S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002106

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM ETRD EAID KCOR NI
SUBJECT: ENGAGING NIGERIA: SUPPORT FOR REFORMS

REF: A. ABUJA 1989


B. ABUJA 1939

C. ABUJA 685

D. ABUJA 2041 AND 2042

E. ABUJA 828

F. ABUJA 937

G. 03 ABUJA 2184

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOMAS P. FUREY FOR REASONS 1.5 (B), (
D), AND (E)

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Summary
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1. (S) The grip of the interlocked coteries that have ruled
Nigeria since the civil war (ref A) continues to be the
driving force in Nigerian politics. In order for Nigeria to
move ahead, this grip must be loosened. Until Nigerians gain
a real stake in their own society, they cannot begin to care
deeply about the political arrangements that affect them.
Mission has identified a series of actions intended to
accomplish three discrete, but overlapping tasks: a) break
up the coteries; b) help the "modernizers;" and c) enable
Nigerian economic development and prosperity. These three
elements will be focused on breaking the coteries' hold, but
should be balanced to limit the institutional disruption that
pursuing one without the other could bring. Any success in
dismantling the groups will support the efforts of Nigeria's
"modernizers:" its next generation of leaders who say they
want to break Nigeria's pattern of entrenched corruption.
These modernizers come from throughout the country and are
generally younger, western-educated technocrats, much like
the current regime's economic "dream team." When the
coteries are weakened, economic and political development
will become possible. The following initiatives have been
identified by the Mission:

Breaking up Coteries

-- Engage and Lobby National Assembly on Political and
Financial Reform Measures (Para 4 and 5)
-- Shift Technical Focus to Embedded Experts (Para 6)
-- Fund MPRI Civil-Military Program (Para 9)
-- Restart IMET (Para 10)

Supporting "Modernizers"

-- Support Political Parties (Para 14)
-- Assist Civil Society (Para 15)
-- Encourage Judiciary (Para 16)

Enabling Economic Development

--

Continue Visas Donkey Program (Para 19)
-- Design Debt Relief Linkages (Para 20)
-- Facilitate AGOA Investment (Para 23)

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Breaking the Coteries - Political
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2. (S) Despite its federal structure, the Nigerian political
system is highly centralized with most of the power residing
in the Presidency. Nigeria's political culture is a legacy
of military rule, colonial governance, and many of the
indigenous forms of government that preceded the current
political arrangement. Decisions, and even non-decisions,
cannot be made without the President's approval, the National
Assembly was largely handpicked as supporters of the
President, and the Judiciary remains under threat both from
the corrupt members within its own ranks and attacks by the
GON when court decisions do not conform to the whims of
government. With total control of the budget resting in the
Presidency (a nod to the National Assembly currently provides
for the barest of oversight authority), almost every funding
decision has the potential to be both a political sop to
supporters and a club with which to intimidate critics.
Encouraging the executive branch to behave as a partner in
Nigeria's development rather than a (sometimes rather stern)
father would encourage cooperation from the other levels of
government.


3. (S) It is important to develop the National Assembly as
an institution capable of holding the GON's executive branch
accountable for its actions. While elements in the current
National Assembly appear to be paying more attention to
oversight of government officials and budgets, in the current
dispensation the National Assembly remains weak and provides
little effective oversight. Many believe the quality of the
Assembly declined significantly with the 2003 elections. The
1999 legislature included many well-known politicians who are
now gone (some 80% of the politicians who received USG
technical assistance in the 1999 legislature are now out of
office).


4. (S) The U.S. should engage the National Assembly on a
packet of measures that would strengthen oversight of the
Presidency, increase the prospects for a democratic election
in the future, and further professionalize the military (see
next sections for specific approaches to the military).
First, the USG should aid in the establishment and operation
of a National Assembly budget office, in close cooperation
with the UK and other international donors, particularly the
European Union and the World Bank. In conjunction with this
effort, a strong lobbying effort should be mounted to
encourage the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill to
provide oversight over expenditures at every level.

5. (S) A second, simultaneous lobbying effort could also
tackle the military's system of preferential promotions.
Enacting guidelines that ensured promotions based on
competence and ability, rather than on ethnic affiliation and
political ties, would support other USG efforts to instill
high professional standards.


6. (S) Most GON ministries are ineffective, existing more to
provide employment than to take action. The Presidency is
the sole decision point for the GON. In spite of this, parts
of the Ministries of Health and Education are able to operate
effectively, to some degree, and should receive U.S. support.
The most effective support is in the form of embedded
technical assistance, but it is important that the U.S.
actually be able to provide the embedded staff. It is also
important to build in some level of control and influence
over the processes to which these experts contribute.
Alternatively, there should be no compunction about
criticizing when best practices are subverted for private
gain. Junkets provide no benefits, and the U.S. should not
provide additional plane tickets to GON bureaucrats.


