RIVERS STATE FLARES UP AGAIN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001656 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2014 TAGS: PREL PGOV NI ASEC DELTAVIOLENCE SUBJECT: RIVERS STATE FLARES UP AGAIN REF: A. ABUJA 1486 ¶B. LAGOS 1892 ¶C. LAGOS 1820 Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Delta continues as a flashpoint of communal/political problems in Nigeria. The political and economic environment there has given rise to competing gangs of criminals, militias and political opportunists (Ref A). President Obasanjo has spoken of a desire for a peaceful solution to the crises, but a recent GON assault on one of the militias threatens to terminate the possibility for a negotiated solution to the problems and bodes ill for the future. The fighting has gone far beyond a dispute between gangs (Ref C),involves the governor of the state, and is not business as usual. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) The Delta region continues to be the flashpoint of communal/political problems for Nigeria and President Obasanjo. The political manipulation from the 2003 elections created an environment that fostered confrontation in a region already prone to altercations, and overflowing with well-armed militias funded by major oil thieves that are major political players (Ref A). In the recent spate of attacks and counterattacks in Rivers state, the Port Harcourt area -- the center of Nigeria's oil industry -- has become the epicenter of the most critical problem in the region. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (C) The entire Delta area remains prone to ethnic violence that can be divided into three distinct issues: a) marginalization of the Ogonis and other minorities in the east; b) intra-Ijaw and political problems in the center, and c) conflict between the Ijaw, Itsekiri and Urhobo in the west. There are also four types of armed militias to undertake that violence: ethnic, cults, criminal, and political. While each militia is often a mix of them, they have their own dynamics and very different goals. Most credible observers attribute a very small percentage of the conflict to actual "cult" violence. The term cult, properly describing indigenous religious practices, is sometimes used freely by Nigerian officials to refer to criminal and ethnic militia activity in order to misdirect responsibility and heighten the fear and concern of residents. The eastern and western conflicts in the Delta are properly attributed primarily to ethnic tensions over economic issues, and fueled by criminal activity. The Port Harcourt conflict, while described as "cultism" by the GON, is more properly attributed to the possibilities for personal enrichment through criminal and political activity, and occurs primarily within the Ijaw tribe. NEW MILITARY OPERATIONS -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) Ambassador and Poloff spoke recently to an Australian national who originally came to Nigeria as a consultant for Shell Oil and is now freelancing, and who also claims a close relationship with President Obasanjo by having served as Obasanjo's intermediary separate from official government channels. He said he had been able to arrange discussions between Obasanjo and Alhaji Dokubo Asari, leader of one of the militias in Rivers state. The Australian said they had reportedly agreed on or about September 7 to a ceasefire and to negotiations headed by EFCC Chairman Nuhu Ribadu on Ribadu's return from an overseas trip. On September 16, only a couple of days before that first negotiations, a source close to Asari reported that the Nigerian military had just launched a new campaign "aimed at eliminating him" (Ref C). ¶5. (S/NF) Sources in the Asari camp say that the attack was "expected" and that the fighters were able to disperse into the jungle. That and earlier fighting in and around Port Harcourt has primarily been a power struggle between two major power brokers, Rivers State Governor Peter Odili and his former henchman Asari. Asari now questions both his safety and Obasanjo's sincerity, and reportedly says he will only conduct negotiations by one of his many cell phones. One contact reported that Asari told him "this is personal and I will shock Nigeria." He has also threatened to storm Rivers capital Port Harcourt and occupy "Government House," and assassinate Rivers Governor Odili even at the expense of his own life. ¶6. (S/NF) A lone press article in the newspaper "This Day" on September 17 reported the fighting, but a member of Asari's group and a State Security Service (SSS) officer stationed at the Presidential Villa in Abuja confirmed the facts. The various reports agree that a major operation was launched by "land, sea and air" and that the battle has not gone well for the Nigerian military. While some sources claim that 200 soldiers have been killed, our SSS source could only confirm 200 "casualties" among the military. "The situation is grave," he said, "and every effort is being made to keep it out of the press." This SSS source said Chief of Staff Gen. Ogomudia has assumed personal command of the ongoing operation and at least 500 soldiers are involved. Reinforcements are expected from Calabar, perhaps as many as 400 more men. The SSS source related that he was present at a September 21 meeting at the Villa where Ogomudia lashed out at SSS head Kayode Are and Chief of Army Staff Martin Agwai, shouting