with the Evian program, given that Nigeria has been identified as an Evian pilot country and that EITI is already publicly moving forward in Nigeria under the GON, British and World Bank (Ref C). Partly to ensure that EITI does not get too far ahead of the Evian framework, Post has been coordinating with G-8 missions, the World Bank and IMF here, and will host all of them March 17 for a coordination meeting. ¶2. (SBU) Per the Reftelcon D request for ideas on the way forward, Post believes it possible to begin a G-8 coordinating body in Abuja at the March 17 meeting, to begin negotiations with the GON on the joint Political Statement as soon as Department instructions are received, and to aim for negotiations thereafter to produce the consolidated G-8/GON Technical Plan -- before the G-8 summit if desirable. Nigeria is different from the other Evian pilot countries in that: -- Several G-8 members, and the World Bank and IMF, already have major transparency/anti-corruption programs in place in Nigeria, and thus the Technical Plan exercise will be more looking for small gaps and negotiating GON milestones than the start-from- scratch program approach necessary in other countries. -- Because of Nigeria's importance and the size of the major transparency/anti-corruption programs in place, G- 8 Embassies, Missions and the World Bank already have political and technical capacity on the ground to conduct both of the negotiations. -- The GON has already named an anti-corruption czar, Dr. Ezekwesili, and is already moving forward through her on EITI. End Summary. -------------- WHERE WE STAND WITH NIGERIA -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Events are moving rapidly in Nigeria, with or without us. The same senior Nigerian Government (GON) officials have told U/S Larson and us in February that Nigeria is interested in being a pilot country for the Evian transparency/anti-corruption program. Those senior GON officials are already doing many of the things they would do under an Evian pilot program, including EITI, whether we do an Evian pilot program or not. G-8 countries have extensive transparency/anti- corruption programs here, again whether or not Nigeria is an Evian pilot. ¶4. (SBU) The gains we make in having an Evian program here are that it would coordinate these activities, and commit the GON to specific milestones and performance. Post does not envision much if any additional USG funding above the considerable programs already funded, and our consultations with other G-8 countries, the World Bank and IMF lead us to believe little additional will come from them for similar reasons. It is more likely -- and here we are unlike the smaller country pilots -- that the Evian technical plan with Nigeria will identify small gaps we will seek to fill with small funding, first from Canada, Japan and Russia which have Embassies here but no anti-corruption programs. ¶5. (SBU) Coordination will be critical. EITI is already far in front, having been launched publicly and already working on policy issues (Ref B). The GON is pushing ahead on EITI for its own reasons, and delay on Evian will make it appear separate and make coordination more difficult. Transparency/anti- corruption programs are a growth industry in Nigeria, and we must also use Evian to map out the G-8's combined existing programs to prevent duplication and to prevent forum-shopping by Nigerians. ¶6. (SBU) Most existing G-8 members' transparency/anti- corruption programs have performance benchmarks, but they tend to be limited results from the particular program instead of overall progress and performance toward transparency and against corruption. The G-8 Evian pilot program will give us opportunities in the G- 8/GON Political Statement and in the comprehensive Technical Plan to work with the GON on broader performance-oriented milestones. -------------- WHERE WE GO FROM HERE -- COORDINATION -------------- ¶7. (SBU) To keep up, Embassy Abuja is already coordinating with other G-8 members, the World Bank and IMF here in Abuja. Post is working with them to draw up a comprehensive list of existing G-8 member programs, and compare their goals to find synergies. At the meeting Embassy Abuja will host on March 17, we will ask our G-8 colleagues for their ideas on timeline and mechanisms for working with the GON under Evian. We originally planned this Abuja coordinating body to coordinate the growth in the various countries' transparency/anti-corruption programs here with a mind to using it for Evian if Nigeria became a pilot. With EITI already making progress, that coordination will become critical. -------------- POLITICAL STATEMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The farther Evian is behind EITI, the more difficult the G-8/GON joint Political Statement will be to accomplish. EITI is already mapping out milestones with the Nigerians; Evian could be limited to those milestones if we do not begin similar work soon with the Nigerians on a broader Political Statement. The GON's continuing effort on their own new programs will have a similar limiting effect on our room to maneuver. Moreover, at some point the GON could begin to see an Evian pilot program with Nigeria as unlikely to be consummated, considering that they have been expressing interest for months without further action from us. ¶9. (SBU) Neither we nor the British, for different reasons, have given the GON the "Indicative Statement" model from paragraph 10 of Ref A. We did not after learning (Reftelcon D) that another model is being discussed by Washington and London. The British did not because their instructions to do so came after the Sous Sherpa meeting February 17-18, and the instructions said to do so before that meeting. Both we and the British have gone over the gist of that model with GON interlocutors since. ¶10. (SBU) Post believes negotiating the Political Statement can be done by G-8 member staff already in Nigeria, augmented by experts from Washington if desired, soon after we get the new instructions. All G- 8 members here have sizable Embassy political/economic staffs and expertise on transparency/anti-corruption issues that are already a priority for most of them. USAID and DFID have large democracy and governance units in Abuja with senior American and British staff devoted to planning and running their existing transparency/anti-corruption programs. ¶11. (SBU) Post believes negotiations on the Political Statement should start with the GON in March, so Evian does not get farther behind. One benefit of the G-8 having so many transparency/anti-corruption programs already in Abuja is that we can work up much of the technical program mapping among G-8 members here while we negotiate the Political Statement with the Nigerians, allowing for faster work with the GON on the comprehensive Technical Plan. -------------- TECHNICAL PLAN -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The process will be: -- Map out existing G-8 programs in Nigeria (already underway). -- Map out existing GON transparency/anti-corruption programs. -- Find the gaps where those two sets do not coincide, seeking to expand GON efforts where the G-8/World Bank/IMF are able to help and seeking to fill gaps where GON programs could use help that G-8 countries are willing to add. Canada, Japan and Russia are doing no such programs in Nigeria now, and perhaps could fill some of those small niches. -- Most important, seek agreement with the GON on milestones for overall progress and performance. -------------- FIRST TO MARKET ADVANTAGES -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Post sees several opportunities from moving forward quickly, most of them basically "first to market" advantages: -- The Political Statement and Technical Plan can be done much faster in Nigeria than in the other pilot countries, because so much already exists here, and Nigeria's Statement and Plan can serve as models in both form and process for the others. -- Likewise, a Nigeria pilot that can produce Political Statement and Technical Plan before the G-8 Summit will show off the Evian program to non-pilot countries, as well as be a coup for the USG as Summit host. -- Programs packaged in that way for Nigeria can be models for programs by other donors in other countries. ¶14. (SBU) The flip side is also true. If Evian does not move forward in Nigeria as EITI has and is, all of those advantages will apply to EITI alone instead of EITI as part of Evian. ROBERTS