7. (S) The states receive half of all GON revenue, and
implementation of GON programs rests heavily with the states.
Several states stand out as more effective than the rest and
deserve U.S. support: Gombe, Bauchi, Katsina, Cross Rivers,
Kaduna, Lagos, Kwara, and the Federal Capital Territory
(Abuja) among them. A few other states stand out for their
lack of demonstrated commitment to improvement and should be
avoided: among them Ogun, Adamawa, Plateau, Rivers, Delta,
Zamfara, and Benue.

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Breaking the Coteries - Military
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8. (S) Military corruption is heavily ingrained; long-term
reform is necessary to help address the problem.
Regularizing military procurement, pay, contracts, and
operational expenditures will greatly reduce the scope and
opportunity for large-scale corruption. However, many people
benefit from the current system, so radical changes will
require significant support from politicians and the middle
echelons of the armed forces. The Civil-Military Program,
IMET, and other professional training form the best route for
success, but a long journey is required for effective change.
The military reflects society at large, so a reduction in
military-specific corruption can only reasonably be expected
within the framework of larger governmental and societal
changes.


9. (S) The MPRI Civil-Military Program, which has lapsed due
to the GON's failure to fund its project obligations, is
important enough that the U.S. should consider fully funding
it, regardless of the GON's lack of contribution. The
Civil-Military Program focuses on reform and modernization
within the military, civilian control, resource management,
legislative relations, and training management. Even though
there were funding problems, a group of "modernizers" within
the Nigerian military and the National Assembly recognizes
the value and necessity of the reforms being worked on by the
Civil-Military Program.


10. (S) With the lifting of the Feingold sanctions on
military assistance, the remaining obstacle to ongoing
military cooperation is the Leahy sanctions. Continuing
sanctions have led to a downward trend in funding for
Nigerian military assistance, and a waiver or lifting of
Leahy sanctions is necessary for effective defense
cooperation. The sanctions have shut down IMET training, one
of the USG's most useful and effective means of positively
influencing military officers. Our priority should be to
restart the IMET program.


11. (S) EUCOM has proposed to track oil bunkering vessels,
but intelligence sharing is only part of the equation: the
GON would need to take action on the intelligence received,
so Nigerian buy-in on the EUCOM proposal is essential to its
success. However, since participation in bunkering runs to
the highest levels of the GON, full buy-in by the GON is
unlikely. Raising this issue could be problematic for both
sides, with the USG unwilling to share significant portions
of intelligence and the GON unwilling to act in areas that
hurt the elites who are deriving the illicit benefits.

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Supporting the "Modernizers"
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12. (S) When searching for "modernizers," Obasanjo's
economic "dream team" exhibits the desired traits--education,
experience, and international reputation--but Obasanjo's team
has little public support within Nigeria. A wider group of
business and political leaders exists apart from the Obasanjo
team and has little interaction with it. This group of
"modernizers" is generally supportive of the goals stated by
Obasanjo and could assist in selling a credible reform
program, promoting ethical guidelines, and pulling Nigeria's
political economy from its 20-year miasma. Composed
primarily of professionals from all elements of society, the
"modernizers" are also in agreement that the ongoing excesses
of the past 30 years need to be addressed. Some take part in
politics, others in business; most are not at the forefront
of the political battle shaping up for 2007. This group,
currently operating outside the Nigerian political limelight,
must be encouraged to contribute to Nigeria's future. The
following policy initiatives are designed to encourage
broader participation by this target group.


13. (S) AID targets three areas for assistance to strengthen
Nigeria's electoral process: INEC, Nigeria's political
parties, and domestic election monitors. It is a matter of
debate whether to continue to support the Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC), given the serious flaws
in the 2003 elections, and especially INEC's testimony in the
Buhari tribunal that it saw no need to be independent (ref
B). Without legislation strengthening INEC's independence
and removing its funding from political caprice, little or no
improvement can be expected over the dismal 2003/2004
election cycle. However, "throwing out the baby with the
bathwater" would also not serve U.S. interests. The USG
should remain engaged with INEC and seek to secure a more
cooperative working relationship with its officials.


14. (S) As currently established, the political parties in
Nigeria range from irrelevant (the 26 mini-parties) to
regional/ethnic based (APGA and AD) to groups of elite
seeking to maintain control over Nigeria's resources (PDP and
ANPP). It is important to support the development of party
platforms based on an ideological and/or programmatic agenda.
USAID is currently supporting the International Republican
Institute (IRI) in political party development.


15. (S) Providing continuing support to civil society will
be a key activity for the U.S. in preparation for the 2007
elections and is one of the most important deliverables among
our programs. While most "civil society" organizations are
not representative of their purported constituencies, many
have talented and dedicated staff. To ensure that the 2007
elections are monitored by local observers, much more
development and training needs to take place. It is critical
that Economic Support Funds (ESF) are released by the
Department to fund programs that support a transparent and
accountable electoral process, and that engage civil society
in that process.


