DELTA VIOLENCE: KEEPING OUR POWDER DRY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 001673 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2014 TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV EPET PINS CASC ASEC NI DELTAVIOLENCE SUBJECT: DELTA VIOLENCE: KEEPING OUR POWDER DRY REF: A. LAGOS 1982 AND PREVIOUS ¶B. ABUJA 1656 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. ABUJA 1486 Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). ¶1. (S) Summary: Although the military situation has been relatively quiet the past few days, there is much political movement among the major players. A senior Defense Ministry source confirmed press reports that militia leader Asari, whom GON forces were trying to kill last week, is in Abuja today, September 29, to meet with President Obasanjo. For now, the situation is too fluid for meaningful USG action, and militia leader Asari's targeting of expatriates and oil production could be ended by a deal even before the targeting was to take effect October 1. That targeting could also, however, become more real (only Shell has reduced staff so far, not even a full drawdown),and in any case there will remain the deeper and wider problem of: -- the well-armed militias, -- the GON's not putting them out of business, -- their (USD 1 billion-plus) business stealing oil that funds both militias and GON officials; and -- the long-term threat of this environment to U.S. citizens and oil imports. End Summary. ¶2. (S) Dokubo Asari's militia, one of many in Nigeria's oil-rich Delta, this week threatened expatriate oil workers and demanded a halt to oil production from October 1 until the GON meets his demands for political and economic changes in the Delta. The GON has attacked his militia the past few weeks, but he and it are still at large and capable of attacking oil company workers and facilities. His threats may be political theater, however, and a political resolution to his personal grievances could occur at any time. ¶3. (S) Today, September 29, Asari is in Abuja to meet with President Obasanjo. The political situation among the GON, the Delta's well-armed militias, and the politicians who use those militias such as Governor Odili, moves rapidly. The past two days have been relatively quiet militarily, perhaps as the various players recheck their alliances and the balance of power on the ground. ChevronTexaco's Managing Director for Nigeria told us September 28 that he is more worried about human rights violations and collateral damage from GON operations against Asari's militia than about the threat from Asari's militia. DATT TRIP TO PORT HARCOURT ¶4. (S) The Defense Attache and DAO/MARA staff visited Port Harcourt September 27-28. The city had the outward appearance of normalcy, with a very minimal security force presence on the streets. The people there reported an intensification of military activity and militia violence over the past three weeks, including GON formation of a "joint military task force." One DAO contact indicated that on September 8, Asari and the GON had agreed on a ceasefire that held about a week, only to be broken by military action o/a September 15 when a military MI-35 helicopter attacked a number of localities in the vicinity of Tombia and Buguma, approximately 30km southeast of Port Harcourt. An RSO contact indicated that this was part of a planned 90-day military campaign to eliminate Asari. ¶5. (S) Estimates of the strength of Asari's militia ranged from a few hundred to a few thousand. One DAO contact described a meeting of the militia's "central command" on September 27 to decide the group's next steps, attended by 312 "commanders." OUTLOOK FOR USG ACTION ¶6. (S) Post believes the situation is too fluid for meaningful USG action on Asari at this time. Over the next weeks, maybe days, the situation may bring major changes. The critical point now is that the GON does not have sufficient forces in the Delta to finish off Asari's militia on the battlefield now or for the next few weeks, hence only political deals or Asari's capture/death would fundamentally change the threat from his militia. Asari's fate, in turn, could make the Delta somewhat worse, but certainly will not resolve the overall Delta threat above (see Ref C). CAMPBELL