that "if you don't know how to handle this, I will do it myself." ¶7. (C) It appears the fighting has slowed since September 21, but the situation is still unsettled. According to a journalist in Abuja, many reporters in Port Harcourt have been detained, slapped and "threatened directly" with bodily harm if they pursue the story of the military operation. Rumors have emerged about the use of "chemical weapons" but remain rumors at this point. The use of any sophisticated CW is highly unlikely, but tear gas is plentiful in Nigeria. ONE MAN'S ASSESSMENT -------------- ¶8. (S/NF) The Australian consultant gave Ambassador and Poloff an overall assessment of the region that meshes closely with Embassy's (Ref A). The consultant said that Obasanjo has finally realized that the problems in the Delta would not succumb to a military solution alone. For this reason, Obasanjo has been seeking dialog in order to halt the violence. The Australian also claimed that Obasanjo has "realized that Governor Odili is a crook and a large part of the problem." With that in mind, Obasanjo reportedly asked the source to facilitate bartered settlements for the various conflicts. ¶9. (S/NF) With the intervention of the "Coventry Cathedral Group" in Ogoniland, some of the disputes in the eastern Delta appeared "headed for a solution," the Australian averred. Obasanjo reportedly met with MOSOP (Movement for the Sovereignty of the Ogoni People) leader Ledum Mittee recently and agreed on engagement to resolve ongoing disputes. In the western Delta, there is a ceasefire between many combatants but breaches are becoming more common. The ethnic and political dimension of this dispute renders it difficult to resolve with an overhaul of the political system at some level. The Australian said that Obasanjo is not concentrating on this issue at the moment, and militants from the Ijaw and from the O'odua Peoples Congress have not been fighting in the area for some months. Still, delays in incorporating political gains could create friction again in the near future (Ref B). ¶10. (S/NF) While the east and west appear to be comparatively quiet for the moment, the center is boiling. Recent military actions demonstrate the potential for this conflict to create even bigger headaches than the other two have been. According to Obasanjo,s Australian consultant, the center part of the Delta region, in Rivers and Bayelsa states, is the most troubling problem. While Governor Odili has blamed Asari for the violence, Asari claims that the clashes in and around Port Harcourt were carried out by the leader of another militia, Ateke Tom, and another militia called the Okrika Peacemakers operating out of Bayelsa since Tom drove them from Rivers. ¶11. (S/NF) The Australian judges that Obasanjo is hamstrung by domestic politics and but is generally receptive to innovative measures to limit the violence. He said Obasanjo was also receptive to an increased international presence in the Gulf to restore the GON's sovereignty and the Rule of Law. Obasanjo was looking for increased participation from the oil companies too, and supposedly would welcome "external powers" patrolling the region to combat the oil thieves/smugglers that the GON is unable to control. SOME HISTORY ON GOV. ODILI, ASARI AND TOM -------------- ¶12. (C) When Nigeria held its 1999 election, Odili reportedly hired Asari and another strongman, Ateke Tom, to ensure the PDP victory in Rivers State. A Rivers State security official admitted recently that she had been instrumental in hiring Asari and was aware of, but not involved in, hiring Tom. Asari was also able to assist Bayelsa Governor Alamieyeseigha in winning his state for the PDP. By the time the 2003 elections took place, Asari was having second thoughts about working for Odili and Obasanjo, and said he was basing his change of heart on Obasanjo's perceived neglect of the oil region during his first term in office. ¶13. (C) Asari claims to have been a part of rigging the Rivers, Bayelsa and Akwa Ibom elections in favor of the PDP and admits to carrying out attacks on government and oil installations in the regions. He justifies his attacks by saying that he wants to "liberate" Okrika-speaking areas, claiming an 1893 treaty with the UK recognized the independence of the region. He says that the way out of the "illegal amalgamation" of the Nigerian state is for a national conference and referendum on the continuation of the federation. Since his defection from Odili's camp, he has vowed to "crush" Tom and Odili. COMMENT -------------- ¶14. (S/NF) President Obasanjo's intentions remain unclear. The alleged link between Obasanjo's son Gbenga and Gov. Odili and their involvement in oil smuggling and other activities is said by administration critics to have the President's blessing. While Governors have enough influence to gain military action -- one of the reasons President Obasanjo gave for sacking Plateau Governor Dariye was that Dariye did not quell militia fighting -- it is also unlikely that the military would have launched the September 16 assault on Asari against Obasanjo's direct orders. ¶15. (C) The situation around Port Harcourt remains, by all accounts, grave. At least hundreds have died, perhaps thousands wounded or made homeless, mostly innocent civilians. With Asari,s knowledge of the area and his determination to exact a measure of revenge, the fighting is not likely to end soon. CAMPBELL