16. (S) In Ref C, Post recommended ways to support rule of
law in Nigeria. We need to focus on good governance and
transparency, both economic and political, and we should make
our attention toward these issues public, including
commentary on positive and negative actions by the judiciary.
Public support for the process, and not for individuals, is
an important aspect. Obversely, private criticism of
failures should de-emphasize the process and focus on the
individual. Depersonalizing our public approach will allow
us to maintain relations with all the players in the process
and encourage some to improve. Efforts to empower the
judiciary are critical for both the nation and for the
"modernizers," but we have little in the way of programming
to offer. The judiciary, out of the mainstream for many
years and viewed as a tool of the "powers that be," can
respond to and be empowered by public encouragement. An
added benefit is an expected improvement in the USG's image,
helping to persuade the increasingly alienated citizens of
Nigeria that the USG cares that they have a stake in the
process.


17. (S) Twelve Nigerian states have adopted Shari'a, or
Islamic law. In order to prevent abuses of Shari'a,
particularly cruel and unusual punishment, the U.S. should
continue to provide assistance to local Islamic organizations
that provide legal assistance to Shari'a defendants. The
U.S. should not be publicly involved in this effort, however;
to do so would strengthen those interested in imposing an
intolerant version of Shari'a. The U.S. should increase
opportunities for interaction between American and Nigerian
Muslims, while avoiding direct confrontation over the legal
code.


18. (S) It is essential to continue public outreach efforts,
especially by maintaining Post's publications such as
"Crossroads" and its Hausa counterpart "Magama." We should
expand the American Corners program, and should regularly
poll public opinion to monitor the success of our activities.

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Enabling Economic Development
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19. (S) Corruption is such a pervasive issue in Nigerian
society that it must be addressed. If the U.S. rewards the
modernizers, it must also penalize the transgressors. A key
element here is to expand the Visas Donkey program that Post
began implementing in December (Ref D). The U.S. should also
comment publicly and regularly to encourage prosecutions for
all corruption.


20. (S) The U.S. should consider options relative to debt
relief for Nigeria, linking debt relief to transparency with
no immediate commitment (Ref F). Any assistance provided to
the GON should come with an appropriately strong level of
Nigerian public oversight and access to the processes (not to
be confused with oversight and access by NGOs, which are part
of the system and often not Nigerian).


21. (S) In Ref E, Post recommended ways to reduce tensions
that lead to ethnic conflict and other communal violence.
The U.S. should treat Nigeria's many Rule of Law problems not
as blemishes in its system of governance, but rather as
fundamental breakdowns. The U.S. should make strong
representations advocating that the GON establish Rule of Law
generally in areas now dominated by heavily armed militias.
For the Delta, we will first need a consensus with the oil
majors that security must be established by the GON and not
through local partners. We can approach other friends of
Nigeria to weigh in as well. The U.S. should take a stand
that Nigeria's state governments must extend the Rule of Law
to their "non-indigene" citizens, people categorized legally
as having family origins in another Nigerian state.
President Obasanjo, along with other luminaries, has publicly
called for Nigerians to stop discriminating along
indigene/non-indigene lines, and U.S. spokesmen can echo his
call.


22. (S) The U.S. should raise the priority for the GON's
establishing a workable land use and easement registration
system. A workable system is a necessity for Rule of Law to
resolve land disputes at the heart of several of Nigeria's
so-called ethnic and religious conflicts, and it will yield
additional benefits in improving the GON's tax and utilities
revenue collection and in capital formation. An element of
such an overhaul needs to include a rationalization of
governmental land holdings. A rational system of land
registration and usage should lead to the divestiture of many
federal and state land holdings, further reducing the
opportunity for graft in the preferential distribution of
prime properties.


23. (S) The U.S. should work to improve the environment for
U.S. investment in Nigerian industries interested in
exporting to the U.S. under the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA). The GON would have to commit in
advance to facilitating such investment, and Post believes a
USDOC advocacy program on behalf of other U.S. firms seeking
to make greenfield investments in Nigeria would help (Ref G).


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Wrap-Up
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24. (S) Until Nigerians gain a real stake in their own
society, they cannot begin to affect their own political
arrangements. The "modernizers" are Nigeria's best hope for
developing a sustainable, stable Nigeria. While currently
marginalized by the prevalence of the ruling coteries, this
group of like-thinkers has yet to give up hope. If the USG
encourages a more open electoral system and cleaner economy,
the Nigerians who continue calling for representative and
accountable governance could be emboldened. Some elements of
this program have the potential to introduce a degree of
uncertainty into the Nigerian polity...but failure to act
already has.
FUREY